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Circle CEO Heath Tarbert's Congressional Hearing Testimony: The US Dollar Strategy in the Internet Financial System

Circle CEO Heath Tarbert's Congressional Hearing Testimony: The US Dollar Strategy in the Internet Financial System

2026.09.04
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During a congressional hearing, the CEO of Circle urged the United States to pass the CLARITY Act to strengthen the digital asset market structure and safeguard the U.S. dollar's dominant position in the global digital finance system.

Compiled from original source:lufei

Testimony of Heath P. Tarbert

President, Circle Internet Group, Inc.

Former Chair, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)

Former Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Submitted to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services

Hearing Topic: "Strengthening the U.S. Economy: Fostering Growth, Opportunity, and Prosperity"

Wednesday, September 2, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.

https://www.circle.com/blog/circle-president-to-congress-protect-the-u-s-dollars-lead

Full testimony: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA00/20260902/119522/HHRG-119-BA00-Wstate-TarbertH-20260902.pdf

Key Takeaways

Viewed on its own merits, this testimony makes it clear that Heath Tarbert’s purpose in testifying before Congress is straightforward: to urge the U.S. to continue building a comprehensive digital asset market structure after stabilizing stablecoin regulation, and to elevate this effort to a national strategy aimed at safeguarding the global standing of the U.S. dollar, American financial dominance, and rule-making authority.

Specifically, there are five key demands.

First, elevate GENIUS and CLARITY to the strategic height of "dollar statecraft." In Heath’s framework, the significance of these two bills extends beyond regulating the crypto industry itself; it concerns whether the U.S. dollar and American rules can remain at the core of the global financial system once future financial infrastructure migrates to blockchain.

Second, advance CLARITY toward enactment. His phrasing is direct: GENIUS has already established the "dollar layer" within the internet financial system; next, the "market layer" must be completed by bringing digital asset trading, custody, intermediaries, client asset protection, and market oversight into a long-term, stable federal statutory framework.

Third, ensure strict implementation of GENIUS to close regulatory arbitrage loopholes for offshore stablecoins. He emphasizes that final rules must not leave gaps; regulatory requirements must cover intermediaries actually servicing U.S. clients, and foreign stablecoin issuers must meet truly comparable regulatory standards.

Fourth, expand the policy discussion from stablecoins to the broader migration of the entire financial system onto blockchain. Heath stresses that the dollar is only the first layer. What is actually migrating is money, securities, collateral, payments, settlement, and capital markets infrastructure. The core of future competition will be which tracks these financial assets run on, who governs them, and whose rules they follow.

Fifth, reinforce the strategic position of the compliant American financial infrastructure path represented by Circle. Heath explicitly opposes artificially creating "national champion" firms, but the future system he envisions is clear: dollar-denominated, governed by U.S. law, regulated stablecoins, institutional-grade settlement networks, programmable finance, and AI agent payments. Circle’s USDC, CPN, and Arc all sit on this path.

Thus, the core message of Heath’s testimony can be further condensed to:

Financial infrastructure is migrating to blockchain, and this transition has already begun. The U.S. now must decide whether future digital dollars, tokenized assets, and financial markets will operate atop U.S. rules and infrastructure, or along tracks built by other systems. GENIUS has completed the first step; CLARITY and implementing rules are next.

From the perspective of CRCL investors, the most noteworthy signal is:

Circle is aligning its long-term development path with America’s dollar strategy, the financial migration to blockchain, and the digital asset regulatory framework along a single, enduring policy mainline.

Full Text: Dollar Statecraft in the Internet Financial System

Introduction

Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and distinguished members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

My name is Heath Tarbert. I am a corporate executive and former U.S. government official and financial regulator. I currently serve as President of Circle Internet Group. We are a publicly traded technology company headquartered in One World Trade Center, New York City, with employees across 44 states and the District of Columbia.

I have served on both sides of financial regulation: as a public official, I was responsible for maintaining trust in financial markets; as a corporate executive, I have helped build new financial infrastructure. On both sides, I learned the same lesson: financial innovation that outruns trust does not endure. Compliance is the foundation of serious financial business.

My approach to this work stems from a Baltimore family—where public service and operating by the rules are taken for granted. Both of my grandfathers served in World War II; other family members have been police officers and firefighters. My father attended night school to become an accountant, later serving as chief auditor for one of the busiest ports in the United States; my mother worked in county child support enforcement. This tradition has shaped every role I have held. After leaving government, I settled my family in northern Illinois, where I raise our two sons with my wife. Raising a family in the heartland of America makes the stakes for the nation’s economic future deeply personal. That is the lens through which I view this hearing today.

I am pleased to return to this Committee. My last appearance here was in 2018, when I served as Policy Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS reviews foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies for national security risks, yet its statutory authority had not been updated in thirty years. At the same time, strategic competitors were targeting emerging technologies upon which military capability depends. U.S. law had to adapt before strategic risks outpaced our institutions. We decided then that the law would catch up. Later that year, Congress enacted the most significant reform of U.S. foreign investment review law in three decades. [1]

The topic today is different, but the strategic choice is the same. American technological leadership remains vital to our national defense and economic prosperity, and the law must keep pace. I make this argument here because you have done it before. When it matters most, members of this Committee always find ways to cooperate.

I am not here to defend every token, every protocol, or every business model. I am here to advocate for this principle: financial innovation serving Americans should operate under U.S. law. Under that premise, I am a supporter of blockchain technology.

One principle has consistently guided my thinking. While serving as CFTC Chair, I wrote, "How we regulate is as important as what we regulate." [2] The same applies to the dollar. Its global standing depends less on declarations than on the quality of the laws and institutions behind it.

I call this work dollar statecraft: [3] The deliberate use of American law, markets, and institutional credibility to keep the dollar at the center of value transfer systems. It is not monetary policy—that belongs to the Federal Reserve. Nor is it sanctions policy—that is the coercive edge of the same asset. It is quieter work, and more enduring work. The goal? To ensure the dollar remains the obvious choice, never the forced alternative.

This hearing’s theme is "Strengthening the U.S. Economy: Fostering Growth, Opportunity, and Prosperity." I want to directly link my theme to that title.

Dollar statecraft is economic policy. The dollar’s role in international markets lowers borrowing costs for Americans and reduces the Treasury’s debt-servicing expenses. The infrastructure underlying value transfer determines the cost of capital for every firm that uses it. Getting those choices right strengthens the U.S. economy in the near term—through lower friction, faster settlement, and more efficient capital formation. Get it right, and you strengthen it for posterity—keeping global financial architecture anchored here.

Get it wrong, and the losses will not announce themselves. They will emerge slowly: activity, standards, and jurisdiction gradually migrate to systems built elsewhere.

My testimony contains three key points.

  1. The dollar’s global role is an economic asset, not an inherited right. It lowers the cost of capital for American households and businesses; it expands our capacity to respond to crises; it helps fund defense spending. It rests on trust, and that trust must be maintained.
  2. The infrastructure underlying the transfer of currency and financial assets is being rebuilt in software form. What emerges is what we at Circle call the internet financial system. [4]
  3. Congress has built the internet’s dollar layer and should now complete the market layer. The GENIUS Act establishes a prudential regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. The House has passed the market structure framework contained in the CLARITY Act. Three tasks remain: faithfully execute the first, close avenues for evasion, and craft a durable framework for markets built atop the dollar layer.

Together, these three points boil down to one strategic question: Will the U.S. financial market—the deepest, most trusted market in the world—migrate onto tracks governed by U.S. law, or onto someone else’s?

As CFTC Chair, I also said something I reiterate today: "I hope America leads, because whoever is first in this technology ultimately writes the rules of the game." [5]

I want to be clear about which game I mean. This is not about fighting over a single sector of the financial industry. The infrastructure underpinning value transfer is critical economic infrastructure. It affects the cost of capital for American firms; it enables the U.S. to set anti-money laundering standards and makes our sanctions regime more effective. Ultimately, it concerns our economic strength and national security. Therefore, I will elaborate on the three points mentioned above.

I. The Dollar’s Global Role Is an Asset, Not an Inherited Right

I begin with the dollar. It is the most consequential asset for everything that follows. People often treat its global role as a matter of national status. More accurately, it is a matter of national income. And it is something this country earned, not inherited. It took generations to build. We can strengthen it, or we can spend it away.

(A) What This Role Buys American Families

The dollar’s status is easily mistaken for prestige. It is actually household economics.

It helps lower borrowing costs for American families, businesses, and the federal government. It makes imports cheaper, thereby suppressing prices at the register. It grants our government a crisis-response capacity possessed by few sovereign nations. It also helps fund long-term defense spending, which maintains the most capable military in history. [6]

Consider what this means in practice. The world holds dollars and buys U.S. Treasuries. In doing so, they lend to this country on terms available to only a handful of nations. That advantage flows all the way down to 30-year mortgages, small-business credit lines, and auto loans.

Commodities are priced in dollars. American importers therefore save on exchange rate risk that foreign competitors must hedge and pay for.

When crises strike, the Federal Reserve can inject liquidity on a scale that would stress the credibility of most other central banks. [7]

That is the ledger. It is the least visible and most substantial of the economic advantages Americans enjoy.

(B) This Status Was Built Up, and It Can Be Spent Down

About 57% of global foreign exchange reserves, as reported via the IMF’s COFER dataset, are held in dollars. [8] Yet by market exchange rates, the U.S. share of world output is roughly one-quarter. [9]

These two numbers tell a story.

At the outset of the postwar system’s design, the U.S. accounted for an outsized share of global output and industrial capacity. The dollar’s role was broadly commensurate with the size of its underlying economy. Today, however, the dollar’s role exceeds the scale of the economy behind it.

So, what bridges that gap? Size alone cannot do it. It is market depth, the supply of safe dollar assets, powerful network effects, and trust in American law and institutions.

No payment technology can substitute for sound economic policy. The dollar’s role relies on fiscal credibility and independent monetary management. It depends on deep and liquid markets, a vast supply of safe assets, and the rule of law. Digital infrastructure alone cannot sustain this status. But it is becoming a necessary condition for sustaining it.

This kind of trust is an asset. It accumulated over decades. It can also be spent down through neglect. America’s primacy is not inevitable, just as the postwar order itself was not. [10] In fact, at the end of the 1990s, the dollar accounted for over 70% of reserve shares. Today, that figure stands at roughly 57%. This is a genuine and concerning decline within a single generation. Experts debate the causes, but not the direction. We must act before the downturn becomes irreversible. Arrangements built on power and credibility require maintenance. In a democracy, that maintenance is often a legislative act.

This is the dollar statecraft I introduced at the beginning. The term belongs to a longer tradition. For decades, scholars have written about economic statecraft, and more specifically, financial statecraft and currency statecraft. [11] What I have named is a specific subset of that work: maintaining the dollar’s position within systems where value actually moves.

This type of dollar statecraft has two features. Its primary tools are law and institutional design, not coercion. Its aim is attraction, not compulsion.

Because the dollar system is a network, American leadership should not mean American exclusivity. The most durable tracks will be open, interoperable, and governed by reciprocal high standards with trusted partners. The goal is not to exclude others, but to make infrastructure governed by U.S. law and ally standards the platform the world voluntarily chooses. [12]

Dollar statecraft has always been implemented through institutions. The novelty is that these institutions now run on software, and someone must decide who writes the code.

Two additional observations. Power in the twenty-first century increasingly flows through systems relied upon by others. Academic literature studying how such systems work also explains how they are lost. A nation that over-relies on its status gives everyone else reason to bypass it. [13]

Our strategic competitors are often our closest trading partners. Therefore, American leadership must be exercised in a way that preserves the network’s appeal.

(C) This Stablecoin Layer Is Currently Choosing the Dollar

Here is a fact this Committee should care about most: today, the vast majority of stablecoin value worldwide is dollar-denominated. [14]

Consider how this happened. Private enterprises built a new payment layer atop many nations. And they adopted the dollar as the default unit of account—not because of U.S. mandate, but because the dollar has always been credible, liquid, and readily available.

This is not inevitable, nor is there any guarantee it will persist forever. No natural law dictates that the currency of the internet must be the dollar. [15]

It is necessary to be precise about the mechanism, because this is precisely the bridge between reserve currency status and tokenized infrastructure. The dollar’s reserve currency influence depends not only on what foreign central banks hold. It equally depends on which currency is used to invoice trade, settle transactions, post collateral, and price global financial assets. As these functions migrate to software-based networks, the currency and legal structures embedded in new tracks can capture powerful network effects. If dollar-denominated currency and assets become native assets of regulated infrastructure governed by U.S. law, then dollar demand and American rulemaking authority will reinforce each other. If not, invoicing in dollars alone will not preserve U.S. jurisdiction.

The demand is real. In many markets, households and businesses still have limited access to dollar-denominated bank accounts, even where mobile technology is widely used. [16]

This demand will eventually be met. The U.S. should ensure it is met by domestically regulated issuers under the GENIUS Act, not by offshore issuers subject to no comparable U.S. prudential oversight, nor by foreign sovereign infrastructure built around different policy objectives.

Public blockchains are transparent at the transaction level but typically pseudonymous at the identity level. Analytics tools can trace fund flows in ways cash cannot, and often in ways correspondent banking systems struggle to match. But traceability does not substitute for KYC, sanctions screening, reserve oversight, or accountable management.

This distinction is crucial for understanding "what we lose when issuance migrates offshore." Public transaction data may remain visible. What U.S. regulators lose is direct access to the issuer’s governance structure, its reserves, its books and records, and its responsible executives.

This is why Congress was right to move decisively at the time. The GENIUS Act is not an industry concession. It is a decision: to place American standards under the umbrella of digital dollars before others get there first. [17]

II. The Internet Financial System

The dollar’s status depends on infrastructure. And that infrastructure is being rebuilt today. I want to explain what is being built, and why it extends far beyond currency. I also want to explain why the question of "who builds it" should belong to this Committee, and not merely to software engineers.

(A) What Is the Internet Financial System, and Why Is It Different?

For thirty years, the internet has transmitted information while financial systems transmit value. A trading platform can relay an order in an instant, but funds still travel through card networks, correspondent banks, clearinghouses, and batch settlement. The internet carries orders; financial systems carry funds—but much more slowly, and with greater cost and friction relative to internet data.

This separation is beginning to dissolve. Currency, securities, collateral, and contractual instructions can increasingly be represented and managed via software on shared networks. The financial system and internet infrastructure are beginning to converge. That convergence is what we call the internet financial system.

Convergence gives these instruments new properties. They are programmable, meaning instructions travel with the payment rather than via a separate messaging channel. They are perpetually available, meaning settlement need not halt overnight, on weekends, or during holidays. They can settle at the network layer in seconds rather than days. They also feature composability: a payment, a currency conversion, and a collateral delivery can occur as a single conditional transaction rather than three sequential ones.

To make this concrete: many domestic transactions now achieve final settlement or Delivery versus Payment (DVP) settlement, and our large-value payment systems provide real-time gross settlement with immediate finality. [18] Persistent friction exists elsewhere: cash, securities, collateral, and contractual instructions often reside in separate systems, run on different schedules, and comply with different rules. Intermediaries, credit lines, reconciliation, and prefunded accounts bridge these gaps, but inefficiency remains.

When both legs can move conditionally on compatible infrastructure, principal and timing risk drop significantly. Other risks do not vanish; they shift to technology, governance, liquidity, custody, and law.

A related distinction deserves emphasis because it is easily conflated. Technical finality does not equal legal finality. Deterministic settlement can underpin legal finality, [19] but commercial law, network rules, contracts, and bankruptcy law still determine when a transfer becomes irrevocable and who bears the loss. [20]

The remaining friction largely reflects fragmented systems accumulated over decades, plus compliance, FX, liquidity, and local distribution costs. A worker remitting wages abroad still loses a significant share in fees and spreads—global remittance costs average above 6%. [21] A small manufacturing firm may wait days to receive an international invoice payment and must finance that float. Better infrastructure will not eliminate every cost. But it can eradicate costs arising solely from incompatible systems or inability to co-settle.

This is relevant to a congressional hearing on "growth" for specific reasons. Faster settlement is more than convenience; it frees capital. Every day funds are in transit is a day a company finances a gap it did not create. Settlement cycles also involve collateral posted to guard against failure before delivery. Compressing these cycles releases working capital, and the greatest beneficiaries are often firms that struggle most to obtain credit.

Even where speed is not the primary objective, settlement designs that reduce overall risk and capital friction should be targets. The internet financial system makes this possible.

(B) What Is Migrating Is Not Just the Dollar—It Is the Entire U.S. Financial System

This is the point I most want you to take away from my testimony. Most serious policy discussions about digital assets stop at the dollar. And the dollar is merely the first layer.

U.S. capital markets are envied worldwide. As I told the Senate Agriculture Committee in 2022, our derivatives markets set the "global standard" for integrity, resilience, and vitality. [22]

We possess the deepest, most liquid markets on earth. Companies from around the world list here, raise capital here, hedge here, and clear here because ours is the best global venue for doing so.

This is a massive and undervalued source of American power. And it rests on infrastructure: exchanges, clearinghouses, custodians, transfer agents, and the settlement pipelines beneath them.

This infrastructure is now migrating. Payment stablecoins lead the way because currency is the easiest instrument to render as software and the most useful for transferring value. But the footprint of infrastructure is vastly wider.

Industry data shows that as of August 2026, outstanding tokenized U.S. Treasuries and money market products exceed $16 billion, with providers including traditional asset managers like BlackRock and Franklin Templeton, as well as new entrants like Circle. [23] Tokenized credit is growing from a smaller base. Institutions are also moving from pilots to controlled production environments; the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) has begun advancing work on tokenized custodied assets. [24]

What attracts institutions is utility. Collateral that can be moved rapidly and reconfigured is operationally more valuable than collateral that cannot. Certain business processes can thereby support equivalent scales of activity with less prefunded capital, lowering costs for firms trading within them.

A word on pacing. Think of television. Streaming did not instantly replace cable TV. The two ran in parallel for many years, and still do. But the direction of travel is clear. Companies that saw this shift early built the platforms the whole world uses today. And most of them are American.

The same pattern will hold here. Traditional financial systems and the internet financial system will grow in parallel. The question is not whether this migration will happen, but where the infrastructure is built, and whose rules determine the endpoint.

The strategic question is thus far broader than "which currency the new system uses." A system can be dollar-denominated yet wholly governed by others. That is the true strategic risk.

American leadership here is vital. It means venues trading tokenized assets must comply with our disclosure and market integrity rules. It means custodians holding these assets are overseen by U.S. examiners, and our standards for sanctions, illicit finance, and financial integrity apply. It means U.S. law decides what counts as final settlement, what investors are entitled to know, and who bears losses in bankruptcy. And because financial infrastructure is critical economic infrastructure, it also means our national security is protected. When this Committee wants to know what is happening in a market, it can find out.

But America’s status as the default unit of account does not, by itself, ensure appropriate oversight and accountability. Securing that oversight and accountability requires infrastructure built and governed under U.S. law, with deep involvement from American firms and trusted partners. Otherwise, we will reach our own markets through someone else’s tracks.

(C) Tracks Are Being Built, and Artificial Intelligence Is the Accelerator

Many widely used public blockchains were designed as general-purpose platforms, not as regulated financial infrastructure. Consumer applications run fine on them. Institutional finance is a poorer fit, and that mismatch is visible. Finality models vary, some remaining probabilistic. Fees may be denominated in volatile tokens, making dollar-denominated transaction costs uncertain. And many systems either default to fully public records or drift toward closed, permissioned visibility. Neither suits corporate treasurers, CFOs, or regulatory examiners.

Consequently, a wave of dedicated settlement networks has emerged over the past two years, initiated by payment firms, tech companies, and stablecoin issuers. [25] Circle built one, called Arc. [26] Others are building competing systems. The policy principles I describe here should apply regardless of which network wins.

Those recurring design choices are effectively decisions with broader economic impact. Pricing transaction fees in dollars allows users to price settlement in the same units as the trade itself; pricing only in floating tokens adds another layer of volatility for users. Making settlement deterministic strengthens the foundation legal finality relies upon—payment finality is critical to every market under this Committee’s purview. Building confidentiality alongside governed lawful access enables the system to accommodate regulated institutional activity; broadcasting all records publicly, or making absolute privacy the norm, renders vital application scenarios difficult to realize.

The last choice deserves particular attention because it is often presented to this Committee as an unavoidable trade-off. It is not. Modern regulated finance resolves this tension through conditional confidentiality: records are shielded from the public but visible to auditors, regulators, and law enforcement when law and due process grant viewing rights. A public company cannot broadcast its payroll and supplier prices to competitors on a public ledger; nor should it hide those fund flows from auditors or regulators.

Cryptography can make lawful access faster, more precise, and more auditable. But it cannot replace lawful authorization and due process, nor should it try. The goal should be: privacy for ordinary commerce, accountability for regulated entities, and access for public authorities under clear legal rules.

Design pitfalls also exist in the opposite direction. Retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) could give the government unacceptable visibility into citizens’ lives and potentially disintermediate commercial banks. At the other extreme, an absolute privacy design that ignores compliance would attract actors seeking to evade sanctions, launder money, and support state-sponsored terrorists. Both outcomes hinge on design—which is precisely the point: design is policy.

None of this implies technology lacks risk. As with any financial infrastructure, a robust regulatory framework must address operational resilience, custody, cybersecurity, liquidity, legal certainty, governance, and illicit finance. It must also consider how rapid growth might affect bank funding and the functioning of short-term funding markets. [27] The policy question is not whether these issues should be addressed, but whether they will be governed under enforceable American standards or migrated beyond the reach of U.S. regulation.

This is where dollar statecraft meets engineering. I have said that the dollar’s status depends on trust in American institutions. In this new system, essential institutional rules will increasingly be realized through code and network governance—rules about finality, disclosure, who sees what, and under whose authorization. Trust remains the asset. It is simply won or spent in a different medium.

Firms bound by U.S. law must design in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act, sanctions obligations, privacy laws, and due process. Firms operating elsewhere design around different requirements. And U.S. institutions will transact on whichever system offers liquidity.

This brings me to artificial intelligence—the accelerator for the trends I have outlined today. [28] Payment systems are already designing for it. Software agents can initiate transactions within human-set authorization scopes, spending limits, and compliance controls. Major card networks have already announced work of exactly this sort. [29] Traditional accounts and payment systems are built around human workflows. Agentic commerce raises the need for programmable authorization and settlement. It does not—and should not—eliminate legal identity, human accountability, or oversight.

We ought to hope this economy is built on tracks manufactured in America, priced in American dollars, and governed by American law.

III. Congress Has Built the Dollar Layer and Should Now Complete the Market Layer

The dollar’s role must be maintained, not assumed. The infrastructure beneath it is being built right now. The question then becomes: What does maintenance look like?

In a democracy, it looks like legislation. The GENIUS Act and the CLARITY Act are the most tangible forms of dollar statecraft. They are also why I remain optimistic.

(A) Why the GENIUS Act Is the Right Answer

In the past, three main models have been proposed to host digital dollars on the internet: central bank digital currency, tokenized deposits, and payment stablecoins.

Depending on its architecture, CBDC could create a direct relationship between the Federal Reserve and the public. It could give the government unacceptable visibility into individual financial activity. And it could disintermediate the community and regional banks this Committee has long valued. For these and other reasons, Congress has already banned the issuance of retail CBDC. [30]

Tokenized deposits are the second model, currently being developed by some banks. They should coexist with payment stablecoins. But the two differ legally and economically. Tokenized deposits represent an individual’s claim on a specific bank’s assets (i.e., its loan book, reserves, and other assets). By contrast, payment stablecoins under the GENIUS Act are designed around identifiable 1:1 reserves and offer bankruptcy remoteness. Implementation should preserve this distinction while monitoring both tools’ impacts on bank funding, liquidity, and the federal safety net. [31]

That leaves payment stablecoins. This is where the GENIUS Act comes into play.

The mechanism is straightforward. A customer delivers a dollar to the issuer. The issuer holds identifiably segregated reserves in statutorily permitted assets. A token is minted, redeemable at par. These reserves are restricted from reuse, and their composition is publicly reported. This is the core model Circle employs today for USDC.

This Act does not mandate "light-touch" regulation. It requires holding identifiable 1:1 reserves in specific high-quality liquid assets, redemption at par, public reserve disclosures, regulatory oversight, and compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and sanctions obligations.

Precision on timing strengthens, rather than weakens, the argument. Those requirements are already law, but most have not yet taken effect. The effective date is the earlier of January 18, 2027, or 120 days after major federal regulators publish final implementing rules. From the effective date onward, offering or selling foreign-issued stablecoins to U.S. persons within the United States by digital asset service providers is unlawful unless strict conditions are met; in all cases, selling stablecoins from unlicensed issuers will be illegal starting in July 2028. [32]

Implementation is underway, but it takes time. In September 2025, the Treasury issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, followed by thousands of pages of proposed rules covering areas from prudential standards and disclosure to AML and market conduct. Last month, the Department issued guidance specifying the controls digital asset service providers must implement to ensure Americans are not offered non-compliant foreign stablecoins. [33]

Finalizing implementing rules and getting them right is critical. Market participants are already restructuring around standards that are not yet fully binding. It is unusual for a Committee to evaluate its own legislation this way, but I do not believe it is coincidental. This framework is largely the product of this Committee’s years of work. It reflects a sustained bipartisan effort in which the Chair and Ranking Member have played central roles.

Economy-wide data lets us gauge its scale. Fed staff estimate the stablecoin market stood at approximately $317 billion as of April 2026, over 50% higher than early 2025 levels. The same analytical report noted stablecoin trading volumes on Ethereum rose by roughly 50% in the period following passage of the GENIUS Act. [34] These figures illustrate the size and momentum of the market Congress has chosen to regulate.

Regarding impact on the U.S. Treasury market, trends are notable but not game-changing. In a February 2026 report using data from major issuers through September 2025, the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) estimated stablecoin issuers held less than 1% of outstanding Treasuries, treating the segment as an emerging demand source warranting attention. [35] Indeed, the rationale for this framework does not depend on stablecoins resolving the federal debt challenge.

Regulated infrastructure and use cases are emerging. In December 2025, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) conditionally approved five nationwide trust bank charters in the space. [36] Since then, payment companies, broker-dealers, and banks have filed additional applications—a remarkable development given that the statutory category of "licensed payment stablecoin issuer" did not exist at the federal level just two years ago. Furthermore, as of mid-2026, 175 financial institutions had registered on the Circle Payment Network (CPN). [37] Additionally, in July 2026, under a no-action position by the CFTC, a customer submitted USDC to its futures commission merchant (FCM) to satisfy initial margin requirements. [38] Finally, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently began work to incorporate certain payment stablecoins into the cash equivalents framework—provided they are adequately backed by reserves and redeemable on demand directly from the issuer. This step will draw regulated stablecoins deeper into mainstream treasury management, payments, and financial reporting. [39]

On behalf of American taxpayers, this design warrants emphasis. The GENIUS framework does not extend deposit insurance or express taxpayer guarantees to payment stablecoin holders. That is correct design. Its purpose is to reduce the likelihood of requiring public intervention at any time by imposing upfront reserve, liquidity, disclosure, and regulatory requirements.

It must be acknowledged that compliant payment stablecoins are not zero-risk. Their design avoids the credit intermediation and substantive maturity transformation characteristic of fractional-reserve lending. But operational, custody, liquidity, market, network, and legal risks persist and must be supervised. [40]

Two actions remain to be completed.

First, final rules should be completed on a coordinated timeline. Issuers are building compliance programs based on proposed requirements that may still change, and final requirements remain unsettled. Regulatory certainty is the core promise of this Act. Agencies are undertaking serious work under real-time pressure, and congressional scrutiny of implementation pacing will prove well-placed.

Second, final rules must not leave loopholes. The Act’s protections constrain by limiting "who can issue, offer, or sell digital dollars to Americans." These limits must reach intermediaries actually servicing U.S. clients. Recognition of foreign regulatory comparability should be based on truly equivalent regulatory outcomes.

While serving as Chair, I led the CFTC’s cross-border swap rules on the basis of reciprocal deference. We should show deference to regulators with truly comparable rules and standards, and expect the same treatment in return. [41]

Finally, this is not a story about any single issuer. Today’s digital dollars are issued by state-regulated trust companies, while federally chartered institutions and applicants prepare to participate under the new framework. [42] Congress did not legislate to create a "national champion," nor should this Committee wish it. A core measure of this Act’s success will be whether multiple regulated issuers can compete safely under common rules while maintaining reliable redemptions, transparent reserves, and meaningful consumer protections.

(B) The CLARITY Act Remains Unfinished

Congress has set rules for digital dollars. But it has yet to set rules for the markets that use them. That is everything in Part II aside from the dollar itself.

The significance of this work for the rest of the ecosystem parallels GENIUS’s significance for the dollar. The CLARITY Act passed by the House, and Senate texts forming in its wake, pursue several common goals: allocate jurisdiction between securities and commodities regulators along a line consistent with how these tools actually function; establish a viable onshore regulatory framework for covered intermediaries, with client protection, custody, and conflict-of-interest requirements; and extend existing illicit finance authorities to covered intermediaries and activities, making those authorities clearly applicable here as they are elsewhere. [43]

None of these are subsidies, nor endorsements of any asset. Each is a principle this Committee has applied in every other market under its purview.

What this legislation does not do matters just as much. It does not declare any digital asset sound or suitable for any investor. It does not foreclose antifraud or antimanipulation protections. It does not repeal the Bank Secrecy Act—it expands it. And it will not categorically resolve all classification questions. No statute can. Both Committees will continue interpretive work for years to come.

Yet a framework that answers most questions and establishes procedures for the rest beats a status quo predictably answering too few.

Legislation provides, above all, durability. Agency guidance and enforcement priorities shift with administrations. A bipartisan-backed statute lasts far longer. Firms making ten-year infrastructure investments need statutes, not statements.

The dollar layer now rests on a bipartisan statute. The layer above it rests primarily on the intentions of two agencies. That asymmetry will not resolve itself.

Final legislation should address the legitimate concerns raised by this Committee: client asset protection, conflicts of interest, illicit finance, market integrity, and the treatment of decentralized protocols. These are reasons for careful legislation. You charted the course last year. This Committee should now, as Congress finishes this work, defend the bipartisan principles it established: clear jurisdictional boundaries; effective client asset safeguards; enforceable rules for intermediaries; robust illicit finance authorities; honest handling of conflicts of interest; and a durable path for responsible business to operate onshore. My hope is that all of these elements remain intact in CLARITY, and that Congress signs the final version into law this year.

Closing Remarks

I am an American who has spent most of my career on financial infrastructure—at the Treasury, at the CFTC, and now in the private sector. I have seen how much of this country’s strength rests on systems most citizens never think about. I have also seen how quickly they migrate when the technology underneath changes.

That migration is underway. It will produce a financial system that settles faster, operates continuously, and reaches populations today’s systems fail to serve.

Congress cannot dictate which technologies will succeed. It can decide whether U.S. law, U.S. institutions, and the dollar remain embedded within those successful systems. Unanswered questions remain: Are these tracks American? Is the unit of account still the dollar? And when things go wrong, whose law governs?

This hearing asks how to strengthen the U.S. economy, foster growth, opportunity, and prosperity. Of the steps this Committee can take, few will prove more decisive for America’s long-term prosperity than helping ensure next-generation financial infrastructure is built and governed under U.S. law, developed alongside trusted allies, and anchored to the dollar. It is worth more than any single quarter of growth because it compounds.

This is dollar statecraft in the internet financial system. Not a currency defended by declaration, but a financial system governed by American law, built jointly by American firms and trusted partners, and credible, liquid, and useful enough that the world continues to choose it.

The dollar’s status was built up. It can be built further. It can also be spent down. Which path prevails depends on more than just this Committee. But the part depending on this Committee is far greater than people usually understand.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your questions.



Footnotes

[1] Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), enacted as Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 (Aug. 13, 2018). Prior to this legislation, CFIUS’s granting authority had not been substantially revised since the Exon-Florio Amendment of 1988. Regarding strategic competitors targeting emerging technologies with military applications, see: Statement of Heath P. Tarbert, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (Mar. 15, 2018); Heath P. Tarbert, Modernizing CFIUS, 88 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1477 (2020).

[2] Heath P. Tarbert, Rules for Principles and Principles for Rules: Tools for Crafting Sound Financial Regulation, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2020) ("Any government agency tasked with regulating financial markets and financial institutions should have a fundamental goal of prudent regulation. And how we regulate is as important as what we regulate.").

[3] This formulation is my own. But the tradition behind it is not. See footnote 11 below.

[4] Circle Internet Group, Inc., Beyond Stablecoins: The Rise of the Internet Financial System (Jan. 13, 2026).

[5] CFTC Chair Heath P. Tarbert remarks at Yahoo Finance “All Markets Summit: Generational Opportunity” (Oct. 10, 2019), available at CFTC Press Release No. 8051-19 (Oct. 10, 2019).

[6] On the composition of this ledger, see Daleep Singh, The Right Way to Wield America's Economic Power, Foreign Affairs (Jul. 15, 2025) (identifying the dollar-based financial architecture as conferring enormous advantages on the United States: lower borrowing costs for households and firms, unparalleled fiscal capacity to absorb economic shocks, greater resilience during periods of global stress, and the ability to project power through economic statecraft); Heath P. Tarbert, The Dollar's Digital Future, Wharton School’s Future of Finance Project & University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Pt. 4 (2025), available at https://finance-pillar.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The_Dollars_Digital_Future.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2026). These are contributive advantages of reserve currency status, not mechanical certainties.

[7] Here referring to the central bank’s traditional lender-of-last-resort function: providing liquidity, typically on a fully collateralized or excess-collateralized basis, to prevent expected credit losses from falling on the central bank. It addresses illiquidity, not insolvency. Federal law codifies this distinction. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (requiring emergency loans to be secured to the satisfaction of the lending Federal Reserve Bank and prohibiting assistance to insolvent borrowers). Nothing in this testimony should be read as advocating bailouts for failed institutions.

[8] International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), Q1 2026 release (dollar share 57.13%). The IMF now allocates total reported amounts entirely by currency, rather than separately reporting allocated and unallocated portions, so this figure represents reported foreign exchange reserves.

[9] International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database. The comparison in the main text uses nominal GDP at current market exchange rates; the U.S. share would be smaller under purchasing power parity, which would only reinforce, not weaken, the point.

[10] Graham Allison, The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 2018, p. 125 (arguing that the order we inherited is less a deliberately architected framework and more a byproduct of a particular distribution of power).

[11] David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton University Press 1985); Benn Steil & Robert E. Litan, Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (Council on Foreign Relations/Yale University Press 2006); Benjamin J. Cohen, Currency Statecraft: Monetary Rivalry and Geopolitical Ambition (University of Chicago Press 2018).

[12] On the practical application of reciprocal deference, see footnote 41 below.

[13] Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, 44 Int'l Security 42, 49, 55–56, 76, 79 (Summer 2019) (noting that economic networks tend to form asymmetric structures centered on a handful of intermediately nodes, conferring informational and coercive advantages on the state exercising jurisdiction over them, and warning that the more privileged states exploit this status, the stronger the incentive for others to undermine or replace the network).

[14] Bank for International Settlements, Impact of Stablecoins on the International Monetary and Financial System, BIS Papers No. 170 (2026) p. 1 (stating "approximately 98% of stablecoin value is dollar-denominated"); Federal Reserve Board, Stablecoins in 2025: Developments and Implications for Financial Stability, FEDS Notes (Apr. 8, 2026).

[15] The dollar should not be the sole currency on these tracks either. As other jurisdictions establish stablecoin regulatory regimes, stablecoins denominated in other sovereign currencies, issued by regulated entities meeting comparable standards, should be able to operate alongside digital dollars. A multi-currency system with high-quality domestic currency issuance is healthier than a single-currency ecosystem and aligns with the reciprocal deference principles described below.

[16] Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geography & National Banking and Securities Commission, National Survey on Financial Inclusion 2024 (indicating a substantial portion of Mexican adults lack formal deposit accounts, while mobile phone penetration is far higher). Many forcibly displaced persons similarly face limited or completely absent access to formal banking services. UNHCR, Global Trends (Jun. 2026) (~117.8 million forcibly displaced persons by end of 2025).

[17] One development merits noting. Prior to the GENIUS Act, U.S.-issued dollar stablecoins were comprehensively regulated under the European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), which has applied to such tokens since 2024. For a period, the most detailed prudential rules applying to digital dollars were European, not American. That gap was among the considerations making a domestic framework urgent.

[18] Federal Reserve Board, Fedwire Funds Service (real-time gross settlement with immediate finality). Securities infrastructure likewise utilizes delivery-versus-payment mechanisms.

[19] On many existing blockchains, transactions often undergo a “probabilistic” phase and may be vulnerable to chain reorganizations, allowing recent confirmations to be reversed. Other blockchains—including Circle’s Arc—offer 100% final and irrevocable “deterministic” settlement finality. See Arc: An Open Layer-1 Blockchain Purpose-Built for Stablecoin Finance (Aug. 2025), available at https://www.arc.io/litepaper (last visited Aug. 28, 2026).

[20] Bank for International Settlements, Project Agorá: Shared Programmable Platform for Wholesale Cross-Border Payments, pp. 42, 62, 65 (May 2026) (book settlement “ensures the technologically irreversible nature of workflow status, not the legal settlement finality of underlying funds”; atomic settlement triggers are codified with agreed legal significance, determining the moment of settlement finality; platform rulebooks must establish settlement finality points, liability allocation, and handling of participant defaults or bankruptcies under the domestic law of each participating jurisdiction); Coinbase Institute, On-Chain Settlement Finality: A Pragmatic Framework for Policymakers (Feb. 25, 2026) (noting “finality is always a legal determination layered on top of technical conditions,” and pointing out that even Fedwire transfers can potentially be clawed back by bankruptcy trustees as preferential transfers under domestic bankruptcy law), available at https://www.coinbase.com/public-policy/advocacy/documents/settlement-finality-onchain (last visited Aug. 22, 2026).

[21] World Bank, Global Remittance Prices Worldwide, Q2 2026 release (global average cost approx. 6.4% of remittance amount). Cost drivers include compliance, FX, cash handling, local distribution, competitive landscape, and corridor economics, not merely legacy technology.

[22] Heath P. Tarbert testimony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on the Digital Commodity Consumer Protection Act of 2022 (S. 4760) (Sep. 15, 2022).

[23] Aggregate totals for tokenized U.S. Treasuries and money market products sourced from commercial industry tracker RWA.xyz as of August 2026, including products launched by BlackRock and Franklin Templeton. For any single fund, the sponsor’s disclosure documents serve as the governing source.

[24] Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, DTCC Authorized to Provide New Tokenized Services, Paving the Way for Tokenized DTC Custodied Assets (Dec. 11, 2025).

[25] Dedicated settlement networks launched or announced in 2025 and 2026 include Tempo, initiated by Stripe and Paradigm; Google Cloud Universal Ledger; and networks launched by other stablecoin issuers. Sponsors, launch status, and design characteristics vary across networks.

[26] See Arc whitepaper cited in footnote 19 above (describing the network’s design, including stablecoin-denominated transaction fees, deterministic sub-second finality, configurable privacy, and an initial proof-of-authority consensus mode operated by a validator set selected by Circle); and ARC: The Native Asset of the Economic OS (May 2026), available at https://www.arc.io/arc-token-whitepaper (last visited Aug. 28, 2026) (describing a potential native coordinating asset supporting staking, economic governance, and fee mechanisms, and envisioning a eventual transition from proof-of-authority to proof-of-stake).

[27] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Exposure to Crypto-Assets, SCO60, “The Basel Framework” (effective Jan. 1, 2026); Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, U.S. Treasury Demand Trends (Feb. 2026) (listing bank funding impacts as one of several items warranting monitoring).

[28] The most thorough articulation of this convergence is Jeremy Allaire, The Agentic Economy: The Convergence of Intelligence and the Economy (Jul. 2026), which argues that the agentic economy and the on-chain economy are not adjacent developments but two sides of the same coin. This work is authored in his personal capacity and explicitly does not represent the views of Circle Internet Group, Inc. The argument I advance here is narrower: I view artificial intelligence as an accelerator for a migration already underway, rather than its cause; my testimony does not depend on that stronger proposition—though I incline toward agreement with Mr. Allaire.

[29] Mastercard, Agent Pay (Apr. 2025) (providing examples of agent payment technology operating within human-set authorization and control); Visa, Intelligent Commerce (2025). Circle has also built infrastructure for agent-initiated payments.

[30] See 21st Century Housing ROAD Act, Pub. L. No. 119-101, Title XI, § 1101, 140 Stat. 846, 983–84 (2026) (general prohibition on Federal Reserve direct or pass-through issuance of retail CBDC prior to Dec. 31, 2030).

[31] On the legal and balance-sheet distinctions between bank deposits and payment stablecoins, see Heath P. Tarbert, The Dollar's Digital Future, supra note 6, Pt. 1.

[32] Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (GENIUS Act), Pub. L. No. 119-27 (Jul. 18, 2025) (general effective date is the earlier of Jan. 18, 2027, or 120 days after major federal payment stablecoin regulators publish final implementing rules; transitional provisions for digital asset service provider offerings and sales extend an additional three years).

[33] Implementing Rules for the GENIUS Act on the Issuance, Offer, and Sale of Payment Stablecoins, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 91 Fed. Reg. 53,368 (proposed Aug. 18, 2026) (proposed to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. XV) (proposes to implement Section 3 of the Act, with a 60-day comment period following publication).

[34] Federal Reserve Board, Stablecoins in 2025, supra note 14. The Note reflects the analysis of Board staff, not the institutional position of the Board.

[35] Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, U.S. Treasury Demand Trends, supra note 27, using principal issuer financial data through Sep. 30, 2025.

[36] Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Press Release No. 2025-125 (Dec. 12, 2025) (conditionally approving five applications for nationwide trust bank charters). Conditional approval differs from final approval, and the entity currently issuing USDC is separate from Circle, which received final approval for a nationwide trust bank charter in July 2026.

[37] Circle Internet Group, Inc., Second Quarter 2026 Results (number of financial institutions registered on the Circle Payment Network as of Jun. 30, 2026). Registrant count does not measure transaction activity.

[38] Commodity Futures Trading Commission, No-Action Letter Regarding Use of Certain Digital Assets for Margin Requirements, Staff Letter No. 25-40 (Dec. 8, 2025), subsequently republished as Letter No. 26-05 (Feb. 2026); Jul. 2026 transaction wherein a customer submitted USDC to its futures commission merchant.

[39] Financial Accounting Standards Board, Cash Equivalents—Enhanced Disclosures and Classification of Certain Digital Assets, Project Summary (last updated Jul. 8, 2026), available at https://fasb.org/projects/current-projects/classification-of-certain-digital-assets-as-cash-equivalents-423255 (last visited Aug. 28, 2026); Financial Accounting Standards Board, PMAC Meeting Minutes—May 14, 2026 (documenting discussion regarding stablecoins), available at https://fasb.org/about-us/Advisory-Groups/pmac/pmac-meeting-materials/pmac-meeting-recap-may-14-2026 (last visited Aug. 28, 2026).

[40] Circle Internet Group, Inc. periodic filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (describing risks associated with reserve banks, custodians, asset managers, liquidity, operations, and markets).

[41] CFTC Chair Heath P. Tarbert statement supporting cross-border swaps final rule (Jul. 23, 2020) ("We should show deference to other regulators that have adopted comparable regulations, just as we expect them to do the same for us."); CFTC Chair Heath P. Tarbert remarks at the 35th Annual FIA Expo (Oct. 30, 2019) ("Mutual recognition is a two-way street. So if they extend mutual recognition to us, we will extend mutual recognition to them.")

[42] No entity has yet become a licensed payment stablecoin issuer under the GENIUS Act, as the licensing regime has not yet taken effect. Several sponsors have publicly declared intent to apply for qualification.

[43] Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (CLARITY Act), H.R. 3633, 119th Cong.; Roll Call Vote No. 199 (Jul. 17, 2025) (passed 294–134, with 216 Republicans and 78 Democrats voting yes). The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry acted in Jan. 2026; the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs voted 15–9 to approve its portion on May 14, 2026; a consolidated updated text was released in Jul. 2026. There are differences in provisions across these texts; the description in the body addresses their shared objectives.