
Behind the $1.5 Billion Crypto Heist: On-Chain Batman Rips Apart North Korean Hackers' Money Laundering Network
Written by: Andjela Radmilac
Translated by: Saoirse, Foresight News
In February 2025, North Korean hackers stole approximately $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency from Bybit. Although this hacking incident has received extensive reporting and analysis, little attention has been paid to its aftermath and the whereabouts of the stolen funds.
To move such a massive sum of illicit funds, the hackers rely on an entire network of contacts willing to handle stolen assets. This chain of relationships can be infiltrated with sufficient capital investment.
Pseudonymous blockchain investigator ZachXBT employed this exact method. He deployed 349,700 USDC, posing as a client for a Chinese-language money laundering network, and willingly accepted a 5% loss per trade. Ultimately, he obtained crucial leads tracing over $12 million in funds related to the Bybit theft; according to his own account, this information also assisted Tether in freezing 442,000 USDT.
His investigation uncovered a money laundering network. Based on his assessment, this network has laundered over $1 billion in illicit proceeds from North Korea's Lazarus Group crypto-theft incidents, including the funds from the recent Bybit attack.
This investigation points to a massive black market for illegal financial services, which U.S. authorities have been cracking down on for the past two years.
In September of the same year, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Xinbi Guarantee. The U.S. stated that since 2022, this exchange platform has processed over $24 billion in digital asset and fiat transactions through its own systems, with North Korean hackers being among the illicit entities utilizing its services.
The Treasury also noted that after Huione Group was sanctioned, criminals shifted their operations to Xinbi Guarantee to continue their illicit activities. This demonstrates that simply shutting down one trading platform cannot eradicate the underlying networks of connections and criminal demand.
Remarkably, breaching exchanges and stealing funds represent only the relatively simpler aspects of the entire crime chain. The true difficulty lies in converting the stolen cryptocurrency into fiat currency or other assets with actual purchasing power.
To achieve cashing out, hackers must rely on various payment services and grey-area contacts, which also provides investigators and regulators with an entry point for intervention.
The "Undercover Client" Who Deployed 349,700 USDC
On February 26, 2025, the FBI identified North Korean hackers as responsible for the Bybit theft under Operation TraderTraitor, issuing a warning that the stolen assets were being converted into Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies before being dispersed across thousands of blockchain addresses.
Although the hackers' identities were quickly established, finding the intermediary agents handling the illicit funds still required extensive investigative work.
ZachXBT stated that he observed in public Telegram and Discord groups that over 15 accounts were handling trades linked to the Bybit loot. This indicates that at least during certain stages of money laundering, intermediaries openly solicit business and broker transactions.
Contacting several of these accounts, he ultimately connected with a contact on Telegram known as Jimmy Green, who claimed to facilitate cross-chain cryptocurrency transfers.
ZachXBT revealed that on March 6, 2025, he transferred 349,700 USDC to a brand-new Ethereum address via this contact to swap ETH-based USDC for TRON-based USDT. To establish his cover as a genuine client, he accepted unfavorable exchange rates.
These 349,700 USDC served as operational capital for the trade, not a net loss incurred by the investigation; he was willing to absorb a 5% loss per transaction in exchange for intelligence inaccessible through standard on-chain analysis.
Such trades inherently carry risks: intermediaries could potentially abscond with the funds entirely.
Intermediaries relied upon by hackers might themselves turn traitorous and embezzle the illicit proceeds. With no legally binding commercial safeguards in place, reputation within the circle and personal connections become the core pillars sustaining this cooperation.
And precisely this dynamic provided ZachXBT with an opening to infiltrate: for service providers, clients willing to engage in repeated transactions hold significantly higher value.
Leveraging this undercover relationship, the information he gathered extended far beyond wallet addresses. Intermediaries would discuss fund transfer strategies with him prior to executing trades, allowing ZachXBT to cross-reference private communications against publicly available on-chain transaction records.
In one instance, the intermediary consulted him about moving funds to the Solana chain before the transaction even occurred. Additional exchange records and wallet linkage clues are believed to have helped him identify a large cluster of assets tied to the Bybit theft.
This marked a critical turning point in the investigation: on-chain data can only log transaction behaviors, yet it cannot verify the actors behind the trades or their true motivations. Private communication logs between counterparties serve as the core evidence for pinning down fund controllers and clarifying fund destinations.
Although ZachXBT’s findings do not perfectly align with official FBI records, this remains a highly significant investigative operation of recent years. It proves that tasks unattainable through blockchain data alone can be accomplished using relationship mapping and commercial correspondence evidence; similar methodologies show promise for application to other crypto-theft cases.
Tracing $12 Million ≠ Successfully Recovering $12 Million
ZachXBT stated that through his connection with Jimmy Green, he pinpointed a cluster of Bybit-linked funds distributed across multiple public chains, totaling over $12 million.
He further disclosed that Tether subsequently froze 442,000 USDT linked to the North Korean hacker case. This underscores that when stolen funds remain within issuer-controlled tokens like USDT and USDC, rapidly identifying compromised assets is vital for mitigating losses.
A distinction must be made between two sets of figures: tracing $12 million does not imply all of it was frozen; nor does the freezing of 442,000 USDT mean those tokens were already confiscated and returned to Bybit.
The figure of 442,000 USDT, along with its alleged connection to this investigation, stems solely from ZachXBT’s personal claims; Tether has previously announced larger-scale freezing operations targeting the Bybit theft.
A vast chasm exists between discovering stolen cryptocurrency, identifying handling intermediaries, and obtaining legal or technical control over the illicit funds.
Public blockchains themselves cannot prevent assets from being retransferred. The situation becomes considerably more complicated once funds pass through service platforms unwilling to cooperate with investigations or operating outside judicial jurisdiction.
Centrally issued stablecoins provide regulators with leverage: issuers possess administrative control and can restrict transfers to specific addresses. Native Bitcoin lacks any issuer-provided freezing mechanism; however, once authorities secure proper legal authorization, they can still seize Bitcoin held by custodial institutions or gain control over corresponding private keys.
This means investigations require not only precise tracking but also confirmation that the traced balances fall under the jurisdiction of institutions possessing both technical capabilities and law enforcement authority.
During Bybit’s asset recovery efforts, court injunctions combined with cooperation from financial intermediaries can restrict asset movement long after the theft, though full recovery cannot be guaranteed.
The core issue is that stolen cryptocurrency continuously splits and flows across different wallets, public chains, custodians, and counterparties. Each time funds traverse a new platform, recovery teams often must restart evidence collection and initiate fresh legal proceedings.
This explains why investigators can map fund flows yet remain powerless to halt subsequent transfers or reclaim the stolen assets.
A $4 Billion Cryptocurrency Money Laundering Enterprise
Laundering illicit funds through external intermediaries is not unique to the Bybit theft. U.S. law enforcement records indicate that authorities have long pursued various grey-market operations specifically designed to convert stolen cryptocurrency into assets usable by criminals.
In March 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted two Chinese nationals, Tian Yinyin and Li Jiadong, accusing them of laundering over $100 million worth of cryptocurrency, primarily derived from exchange hackings.
These allegations highlight that even without personally conducting the cyber intrusions, middlemen play a pivotal role throughout the criminal supply chain.
Treasury sanction announcements additionally revealed that Tian had converted nearly $1.4 million in Bitcoin into Apple iTunes prepaid gift cards. This demonstrates that the endpoints of money laundering chains need not involve complex cross-border financial services; ordinary retail reload cards are also exploited.
The same cash-out demand operates on a much larger scale across exchange platforms that broker deals between criminals and settlement, conversion, or payment service providers.
In May 2025, the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) designated Cambodia-based Huione Group as a primary money laundering institution of focus. Investigations found that between August 2021 and January 2025, the group laundered at least $4 billion in illicit proceeds.
Of this total, FinCEN confirmed that at least $37 million in cryptocurrency originated from North Korean cyber thefts, while the remainder stemmed from various investment frauds and online scams.
The $4 billion figure represents the total aggregate amount involved in all aforementioned crimes; the $37 million denotes the lowest verified valuation attributable specifically to North Korean-related illicit funds.
FinCEN’s assessment report highlighted severe deficiencies in the group’s anti-money laundering and customer identification verification protocols. The lack of due diligence allowed subsidiary entities to indirectly accept stolen funds from North Korean attacks.
The significance of this investigation extends far beyond individual transactions. When a single intermediary consistently provides payment rails, it effectively becomes shared criminal infrastructure for multiple syndicates, eliminating the need for each organization to independently build cash-out channels.
As substantial capital pools into such platforms, they inevitably become prime targets for sanctions, asset seizures, banking partnership terminations, and other law enforcement actions.
Huione Group’s trading platforms handled massive volumes of transactions and illicit business. Even after Telegram banned certain channels associated with the network, platform operators continued attempting to maintain operations.
Platform total transaction volume and FinCEN-verified illicit proceeds utilize fundamentally different statistical methodologies; not all funds flowing through the platform can be automatically classified as proven criminal loot.
Criminal Platforms Can Be Shut Down, But Criminal Clients Remain
The fundamental problem is that even if the infrastructure of illegal trading platforms is destroyed, the underlying criminal demand generating this business will not vanish as long as offenders can reach alternative service providers.
In June 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the seizure of backend cloud servers used by Huione Group subsidiaries. These servers were allegedly utilized to channel proceeds from fraud, cybercrime, and other illicit activities.
Operation followed earlier U.S. restrictions imposed on the group, specifically targeting the technical infrastructure supporting illicit fund transfers and asset concealment.
However, dismantling infrastructure does not automatically sever the link between criminal clients and order-taking intermediaries.
On September 9, Treasury sanction notices clearly exposed this limitation: authorities sanctioned Xinbi Guarantee, an illegal marketplace tasked with brokering deals between criminal syndicates and merchants providing financial services, technology, and other resources.
The Treasury noted that since around 2022, Xinbi has processed digital asset and fiat transactions totaling over $24 billion, primarily catering to the Southeast Asian market.
Given its sheer scale, the platform became a primary target for law enforcement operations aimed at dismantling criminal financial infrastructure.
The Treasury further noted that following FinCEN’s crackdown on Huione, cybercriminals migrated their operations to Xinbi to sustain their activities. This new platform offers virtually identical services to the exact same clientele.
Regulators have mapped out a market-driven grey ecosystem: when existing channels grow unreliable due to law enforcement pressure, participants simply pivot to the next available service provider.
During the crackdown targeting Huione, Telegram removed thousands of channels associated with Huione Guarantee, prompting relevant merchants to flock to alternative trading platforms.
Consequently, the effectiveness of enforcement campaigns cannot be measured solely by counting shut-down websites, accounts, or servers. As long as criminal clients maintain demand for illicit financial services, they will inevitably seek out active providers to reconstruct funding rails.
Naturally, enforcement actions still drive up criminal costs through mechanisms like asset freezes, settlement failures, and the disappearance of familiar counterparties. Yet as long as illicit activities remain profitable, the economic incentive to move stolen funds will persist.
The predicament facing law enforcement agencies lies in continuously raising the overall criminal cost across the alternative provider network while degrading its operational stability.
Tether Freezes Force Crypto Laundering Networks Toward Alternative Payment Tools
Enforcement actions targeting Xinbi Guarantee demonstrate that financial restrictions can disrupt criminal operations, but simultaneously force syndicates to switch payment channels.
Tether executed a series of freeze actions, immobilizing over $45 million in USDT across at least 22 Xinbi-linked wallets.
Immediately thereafter, the exchange platform notified users that it would shift operations to USDD. Unlike USDT, this stablecoin’s issuer lacks address-level freezing capabilities.
This represents a critical shift: while illicit funds remain within issuer-controlled parameters, token freezing functionality holds immense value for investigators. Consequently, criminal clients seeking regulatory evasion tend to favor assets governed by different control mechanisms.
This illustrates that when one component of the payment ecosystem faces restriction, transactions inevitably reroute to alternative channels. Investigators must therefore track asset destinations while simultaneously pursuing the service providers facilitating these conduits.
During the September crackdown, authorities likewise targeted Xinbi’s associated infrastructure, seizing over $52 million in cryptocurrency. Concurrently, asset withdrawal speeds accelerated, while competing platforms reportedly began restricting onboarding for money laundering merchants.
The aforementioned cases and the freeze of 442,000 USDT linked to North Korean hackers cited by ZachXBT constitute two separate events. Public reporting cannot confirm whether they involve identical addresses, personnel, or funds.
Nevertheless, both instances confirm a singular reality: criminal syndicates remain heavily dependent on financial intermediaries. Even after initial thefts are complete, intermediary services continue offering regulators intervention windows.
If a token issuer possesses asset freezing capabilities, risk concentrates entirely within identifiable address balances. Conversely, when a platform services multiple criminal syndicates, its vulnerabilities encompass infrastructure, merchant networks, and settlement arrangements.
Either approach successfully elevates both the cost and risk associated with transferring and deploying illicit proceeds.
Transaction-Brokering Middlemen Are Harder to Replace
The breakthrough in ZachXBT’s investigation fundamentally proved that establishing client relationships through paid undercover operations can extract identity details regarding individuals responsible for orchestrating trades.
Criminal intermediaries dealing long-term with stolen cryptocurrency accumulate industry reputation, vet fixed trading partners, and determine which services reliably execute transactions without skimming proceeds.
These relational networks render criminal operations increasingly efficient over time. This becomes particularly critical when clients require large transfers but wish to maintain anonymity while fearing counterparty theft.
Yet once established legacy providers are taken down, rebuilding these cooperative structures grows exceedingly difficult. Replacement providers typically charge higher fees, reject suspicious funds, or exhibit insufficient operational stability.
This dependency dynamic also generates new intelligence streams for investigators. Service providers may disclose upcoming trade plans, co-participants, and the payment infrastructure necessary to fulfill orders.
Investigators must still corroborate intelligence against on-chain records and supplementary evidence. Merely receiving stolen-related funds to an address does not prove the recipient’s awareness or intentional participation in criminal activity.
However, cross-referencing private chat logs with subsequent blockchain fund movements substantially reduces informational uncertainty—a task impossible through transaction ledger tracking alone.
An increasing number of enforcement cases demonstrate that diminishing the appeal of illicit financial services requires more than periodic website takedowns. The client base and profit motives fueling these enterprises vastly outlast website server lifespans.
Nevertheless, asset seizures, financial rail cuts, provider prosecutions, and settlement controller lockdowns fundamentally alter the cost-benefit calculations of criminal behavior. However, each provider possesses distinct risk tolerance thresholds.
This also explains why the total stolen cryptocurrency volume does not equate to the liquidated, spendable funds successfully acquired by criminals; nor does it justify assuming these assets were directly allocated to specific military or state expenditures.
The original stolen amount, intermediary-wallet circulation volume, amounts successfully converted into tangible purchasing power, and funds ultimately recovered by law enforcement represent four independent statistical categories requiring separate evidentiary validation.
For North Korean hackers, even successful intrusion operations carry downstream risks due to reliance on laundering services. Acquiring stolen assets does not guarantee acceptance, conversion, or final consumption by willing third parties.
ZachXBT’s undercover operation demonstrates how cash-out demand transforms client relationships into investigative leverage. Similarly, U.S. campaigns targeting Huione and Xinbi prove that regardless of criminal clients continuously shifting operational bases, grey-area service providers themselves remain viable enforcement targets.
The fundamental vulnerability of criminal conduct lies in this dichotomy: stealing cryptocurrency and actually utilizing it are entirely distinct processes. The latter continues to rely on commercial partnerships where every participant maintains assets, reputation, and economic stakes to protect.
To transform stolen funds into spendable currency, North Korean hackers must repeatedly navigate trust-dependent interpersonal networks; meanwhile, service-providing middlemen inherently assume the risk of capital degradation.














