
View: Stock Perps are the largest growth driver for small-cap stocks in the future.
Author: agintender
In 2020, anyone looking to short GameStop faced an insurmountable hurdle: where could they borrow shares? At the time, this game retailer hadn't yet become a common topic among global retail investors, but borrow fees had exceeded an annualized 100% in Q2. By January 2021, the fee was around 25%. This isn't to tell you whether the stock price would rise or fall, but rather how much you'd need to pay daily to participate in this trade.
Think of it like the car rental business. You expect a $5,000 deal to come through next month, but the rental cost this month is $8,333. Even if the deal goes through, you're operating at a loss. More troubleingly, sometimes the rental company has zero cars available.
The same applies to stocks: paying money doesn't guarantee someone will lend them. For a brokerage to support short selling, your account must have permissions, and there must be available shares to borrow.
This is where the discussion of stock perpetual swaps begins:
The point of perpetual swaps is to allow more people to participate in this game for different reasons.
Some are bullish on the company, some question the valuation, and others have no opinion on the stock's direction—they only care whether the funding rate can cover holding costs or if there's an opportunity in the spot-to-perp spread.
They don't need to believe the same story, nor do they even need to be in the same camp, to become each other's trading counterparties.
The perpetual swap mechanism applies to all stocks. For mid- and small-cap stocks with weaker liquidity and fewer derivative options, it may fill gaps in tradable combinations that couldn't work before, providing an entry point for capital that previously had none.
However, to truly understand this path, don't rush into leverage first. Think about vendors in a fruit market.
Principles Any Fruit Vendor Understands
Fruit vendors stock up because they plan to sell produce to customers. They don't need to believe apple prices will rise next month; as long as the selling price covers purchase, spoilage, and operational costs, there's a reason to buy. Market makers in the stock market operate similarly: they hold shares not because they think the company has bright prospects, but to serve clients on the other side of trades.
Assume a stock trades at $10, and someone wants to buy upside exposure equivalent to 10,000 shares via a perpetual swap. The market maker sells them the contract, becoming the perp short. If the stock price rises, the market maker loses money. To hedge this risk, they buy 10,000 shares in the stock market. Now, the client holds a perp long position, while the market maker holds a "stock long + perp short," generating a $100,000 buy order in the spot market.
This stock buying pressure arises because someone is trading, and the market maker needs to inventory and hedge. Just like a fruit vendor stocking up, buying doesn't necessarily imply bullishness on price appreciation. The difference is that stocks can be paired with contracts to offset most directional risk; the spoilage and quality risks of perishables can't be hedged the same way.
Reversing the flow creates another path. If a client wants to short the perp, the market maker takes the order and becomes the perp long, which may prompt them to sell existing inventory or borrow and short shares to offset downside risk. Consequently, selling pressure emerges in the stock market while buying pressure appears in the contract market.

The image shows two possible hedging paths. Market makers first net out long and short demands from clients, handling only the remaining net risk; not every contract corresponds to a share transaction. Holding share inventory doesn't mean unlimited order acceptance either—constraints stem from capital, borrow supply, and risk tolerance.
Four Prices Behind Perpetual Swaps
But how do perpetual swaps keep prices connected between the two markets? If a stock is $10 and the contract keeps rising to $15, wouldn't they just become two separate markets?
Think of two stalls selling the same product. If one gets pricier, customers compare, and traders consider buying low and selling high. But stock perpetuals have a distinct feature: they typically don't deliver shares on a fixed date, so you can't rely solely on "delivery upon expiry" to anchor prices. Instead, they require a different incentive mechanism—one being the funding rate.
The funding rate resembles a periodically settled holding statement. When the contract stays persistently expensive, the mechanism usually raises the long side's cost, paying fees to shorts to attract participants to the other side; when persistently cheap, the payment direction may reverse. Exchanges don't issue dividends from thin air—the money comes from holders on the opposite side. Every open position corresponds to one long and one short, so it's oversimplified to say "more longs mean everyone pays."
How does the system know if a contract is expensive? First, you must distinguish between several types of prices.

If a bag of rice is tagged at $10, it doesn't mean you can buy an entire truckload at that price. Cheap stock might be limited to one bag, with subsequent bags costing $10.20. Implied execution price calculates along the order book: given a set amount, what's the average actual execution price you'd get buying or selling?
A typical exchange's implied price algorithm looks roughly like this:
[max(Implicit Bid Price – Reference Price, 0) – max(Reference Price – Implicit Ask Price, 0)] ÷ Reference Price
Here, implicit bid and ask prices refer to the average executable prices on the bid and ask sides (the limit orders in the order book). Assuming a reference price of $10, with implicit execution prices of $10.01 and $10.03 on both sides, applying the formula above yields 0.1%.
Mark price handles another function: preventing a single anomalous trade from triggering liquidations across thousands of accounts. It usually estimates risk by combining reference prices, order book snapshots, or smoothed basis spreads. Formulas vary by platform, and these prices aren't guaranteed to be equal at every moment.
Reference price tells you what the market is benchmarking against, funding rates incentivize position adjustments, and mark price dictates how risk management handles volatility—each serves a distinct role.
At this stage, traders specializing in funding rates can step in. They aren't betting on stock direction; they simply calculate whether the income from a position covers the associated costs.
Funding Rates and Costs
Back to that ~$10 stock. They buy 10,000 shares spot and short the equivalent 10,000 shares in perpetuals. Assume the contract pays shorts a 0.03% funding rate every 8 hours. With a notional principal hovering around $100,000, collecting it three times a day yields $90 daily, or roughly $2,700 over 30 days. If the financing cost to buy the stock is 6% annualized (using a 360-day year), that's about $500 over 30 days.

That $2,200 is merely the 30-day spread between funding income and financing costs; annualized by multiplying by 12 and dividing by $100,000, the return is roughly 26.4% (before deducting other costs).
The point of this example is to show that someone can hold a position or shares purely for funding rate income, not necessarily because they're bullish on the company.
If prices move synchronously across both markets, their P&L roughly tracks as follows. For simplicity, assume both positions were opened at $10 for 10,000 shares, excluding funding and fees.

What matters is how much income remains after netting both sides out. Funding rates may look lucrative, but you still need to subtract financing and other costs to determine if the spread trade is worthwhile.
The reverse setup works similarly. Shorting borrowed shares while buying perps means longs might charge fees when funding turns negative. But if you collect $2,700 monthly, and borrow fees are calculated at a 30% annualized rate on a $100k base over 360 days, that's $2,500 for 30 days, leaving only $200 to cover overhead. If borrow fees hit $8,333, relying solely on this funding income won't generate profit.
These two paths aren't symmetrical. "Buy spot, short perp" primarily requires capital, whereas "borrow & short, buy perp" requires capital plus available borrow inventory.
Perpetual swaps let ordinary traders skip the headache of sourcing shares directly, letting natural longs, equity holders, and professional institutions absorb risk. However, the portion requiring share borrowing to hedge remains constrained by borrow availability—a topic outside today's scope.
Basis Spreads and Arbitrage
Another group focuses exclusively on spreads. Imagine a standardized commodity priced at $10 at Store A and $10.20 at Store B; traders analyze whether the 20-cent gap covers transport costs. The same logic applies to stocks and perps, though contracts aren't physical delivery warrants, and price convergence isn't guaranteed on schedule.
Assume the stock is $10 and the contract is $10.20. You buy 10,000 shares spot and short 10,000 shares in the perp. If both jump to $11, the spot leg gains $10,000 while the perp leg loses $8,000, leaving a $2,000 gross spread profit. If both drop to $9, the spot leg loses $10,000 and the perp leg gains $12,000, still leaving $2,000. Funding rates, financing costs, and trading fees are calculated separately.
Traders don't need to know whether the company ultimately proves worth $9 or $11. They only need to assess whether the 20-cent gap will narrow and whether the costs and risks taken justify the potential reward. Since perpetuals lack fixed expiration dates, if the spread widens from 20 cents to 50 cents, they could face paper losses or even be forced to exit before convergence occurs.
Cross-platform traders also compare pricing and funding rates across venues. Some platforms trade premium, others discount; some charge higher fees, others lower. But their contract multipliers, reference prices, and dividend adjustments must align, and capital must be prepared on both sides. Noticing price discrepancies is just the starting point—it doesn't automatically equate to guaranteed profit.
Arbitrarily Added Trading Points?
The term "arbitrarily adding trading points" loses its mystery now. The company remains unchanged, but the market now offers independently comparable prices, fees, and risks. The same stock buy order might come from a fundamental bull or an arb trader hedging a perp short position. The same contract sell order might originate from a bear or a long-term shareholder wanting to temporarily reduce risk while keeping their shares. Identical buy/sell actions can mask entirely different motives.
Suppose one investor buys perp contracts because they're bullish on the company, while another trader sells them those contracts while simultaneously buying spot shares to hedge, aiming to harvest funding rates. These two never agree on the company's outlook, yet execute a mutually beneficial trade. Another shareholder might sell contracts to hedge near-term uncertainty, potentially meeting an arb trader who sees the contract discount as a buying opportunity. Perpetual swaps connect these diverse demands, eliminating the need to wait for someone holding the exact opposite stock view.

This also explains why certain mid- and small-cap stocks could see greater marginal growth. Large caps typically have matured options, borrow facilities, and institutional derivative structures—like a commercial district already equipped with subways, buses, and multiple roads; building an extra route helps, but accessibility wasn't originally blocked. Small-cap tools are scarcer, resembling a remote town with only one road; potential participants might want to enter but give up due to logistical friction.
Short-sellers can't borrow shares, hedging shareholders can't find suitable instruments, arbs can't assemble both legs of the trade, and funding-rate traders lack tradable products altogether. A perpetual swap fills that missing doorway, unlocking transactions that otherwise never happen.
This mechanism applies to all equities; the extra opportunity for small-caps stems from larger structural gaps, not necessarily a better fit for leverage. The hardest-to-trade stocks aren't automatically ideal for Phase 1 launches. A town too narrow for trucks to enter won't thrive just by building a fancy entrance. Fundamental conditions must exist first: viable spot hedging channels, adequate borrow supply, and committed market-making capital.
Paths Already Paved in Crypto Markets
If you think these mechanisms are just theoretical exercises, the crypto market's track record might surprise you.
A token's tiny market cap doesn't dictate that the trading ecosystem built around it must remain equally small. Here, "plasticity" means the same asset can be slotted into different trading combinations to satisfy varied risk profiles; volume magnitude no longer hinges solely on how many want to buy and HODL indefinitely.
ALPACA exemplifies an extreme case. It's the native token of Alpaca Finance (unrelated to the similarly named U.S. securities brokerage infrastructure firm). On April 24, 2025, Binance announced delisting ALPACA: perpetual swaps would settle and halt trading on April 30, with spot listings ending on May 2. The chart below captures price action between the delisting announcement and the cessation of perp trading. (See: https://x.com/agintender/status/1954160744678699396?s=20)

Logically, a mall posting closure notices should see foot traffic dwindle. Yet ALPACA attracted a completely different crowd during this phase: some bet on fire-sale discounts, others on crowded shorts fading, while market makers stepped up to absorb orders and trade spreads. BlockBeats' post-mortem noted that spot prices initially dropped to $0.029 post-announcement, pushing market cap down to ~$5M. This $5M figure represents early-stage valuations, not peak turnover metrics.
ALPACAUSDT Spot and Perpetual Swap Trade Logs:

Between April 23–25, perp daily turnover exploded 52.4x within two days, while spot turned 13.3x. What makes this case so compelling isn't how far the price rallied, but rather how dual trading lanes around the same underlying absorbed nearly 20x divergent volumes. It proves that micro caps aren't mechanically capped from supporting heavy derivative execution.
Why would a "closure notice" trigger such heavy activity?
Because introducing perpetual swaps expanded the "rationale" behind trades.
Previously, you only asked "what is this project fundamentally worth?" Now you can additionally ask: "Are shorts overcrowded?", "What hourly cost/benefit does maintaining this side incur?", "Why do pricing quotes differ across exchanges?", or "Does residual profitability after hedging cover overhead?"
Funding rates resemble constantly shifting parking meter signs. Assume a market posts a -0.1%/hr funding rate; under standard rules, shorts pay longs. Holding a $100k notional long accrues $100/hour, or $2,400/day if parameters remain static. This number serves purely as a structural illustration, not historical ALPACA reality. Even skeptics might long contracts to harvest that flow, then borrow tokens to short spot as a hedge. Execution breaks down if supplies dry up, borrow costs spike, or sign flips. Contracts expand participation rationale without removing the cost of entry.
By identical logic, one trader spotting positive funding buys spot and shorts perps; another arbitrages inter-exchange price gaps alone. To them, the asset is first a calculable matrix of prices, flows, and risks—a secondary layer requires believing in a foundational narrative. That's precisely why perpetual swaps matter: they let diverse actors join the same arena under entirely different premises.
Beyond extreme volatility regimes, micro-cap assets can sustain robust derivative activity. Data from TRB and JELLYJELLY on September 10, 2025 illustrates this:

We observe a small-cap coin worth roughly $50M carrying open interest (OI) representing two-thirds of its total market cap, while aggregate perp volume reached 70% of market cap.
This clarifies why "turnover exceeding market cap" defies no intuition. Picture a wholesale shop sitting on $1M in inventory: goods rotate continuously, and traders cyclically open/close positions. Coupled with margin frameworks, executing a $100 notional trade rarely demands full cash collateral. Capital velocity multiplied across rounds generates volumes vastly surpassing initial principal. Market cap anchors asset valuation; turnover reflects daily throughput; OI measures outstanding notional exposure; orderbook depth approximates immediate liquidity absorption capacity. None substitute for one another.
So if even struggling micro-caps awaiting delisting generate such dense perp activity, shouldn't fundamentally backed equities carrying hundreds of millions—or billions—in market cap stand an even stronger chance?
You tell me?
Data strongly supports dismissing size-only skepticism: micro caps absolutely can anchor active derivatives ecosystems.
Market cap isn't the decisive factor; rather, it's whether infrastructure successfully funnels divergent views and objectives into shared monetary expression.
To tap fresh inflows via perp integration, equities must invite not just bulls, but skeptizers willing to probe fundamentals, plus capital allocators prepared to absorb bilateral hedging flows.
Expanding participation requires universal consensus—a false premise. Bulls gain direct exposure; risk-averse participants fulfill demand via hedging spreads. For underbanked mid/small caps, this spawns fresh liquidity tiers, novel positioning strategies, and renewed analytical focus—contingent on viable hedging and risk scaffolding.
Ground-level thoroughfares haven't vanished; a viaduct simply emerged overhead. Travelers head toward differing destinations, yet collectively amplify arterial throughput through complementary rationales.
Understand the mechanics, and grasp the underlying principles.
May we consistently maintain reverence for the markets.














