
Crypto Primary Investment: The Triangular Game of Human Nature, Law, and Capital | IOSG
Author: IOSG Legal, IOSG Ventures

After years of deep engagement in the crypto industry, we have invested in over a hundred projects. We have watched our stance on industry investment terms evolve from initial confusion to acceptance, and now to reflection and questioning today:
When a project's structure grows increasingly complex and documents more professional, are we truly enhancing security, or merely making risk look more respectable? When agreements are filled with governance clauses, can these rights actually be enforced, or are they mere paper tigers?
The systemic risk of Web3 investments often lies not in the market, but in the lack of inherent accountability within the architecture itself. Documents may be polished and terminology comprehensive, but in the worst-case scenario, investors cannot identify responsible parties, constrain control rights, or access remediation paths. In essence, this is not risk control, but risk packaging.
Three Recurring Structural Issues:
1. Over-Cutting of Legal Entities:
Value, control, and liability are artificially separated. R&D/operations reside in one company, while token issuance and treasury management sit in another entity (foundation/SPV), and investors may only sign an agreement with one of them.
On the surface, it appears as risk isolation, but in practice, it creates "ownerless risk": when things go wrong, everyone can say, "That's not me." What investors truly fear is never decentralization, but deresponsibilization.
2. Symbolic Governance:
Documents exist without mechanisms; rights exist without teeth.
In the early days, investor promises relied on verbal assurances and gentlemen's agreements (which now seem like a Wild West-level adventure). Later, despite instruments like SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrants, key procedural elements remained missing.
Veto rights on material matters, budget and audit schedules for treasury expenditures, rules for replacing multi-sig signers, and standards/boundaries for disclosure—on paper, it looks like corporate governance; in execution, it reads like a wish list.
3. Structurally Weakened Remedial Paths:
Assets move faster than the law, entities change quicker than procedures, and cross-border costs exceed potential compensation—all of which contribute to the difficulty of enforcing rights in crypto investments. For investors, true risk control isn't about writing longer clauses; it's ensuring that in the worst-case scenario, you can "stop the bleeding," "trace assets," and "enforce judgments."
This industry has moved past its early "Dark Forest" era, yet sudden project collapses remain all too common. There are two root causes: first, some founders lack reverence for contractual spirit; second, the industry suffers from structural amnesia, causing investors to repeatedly make the same design mistakes.
This article examines five real-world case scenarios to discuss structural issues that are typically overlooked but can be fatal under extreme conditions, distilling battlefield lessons into actionable principles.
Case 1: From "Perfect Architecture" to "The Disappearing Defendant"
Key Themes: Entity Fragmentation, Legal Entity Continuity
A few years ago, we engaged with a project dedicated to building blockchain gaming infrastructure. The team had impressive backgrounds and top-tier resumes, offering a "one-click on-chain" solution that directly addressed core pain points for traditional game publishers.
To facilitate fundraising and navigate complex global regulations, the team designed what was then widely considered a "perfect" offshore structure: registering a parent company in Delaware, USA, for R&D, while establishing an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for token issuance.
Technology and teams in the US, tokens in offshore SPVs—that was the default consensus in investment circles at the time.
Faced with this structure, investors typically took two paths: traditional equity investors funded the parent company, operating on the logic that controlling the team means controlling the project. We chose a more "crypto-native" path: signing a Token Purchase Agreement directly with the Gibraltar SPV to exchange capital for future token rights.
Our rationale was that since tokens would be the core asset of the ecosystem going forward, securing direct token rights was more straightforward than equity. At the time, it seemed like a highly rational decision.
Following the investment, there was a relatively calm period. Project progress was slow but steady, and the team maintained polite, restrained communication with us.
Then, one day, the Gibraltar SPV suddenly announced a CEO change without notifying the US parent company or any investors, nearly simultaneously unilaterally launching token issuance. Internal struggles went public, market confidence collapsed instantly, and the token price plummeted upon listing. Our "token rights" overnight transformed from latent value into highly volatile digital chips.
Our initial reaction was anger, but after calming down, we quickly assessed this as more of an internal control struggle within the founding team. SPV management was clearly attempting to break free from the parent company's control, and institutions holding parent company equity would inevitably take legal action, potentially putting the project back on track. We decided to wait and see.
Indeed it did. The parent company and its behind-the-scenes equity investors swiftly filed lawsuits in both the US and Gibraltar, scoring an early victory: they successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from a US court restoring the parent company's access rights to key technical infrastructure, and secured a freezing injunction from a Gibraltar court to freeze most of the SPV's issued tokens. The parent company side was highly likely to regain control.
Then, an unexpected twist occurred that no one foresaw.
The Gibraltar court overturned the freezing injunction. The reasoning was chillingly simple: that US parent company had been administratively dissolved by the Delaware government over a year earlier due to failing to file a mandatory compliance document for more than a year straight.
In the eyes of the law, this company had
ceased to exist
.
A company legally "dead" lacks standing to sue anyone as a plaintiff. It possesses no legal personality, no capacity to hold rights, and no interests capable of judicial protection.
The institutions that invested in the parent company's equity were completely ousted overnight. The legal entity backing their investment had vanished, leaving all claims grounded in nothing. Investment returned to zero.
For those of us who invested in SPV token rights, our assets shrank significantly due to internal fighting, but we still held tradable tokens. Meanwhile, those equity investors once deemed "safer" had completely lost their legal footing.
Rather than relief, what we felt in that moment was profound dread.
The most fatal risk in this industry may not be a market crash, a technical vulnerability, or even founder integrity, but a forgotten compliance document costing merely a few hundred dollars.
Case Conclusion
Continuous legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial.
The crux of investment decisions lies not only in verifying that the corporate entity is in "Good Standing" at the moment of signing, but also in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism throughout the entire investment lifecycle. Ensuring every legal entity on the investment chain remains "alive" and compliant is the most fundamental baseline of investment management, yet it is frequently overlooked.
You must penetrate and understand the actual control behind offshore structures.
When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are placed in an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over it relies solely on an agreement, investors must remain highly vigilant. The investment agreement must include strong covenants, such as: no changes to SPV directors or controllers without majority investor consent;
the parent company must maintain its legal existence, otherwise triggering breach clauses; any major decisions (like Token Launch) must obtain approval from investor-appointed directors. These clauses must be explicitly written into the agreement at inception, rather than added retroactively after problems arise.
Never blindly rely on lead investors.
Even the industry's top funds may have blind spots or undisclosed conflicts of interest in their due diligence. Independent, cross-validated reference checks are indispensable. Investors must rely on their own independent judgment and take responsibility for their capital.
Case 2: Value "Evaporation", Entity Switching, and Dilution of Early Investors
Key Themes: Entity Fragmentation, Entity Switching Dilution
There is another category of structural risk, far more covert, and often occurring within a "legal" framework.
In 2021, amidst the market frenzy, we invested in a technology company specializing in formal verification. The team consisted of experts with top academic backgrounds, demonstrated strong technical capabilities, and always showed great respect toward investors, fostering smooth cooperative relationships.
However, roughly two to three years later, we gradually realized the founder began constructing a brand-new token issuance entity, planning to advance the token project under a structure completely separate from the original investing company. Even more unacceptable was that this new entity neither acknowledged early equity investors nor attempted to integrate them into the new token right framework.
From a legal standpoint, their maneuver was technically flawless: the new entity was independently registered, and the original investment contracts did not directly bind the actions of this new subject.
But from a commercial perspective, it was a systematic deprivation of early investors' value. Early investors used capital and trust to cultivate a team and a technology stack, only for these resources to "re-sprout" inside the new entity, while the original equity structure was quietly hollowed out.
We subsequently represented all early investors in protracted, arduous negotiations lasting several months, arguing firmly to secure rightful entitlements. Ultimately, we secured valuation terms for early investors more favorable than those offered to the new round of investors. However, this process nearly exhausted our relational capital with the founder.
This incident made us profoundly realize:
Entity switching can be the most "elegant" form of value extraction.
Case Conclusion
Incorporate an "Entity Switch Protection Clause" into the investment agreement.
Explicitly stipulate that if the founder establishes a new affiliated entity within a certain period after investment (recommended 2-3 years) to advance core asset (particularly Token) issuance, early investors shall receive corresponding equity shares. This clause should be included in the agreement at the initial investment stage, rather than added retroactively after issues arise.
Governance rights matter more than valuation.
Board seats, along with rights to notice and consent regarding major structural changes, form the final line of defense for protecting early investors' interests. Relationships and trust alone are insufficient.
Case 3: When Humanity Becomes a Variable, Rescue Financing, and Broken Promises
Key Themes: Structurally Weakened Remedial Paths
If the previous two cases revolved around the cold calculus of law and structure, this one is steeped in human ties and psychological complexity. Sometimes, what crushes you isn't complex clauses, but faces that shift rapidly when faced with competing interests.
This occurred during the depths of a bear market, when an early investment of ours faced depleted funds and near-bankruptcy. The founder pleaded earnestly, stating there was absolutely nothing left on the books, and operations could not continue without fresh capital injection.
Pledging to protect existing investments and harboring a sliver of hope for the project, we decided to step in with rescue financing via a down-round. The founder expressed profound gratitude at the time.
With capital received, the project survived. The market soon recovered, and the project's sector became the spotlight. Leveraging this "lifeline funding," the founder rode the wave, and combined with exceptional storytelling skills, secured follow-on investment from renowned institutions and successfully listed on mainstream exchanges.
Yet, communication with the founder became exceptionally difficult thereafter. When investors requested fulfillment of initial promises, he launched a series of evasions—from initially refusing to distribute tokens citing Coinbase listing requirements, to delays justified by personal or family illnesses. The entire stalling tactic stretched over several months.
Finally, an ultimatum was delivered: either accept the same terms as other new investors, or walk away entirely. The goodwill of the rescue financing was utterly discarded in the face of massive profit opportunities.
Luckily, our legal and post-investment team never gave up. Through prolonged, patient negotiation and rights enforcement, we ultimately recovered the vast majority of deserved tokens. Yet this experience exposed a fundamental issue:
Changes in interest structures systematically alter human behavior. This isn't cynical pessimism about human nature; it's a variable that should have been anticipated and engineered into the contract structure from the start.
Case Conclusion
All business commitments, regardless of size, must be codified into legally binding formal documents.
Do not relax documentary requirements simply because the counterparty adopts a humble posture. Business decisions must always be based on worst-case assumptions. Rescue financing during bear markets typically occurs at moments of maximum information asymmetry and emotional pressure, precisely when legal standards are most easily compromised. The lower the counterparty's stance and the greater our negotiating leverage, the more imperative it is to insist on documenting every commitment in a formal agreement.
Given the scarcity of contractual ethos, agreement enforcement must be guaranteed by designing clauses with "teeth".
The investment agreement must explicitly define liabilities for breach. For example, failure to fulfill specific clauses should trigger substantial penalty payments or grant investors the right to acquire additional tokens at deeply discounted prices. The cost of default must significantly outweigh the potential gains from betrayal.
Simultaneously, ensure investors hold sufficient bargaining chips, such as board seats, veto rights on material matters, or co-control over corporate bank accounts and multi-sig wallets.
Before deciding to intervene, answer one fundamental question first:
What is the root cause of this team's liquidity crisis? Can their values withstand stress testing? Insisting on transparency and compliance isn't about lacking trust in founders; it's the most basic protection for both parties' relationship.
Case 4: Governance Vacuum, The Cost of Silence
Key Themes: Symbolic Governance
There exists a category of risk that stems neither from legal structural loopholes nor from subjective founder betrayal, but from the investors' own absence at critical junctures.
We once invested in a Web3 infrastructure project with considerable promise at the time. Behind the project stood a major shareholder with significant reputation and substantial assets in the industry—a key factor in our bullish thesis. Yet, during an all-hands meeting, this major shareholder publicly fired the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.
We only learned of this afterward from the departing CEO, rather than through official project communications.
Our assessment at the time was that this was merely a normal leadership adjustment, not a crisis signal requiring immediate intervention. We demanded no audit, requested no special shareholders' meeting, initiated no evaluation procedure, and chose silence and observation.
Roughly six months to a year later, the new management announced: the foundation was being liquidated. Ultimately, we recovered less than 20% of our initial investment.
In hindsight, that sudden CEO dismissal was the clearest warning signal of the project's impending decline.
When a company undergoes significant, abnormal management changes, it often signals deep fissures in its core governance structure. At that moment, investors' highest priority should be immediately demanding an independent audit and intervening in governance reconstruction, rather than standing idly by.
Case Conclusion
Classify major governance events as mandatory "Intervention Trigger Events".
The investment agreement should explicitly state that major events—such as abnormal CEO departure, core shareholder changes, or initiation of litigation/arbitration—will automatically trigger investors' special rights, including demands for independent financial audits, convening special shareholders' meetings, and suspending major financial expenditures.
Maintain continuous monitoring, rather than passively waiting.
Post-investment management should not stop at routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive information channels, including maintaining communication with core project employees (not just founders). We recommend requesting quarterly independent updates from the CFO/CTO level in the post-investment agreement, rather than relying solely on the founder as a single point of contact.
Case 5: The Halo of Resumes, The Black Hole of Character
Key Themes: Symbolic Governance, Structurally Weakened Remedial Paths
"Investing is investing in people," as the saying goes. Yet, we are far too easily dazzled by glittering resumes. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, top-tier hedge funds... these names seem to carry an innate halo, leading us subconsciously to equate "elite backgrounds" with "professionalism, discipline, and reliability." But the harsh reality is that sometimes, the most dangerous players are precisely these "golden boys."
Wall Street training taught them to package narratives, exploit rules, and sway emotions. These capabilities are inherently neutral, but once deployed mischievously, their destructive power exceeds imagination.
We had the "luck" to miss out on a project. The founder's resume was practically flawless, climbing to executive levels at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan before striking out on his own. His venture aimed to build an "absolutely fair" on-chain casino. The story was seductive, the team opulent, and numerous prominent industry institutions vied for entry at the time.
However, due to our severe concerns regarding the compliance risks of the "casino" sector, and after multiple fruitless discussions with the founder on viable compliance pathways, our risk control department ultimately rejected the investment.
The plot twist came the very next day. The project announced the closure of millions in funding. Yet, within minutes of capital receipt, the founder began transferring company funds into his personal wallet. Over the following week, he gambled away millions of those dollars in another on-chain casino app.
He promised to build a fair casino, yet took the construction funds to become a gambler in someone else's house. This wasn't a failure of risk management; it was blatant fraud and misappropriation. Ultimately, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and faced years of imprisonment.
Another case we personally experienced involved a highly anticipated 3A game title dubbed the "Call of Duty on-chain." While team members hailed from top-tier game studios, the project's cash burn rate was terrifying, consuming $2–3 million monthly against severely delayed development milestones. The company quickly spiraled into a financial crisis, slashing headcount from over a hundred to just a dozen.
Just as the edifice was crumbling, we discovered that the project's co-founder and CTO had been continuously dumping his allocated team tokens on the secondary market over a seven-month period, netting nearly $700,000. Legally speaking, he was selling vested shares, seemingly beyond reproach.
But from a commercial ethics standpoint, with the company hanging by a thread and mass layoffs underway, him frantically cashing out personally sent a crystal-clear market signal: "The ship is sinking; I'm jumping first."
In both cases, investors overly fixated on the founders' past accolades while neglecting deep scrutiny of their current character and behavioral patterns. Simultaneously, the lack of key controls like "multi-signature" authorization and "milestone-based disbursements" directly led to loss of financial oversight.
Case Conclusion
Character Due Diligence (Character DD) must take absolute precedence.
Resumes can be polished, stories packaged, but an individual's character and behavioral patterns remain relatively stable. Investment firms need to establish a more systematic methodology for character due diligence, extending beyond standard background checks to include deeper interviews and even behavioral stress testing. Particular attention must be paid to: whether the founder's personal history fundamentally contradicts the mission they claim for the project?
An individual with a gambling record entering the casino space is itself a massive Red Flag.
Financial control is a non-negotiable baseline for investment.
For early-stage projects, particularly where a founder holds unilateral control, absolutely no capital should be placed in a single wallet fully controlled by one individual. Multi-sig wallets must become a mandatory requirement, with investors or their designated, trusted third parties serving as co-signers.
Fund disbursements should be based on clear, quantifiable milestones, releasing tranche funds only upon completion of specific tasks. These risk control mechanisms, long matured in traditional VC, demand even stricter enforcement in the crypto industry.
Deeply align the core team's interests with the project's long-term development.
Team token unlocks should not be tied solely to time, but heavily weighted against project milestones, such as product launches, reaching specific user thresholds, or achieving target protocol revenues. Furthermore, agreements must explicitly stipulate restrictions on core member token sales during periods of financial distress or major crises.
This serves as both a constraint and a statement of intent, signaling to the community and all investors the team's resolve to survive or perish together with the project.
Conclusion: Back to Common Sense, Navigating Cycles
After experiencing so much, we are no longer the fervent "Web3 believers" of old. We've morphed into realists, risk assessors, observers of human nature. We no longer get easily swept up by grand narratives; instead, we scrutinize every detail like auditors and test every hypothesis like engineers.
When evaluating a project, we constantly ask ourselves:
Do we truly know this founder? Beyond the narrative they spin, have we sought indirect insights from former colleagues, ex-bosses, or even competitors to understand what kind of person they really are?
Do we truly comprehend this project's legal architecture? Are there hidden "backdoors"? If the founder absconds, does the contract in our hands remain worthless paper or transform into a sharp sword?
Post-funding, do we retain control over capital utilization? Or are we forced to place blind faith in the founder's moral conscience?
Are the founding team's interests truly perfectly aligned with ours as investors? Does their token unlock mechanism incentivize long-term building, or merely facilitate short-term cash-outs?
When warning signs emerge, do we have the courage to say no?
At its core, sound investment structures aren't designed to guard against gentlemanly conduct; they exist to survive extreme scenarios. When everyone maintains decorum, any architecture functions smoothly; the true test arrives during periods of diverging interests, market upheaval, and collapsing trust—can the contract in your hands speak on your behalf?
We purchased these lessons with hard cash. We put them in writing because we believe that
the cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly borne by each new generation of entrants.
And precisely because of this, we have systematically integrated continuous compliance monitoring, entity-switch protection clauses, and mandatory multi-sig wallet requirements into our investment workflow. These are not mere paper improvements; they are institutional upgrades cemented through repeated, tangible costs.
This article serves as the inaugural submission in the IOSG-Legal series. We will continue to publish industry practice guidelines, welcoming peer exchanges and collaborative standard-building. If you possess similar field experiences, structural insights, or lessons learned from pitfalls you wish to share, please submit and connect with us.















