
Why Is It Difficult for Crypto Bank Cards to Replace Visa?
By: Vaidik Mandloi
Compiled by: Luffy, Foresight News
Did you know? In July, crypto credit card spending exceeded $759 million, with 9 million transactions. This is nearly two and a half times that of the same period last year. Moreover, over 90% of the transaction volume was still paid using Visa cards.
Almost all crypto bank card projects are telling the same story: leveraging stablecoin payment channels to bypass card network fees and pass the saved costs back to merchants. We previously explored this logic when analyzing Stripe building a stablecoin-based cross-border payment link.
For this, I deeply researched a core question: What actually happens in reality if we try to bypass traditional card networks? Can getting rid of Visa and Mastercard really save costs for merchants? Which layer of the payment architecture can stablecoins actually replace?
The final conclusion was completely unexpected.
How the Payment System Works
To find the answer, we must first clarify where the fees actually go when consumers swipe their cards to pay. I first realized a common misconception: including many practitioners in the crypto industry, everyone thinks that card networks like Visa take the largest share of the fees.
The fact is not so. When a merchant accepts a $100 rewards credit card transaction, they need to pay a merchant discount rate of about 2.2%, totaling $2.2. The key is that this $2.2 does not fall into Visa's pocket, but is distributed among three parties, and the distribution ratio is not equal.

- The largest share, about $1.75, belongs to the issuing bank, which is the institution that issues credit cards to consumers. This fee is called the interchange fee, accounting for 70%–80% of the total merchant fees.
- Next is the merchant-side payment processor (acquiring institution), which charges a service fee of $0.30–$0.70.
- Finally, there is the card network Visa / Mastercard that everyone wants to disrupt, which charges only an assessment fee of $0.13–$0.18, accounting for only about 7%–9% of the total merchant expenditure.
In other words, if only Visa is removed, only the smallest fee in the entire chain is cut. And there are underlying reasons why Visa charges only a small fee itself.
Visa does not issue credit to anyone, nor does it need to bear credit risk, chargeback disputes, and fraud losses. In fact, Visa does not even participate in fund transfers. It is merely an information transmission network that is activated only when a user swipes their card at a merchant terminal. Visa's job is to transmit authorization information bidirectionally between the merchant terminal and the issuing bank, and to set the operating rules for the entire system. The issuing institution truly bears the heaviest functions.
Issuing institutions provide credit to consumers and bear bad debt risk; at the same time, they bear the capital occupancy cost between consumer spending and the bill repayment date, and rely on interchange fees to subsidize card swipe reward programs, thereby attracting users to use the cards.
This also creates Visa's extremely attractive business model. In 2025, Visa processed $14.2 trillion in payment transaction volume, with 257.5 billion transactions, creating $40 billion in net revenue, with a net profit margin close to 50%. It earns only about $0.13 per transaction on average, which is its entire source of profit. Visa can rank among the companies with the highest market capitalization globally, not because the fee per card swipe is high, but because it processes hundreds of billions of transactions annually, with marginal costs close to zero, and it bears no credit risk at all.
Next comes the thorniest realistic problem for stablecoin bank cards.
All stablecoin bank cards on the market belong to debit card products. Before consumption occurs, funds are already stored in the user's wallet in the form of USDC or USDT. There is no capital occupancy period, nor is there revolving credit generating interest income. This places such cards in a completely different economic model.
In addition, the U.S. Congress introduced the "Durbin Amendment" in 2010. For debit cards issued by banks with asset sizes exceeding $10 billion, the interchange fee cap is locked at $0.21 per transaction + 5 basis points. The vast majority of stablecoin bank card solutions choose to cooperate with small partner banks (digital banks) with assets below the $10 billion threshold, which are not subject to the Durbin Amendment. This is also the partner bank model commonly adopted by the fintech industry.

The unrestricted dual-network debit card interchange fee is currently about $0.62 per transaction on average. The comparison clearly shows: for a $100 transaction, a rewards credit card can generate $2.2 in total revenue; while a stablecoin debit card, even if applicable to higher exempt rates, has a total revenue of only $0.62. The project party still needs to pay card network fees, processor fees, and partner bank costs from these 62 cents, while covering fraud losses and operating expenses, only then can the remaining space consider offering benefits to merchants.
What Can Stablecoins Actually Replace?
From the above, it can be seen that the fees saved by removing Visa are negligible, and the profit space for operating stablecoin bank cards relying on debit card interchange fees is extremely narrow. But the value of stablecoin payments may not lie in saving negligible card network fees, but in the hope of replacing more core links in the payment architecture.
For this, I looked back at the previous article "Stripe Builds Its Own Public Chain". The article breaks down a cross-border payment into seven fee-charging links: acceptance, process scheduling, license compliance, custody, foreign exchange conversion, card issuance, and clearing settlement. I compared domestic card swipe transactions against this seven-layer structure to analyze which links will undergo substantial changes.

From the merchant's perspective, the transaction acceptance layer has not changed at all. The process remains the same, merchants are equipped with terminals, users swipe cards, and they still need to pay the merchant discount rate to the acquiring institution. Merchants cannot even perceive that the source of funds behind the card is USDC. In the merchant's bill, this transaction is no different from a normal Visa transaction. Similarly, the process scheduling layer still goes through Visa or Mastercard, and the card issuance link still relies on partner banks and card network BIN numbers. Long before stablecoins were born, fintech companies were already using this model, and there was no essential innovation.
What really changes is the backend link, which is also the most easily overlooked place.
The clearing and settlement layer is the only link where stablecoins can bring fundamental changes. In the traditional model, transaction clearing between issuing banks and card networks is on a T+2 cycle, combined with weekend market closures and batch processing. To optimize this pain point, service providers like Rain support end-of-day stablecoin settlement with Visa; Mastercard has also begun accepting stablecoins such as USDC, PYUSD, and RLUSD to achieve intraday settlement. This greatly compresses the traditional T+2 settlement, approaching real-time clearing, and releases the working capital originally occupied by issuing banks.
However, all benefits brought by working capital optimization belong to the issuing institution. The discount rate paid by merchants will not be reduced due to faster settlement, and consumers will not feel any difference in the checkout experience.
The only beneficiary of stablecoin T+0 settlement is the card operator, who no longer needs to advance funds for a two-day cycle. The innovation brought by stablecoins essentially helps issuing institutions optimize capital management. The returns are considerable after scaling up, but it cannot bring extra benefits to merchants or consumers. At the same time, Visa has no incentive to reduce fees — the cost of settling capital occupancy is never borne by Visa, and the pressure always falls on the issuing bank. Even if stablecoin settlement reduces the issuing bank's capital cost, Visa's own costs do not change, so the merchant rate naturally remains the same.
It is worth noting that Visa and Mastercard did not resist stablecoin settlement, but instead proactively integrated it into their own networks. Visa has supported USDC settlement on the Ethereum and Solana networks since 2021, and the current annualized settlement scale reaches $7 billion. Mastercard acquired BVNK a few months ago to expand its own stablecoin infrastructure. The two card networks even stated: "Stablecoins will not disrupt the existing payment landscape, but will instead consolidate this system."
Major card networks have not been disrupted or replaced by stablecoins; on the contrary, they have absorbed stablecoins as an upgrade solution for their own settlement layers. Every stablecoin bank card running on Visa claims to disrupt Visa on one hand, while contributing transaction volume and continuously paying fees to it on the other.
Additionally, to add a point, in the relevant Stripe article we mentioned that stablecoins can indeed reduce cross-border payment costs and save multiple layers of intermediary banks; this argument holds. But scenarios must be distinguished; the core pain points of cross-border payments are foreign exchange conversion and multiple layers of intermediaries, while domestic consumption has a completely different fee structure. The industry applies the verified logic of cross-border payments directly to domestic consumption scenarios, which does not match the real cost structure.
The logic of stablecoins empowering cross-border payments is very solid, but once implemented in domestic consumption, after sorting out the flow of fees, it can be found that this narrative is difficult to establish.
What can stablecoins ultimately replace? Objectively speaking, the answer is the clearing and settlement link and cross-border foreign exchange conversion. It transforms the underlying capital channel behind transactions. However, the largest source of cost for domestic card swipe transactions has never been on settlement infrastructure.















