
The incentive mechanism of Perp DEX needs a second answer
Written by: Foresight Ventures
The growth of Perp DEX is largely due to token incentives.
Cold starts require incentives; traders, liquidity providers, and order flow channels create value for the market and deserve rewards accordingly. What truly deserves discussion is not "whether to incentivize," but in what form incentives occur, and whether rewards truly correspond to contributions.

Before TGE, platforms typically use points, airdrops, and trading mining to attract current trading volume and liquidity with future token expectations. Such mechanisms can quickly complete user acquisition, but the fees paid by users are real, while the rewards obtained still depend on future token distribution and market pricing. After TGE, fees begin to be used for buybacks, burns, and staking rewards; value gradually returns to the ecosystem, but mainly still through platform tokens for absorption and distribution.
The problem therefore lies not in incentives themselves, but in whether incentives rely too heavily on future expectations. Traders create trading demand and fee revenue; liquidity providers provide depth and execution; wallets, trading terminals, and communities bring continuous order flow. But existing mechanisms reward points acquisition ability and token holdings more than who truly makes the market operate.
This is also the key issue discussed by Foresight Ventures during the investment and incubation of PopDEX: Can platforms establish a more direct and sustainable value return path, making rewards closer to real market contributions?
I. Early Growth and Demand Verification Under Token Incentives
1. Why Tokens Become the Default Tool
The cold start of a Perp DEX requires acquiring traders, liquidity, and distribution channels simultaneously, while early platforms usually lack stable income and find it difficult to bear high cash subsidies for the long term.
Tokens provide a more efficient coordination method: platforms can uniformly convert the contributions of traders, market makers, and early participants into future equity, exchanging future value for current trading volume, liquidity, and market attention.
dYdX represents a relatively early complete token incentive model. In its initial token supply, 25% was used for trading rewards, 7.5% allocated to historical users, and 7.5% for liquidity rewards. Trading rewards were calculated based on fee contribution and open interest, while liquidity rewards examined quote online rate, two-sided depth, bid-ask spread, and number of markets covered. User acquisition, market making subsidies, and early ownership allocation were thus incorporated into the same token system.
Subsequent platforms made different adjustments on this framework:
- Hyperliquid combines points, Referral, and HLP, used respectively to attract traders, expand order flow, and establish protocol liquidity;
- Aster: Adopts multi-season trading mining, sustaining trading participation and user activity through continuous points cycles and phased token distribution.
- Lighter lowers the trading threshold through zero fees, and sets retail points and market maker points separately to distinguish trading activity from liquidity quality;
These platforms do not rely solely on tokens, but tokens remain the core coordination tool in the cold start system. Its advantage is not just "distributing rewards," but the ability to uniformly convert the contributions of different participants into future equity, and defer most user acquisition and liquidity costs to TGE. Specific mechanisms vary, but the exchange relationship is basically consistent: platforms first use future equity and early subsidies to exchange for current trading volume, liquidity, and market attention.
2. Those Attracted by Points Are Not Necessarily Long-term Traders
Points airdrops not only change whether users enter the platform, but also change why users trade.
Under normal circumstances, traders choosing a platform will focus on liquidity, execution stability, fees, asset coverage, and risk management. After points airdrops are added, these standards do not disappear, but users' decision weights will change: in addition to the trading experience itself, users will also calculate how many points can be obtained per unit of trading cost, whether potential airdrops can cover fees and capital occupation, and when rewards will be realized.
This does not mean that users participating in points are not professional traders. On the contrary, many professional traders will also rationally evaluate points returns. The problem is that when points become an important variable in trading decisions, the trading volume obtained by the platform no longer reflects only product competitiveness, but also includes users' pricing of future rewards.
Both types of trading behavior can contribute to trading volume, but the retention logic is different.
One type of trading behavior comes from continuous product demand: users stay because the platform's liquidity, execution, costs, and asset coverage can meet trading needs. The other type of trading behavior comes more from reward expectations: whether users continue to trade depends on whether points still have value, whether airdrops still have room for imagination, and whether the input-output still holds.

In the Perp DEX retail survey previously conducted by Foresight Ventures, 69% of respondents listed points or airdrops as an important factor in choosing a trading platform, higher than reliability (61%), liquidity and depth (58%), and fees (47%). Points and airdrops are no longer just additional rewards outside the product, but are competing directly with reliability, liquidity, and fees, becoming core variables for users choosing a platform.
This will change the nature of the order flow obtained by the platform. When users enter based on reward expectations first, what the platform establishes is not high switching costs based on product habits, but a trading relationship that requires continuous subsidies. Rewards can lower the threshold for users to enter the platform, but also lower the threshold for users to leave the platform.
3. TGE is the First Stress Test for Trading Demand
During the points cycle, what the platform buys is not just trading volume, but also users' waiting for future equity. As long as there is still room for imagination for airdrops, users are willing to trade, pay fees, occupy capital, and accept a product experience that is not yet fully mature.
But the data during the points period is not pure. A trade may come from real market demand, or from expectations of airdrops; a new user may form long-term order flow, or may stop trading after completing tasks.
On the surface data, they all belong to growth.
When these different motivations are put into the same token and points system, it is difficult for the platform to judge what is ultimately obtained. Therefore, data after TGE cannot just look at rises and falls; more importantly, there are three things:
- Whether trading volume remains after rewards exit, or is continued to be maintained by a new round of incentives;
- Whether market share has increased, rather than just following overall Perp DEX market fluctuations;
- Whether the platform has entered a natural retention stage, or is still in a new incentive cycle.

Note: The table only includes platforms for which unified trading volume and market share data standards 30 days before and after TGE can be obtained. Aster was not included in this comparison due to incomplete current public data standards.
What this set of data really looks at is not which platform has higher trading volume after TGE, but which platform converted the attention brought by airdrops into continuous trading relationships.
If there is still a new round of points, mining, or subsidies after TGE, the trading volume still contains incentive components and cannot be simply equated to demand accumulation. The real watershed is whether users are still willing to continue trading based on the platform itself after the marginal attraction of reward expectations declines.
In other words, pre-TGE verifies whether the platform can attract users to enter; post-TGE verifies whether the platform can keep users. The former can be completed by incentives, the latter ultimately depends on product capabilities and value distribution mechanisms.
II. Value Begins to Return, But Still Revolves Around Platform Tokens
1. From Distributing Tokens to Supporting Tokens
After TGE, incentive mechanisms usually shift from "distributing tokens" to "supporting tokens." Platforms typically use fee income for buybacks, burns, staking yields, and token holding discounts. Value begins to return, but the distribution basis also shifts from trading contributions to token holdings.
This means that traders first create income through trading, and then obtain the qualification to share income by purchasing or staking platform tokens. The platform thus needs to maintain two markets simultaneously: the trading market and the platform token market.
The two can reinforce each other, but are not always consistent. Professional traders may contribute fees for the long term, but are unwilling to bear additional platform token risks. Thus, platform rewards gradually include not just trading itself, but also users' capital investment in platform tokens.
This transformation has different implementations on different platforms. What is truly worth comparing is not just whether there are buybacks, but how much income enters the token system, how tokens are handled after buybacks, and who ultimately absorbs this part of the value.

2. Platform Tokens Expand Participation, But Do Not Equal Trading Demand
Platform tokens can expand ecosystem participation, but the address growth they bring does not necessarily synchronize into contract trading demand. To observe this difference, we conducted a cross-analysis of Hyperliquid's HYPE holding addresses, yield product user addresses, and contract trading user addresses.
The results show that in the union of the three types of users, HYPE holding addresses account for 89%, yield product users account for 27%, and contract users account for only 20%; users participating in holding, yield products, and contract trading simultaneously account for only 5% of the whole.
Further breakdown shows:
- Among contract users, 62% hold HYPE, but over 70% did not participate in yield products;
- Among HYPE holding users, 86% have never conducted contract trading;
- Among yield product users, 85% hold HYPE, but the proportion participating in contract trading is only 19%.
This set of data indicates that platform tokens can bring broader asset holding and ecosystem participation, but holding, yield products, and trading do not correspond to the same type of demand. Holding may come from asset allocation and price expectations, yield products correspond more to yield strategies, and contract trading directly reflects trading demand and order flow.
When holding addresses, asset scale, and yield product users are uniformly counted into ecosystem growth, capital participation is easily misread as trading market growth. But for Perp DEX, what truly determines market quality is still continuous trading, effective liquidity, and real fee income.
Platform tokens can expand ecosystem participation, but cannot replace trading demand itself.
3. One Platform, Two Sets of Growth Goals
When income distribution, fee discounts, and product permissions are all bound to platform tokens, Perp DEX actually needs to operate two markets simultaneously: the trading market and the token market. This brings a fundamental tension: what the platform serves with highest priority is actually the trading product itself, or the value cycle built around platform tokens.
These two sets of goals are not always synchronized. The trading market focuses on execution quality, liquidity, and costs, relying on long-term product capabilities; the token market focuses on demand, scarcity, and price expectations, relying on continuously creating reasons to hold tokens.
The resulting risk is not just that resources are dispersed, but that evaluation standards shift. Trading volume, fees, and user growth are no longer used only to measure whether the trading product is healthy, but also begin to bear the role of supporting token narratives. What the platform pursues may no longer be just more real trading, but more data that can strengthen token demand.
III. PopDEX: Another Answer to Incentive Mechanisms
From Foresight Ventures' investment perspective, what is worth paying attention to about PopDEX is not simply discussing whether platform tokens exist, but that the team did not take token expectations as the growth starting point, nor did they set token holding status as a necessary prerequisite for trading rights. Compared to converging platform value to platform tokens first, and then redistributing through platform tokens, PopDEX starts more directly from real market contributions: whoever creates value, value should return to them.
Based on this idea, PopDEX has established a 100% value return system.
The 100% here targets the distributable value formed by trading fees, rather than returning every fee back to traders along the original path. Its core lies in: the distributable value formed by trading fees is no longer prioritized for supporting platform tokens, but enters a return framework designed around real contributions.
Under this framework, PopDEX's value return will cover two types of participants: ecosystem contributors and real trading users. The former includes ecosystem roles such as Referral, Affiliate, trading activities, and joint Campaigns that continuously bring users, order flow, and market attention; the latter, based on real trading contributions, explores more direct, periodic, transparent, and verifiable value return methods.
As for what form this part of value will ultimately be distributed in, PopDEX will gradually disclose it in subsequent product stages.
For PopDEX, this is not a negation of existing models, but a different incentive mechanism attempt: incentives are not only used to acquire growth, but can also become a way for the platform to continuously give back to the ecosystem.
There is no standard answer for how incentive mechanisms should evolve, and the market will ultimately give its own judgment. But we believe that as the Perp DEX industry continues to mature, its incentive mechanisms should not have only a single path, and it is also worth having more answers appear.















