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Ray Dalio Warns of U.S. Treasury Supply-Demand Imbalance: Gold and Bitcoin May Serve as Hedge Assets Against Debt Crisis

Ray Dalio Warns of U.S. Treasury Supply-Demand Imbalance: Gold and Bitcoin May Serve as Hedge Assets Against Debt Crisis

2026.08.22
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The intensifying supply-demand imbalance in US Treasuries may trigger rising interest rates, a weakening US dollar, and debt monetization.

Translator: AB Kuai.Dong

In my book, How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle, I laid out a typical framework to explain how situations typically unfold when unsustainable imbalances occur in the supply and demand for debt. Recently, three things have happened simultaneously:

  1. The Japanese government sold part of its holdings of U.S. bonds, repatriated the funds to Japan to support the yen and the Japanese capital markets, and reduced its exposure to U.S. Treasuries. This allows it to avoid raising interest rates beyond acceptable levels in order to prop up the yen.
  2. U.S. Treasury yields hit new highs, led by longer-term yields, while the dollar weakened. This is due to both the massive supply of bonds currently and in the future, as well as weakening market demand for them.
  3. This week, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent announced that the Treasury Department would purchase U.S. Treasuries, albeit on a very limited scale.

Many have therefore asked me: Do these events align with the classic framework described in my book? The answer is yes. To gauge what might happen next, it is worth revisiting this framework.

In the book, I detailed how the process of government debt and currency restructuring typically unfolds. I also made projections illustrating the imbalance where the supply of new debt and maturing/renewed debt continuously increases while market demand fails to keep pace. These projections serve as a template to compare with reality and help us judge what lies ahead.

If you are a market participant who needs to understand this framework in detail to time your markets, I recommend reading the entire book. If you prefer not to dive into that many details or spend that much time, you can read the five-minute summary below to understand how this mechanism works.

How This Mechanism Works

The logic behind central government debt operates similarly to that of individuals or businesses. The difference is that a central government has a central bank capable of printing money, which devalues the currency; the government can also raise funds from the public through taxation.

Therefore, if you can imagine a scenario where you or your business can both print money and collect funds from others through taxation, you will understand how government debt functions. Just remember that your goal is not merely to benefit yourself, but to ensure the entire system operates smoothly for all citizens.

In my view, the credit and market system resembles the human circulatory system, delivering nutrients to all the parts that make up the market and economy.

If credit is used effectively, it boosts productivity, generates income, and enables borrowers to service their debt and interest—a healthy state. But if credit is misallocated and fails to generate sufficient income to cover principal and interest, the burden of debt service accumulates like plaque in blood vessels, crowding out other expenditures.

When debt service payments become overwhelmingly large, debt repayment issues arise first, followed by rollover/refinancing problems: creditors become unwilling to roll over maturing debt and instead prefer to sell their bonds.

This naturally leads to insufficient demand and selling pressure for bonds and other debt instruments. When demand falls short of supply, two outcomes typically follow:

  1. Interest rates rise, thereby damaging the market and the economy;
  2. The central bank prints money to buy debt, causing the currency to depreciate and pushing inflation higher than it otherwise would have been.

Printing money also artificially suppresses interest rates, harming creditors' returns. Neither approach is desirable.

If bond selling becomes too rampant to contain, interest rates will rise; and if the central bank has previously bought heavily, rising rates will cause the value of its holdings to fall, leading to losses and straining its cash flow. If this persists, the central bank will eventually end up with negative net assets.

As the problem worsens, both the central government and the central bank borrow to pay principal and interest. Due to insufficient free-market demand, the central bank funds these loans by printing money, ultimately creating a self-reinforcing cycle of "debt increase—money printing—inflation."

Broadly speaking, there are three classic indicators to watch:

  1. The size of government debt service relative to fiscal revenue. This is akin to the amount of plaque in the circulatory system.
  2. The volume of government bonds offered for sale relative to market demand. This is like a plaque rupture triggering a heart attack.
  3. How much money the central bank printed to buy government bonds. **This is done to offset insufficient market demand for government bonds, much like a central bank injecting massive liquidity and credit to ease shortages, while simultaneously creating more debt to which it itself is now exposed.

Over a long cycle spanning decades, debt and debt service relative to income typically continue to rise until the trend becomes unsustainable. This usually happens for one of three reasons:

  1. Debt service spending severely crowds out other government expenditures to an unacceptable level;
  2. The supply of bonds that the market must absorb far exceeds buying demand, forcing interest rates to spike sharply and severely damaging the market and economy;
  3. To prevent rising interest rates and economic deterioration, the central bank prints heavily and buys government bonds to fill the demand gap, resulting in sharp currency depreciation.

Regardless of which path is taken, bond returns will remain poor until currency and debt assets become sufficiently cheap to attract buyers again, or until the government can refinance/restructure debt at a lower cost.

In simple terms, this is the basic shape of a big debt cycle.

Because these metrics can be quantified, people can monitor the development of the debt mechanism and fairly easily see that trouble is approaching. I have always used this diagnostic method in my own investing, keeping it private in the past. But now, I explain it in detail in How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle because it is too important to keep solely to myself.

More specifically, we will see debt and its servicing costs continue to climb relative to income, with debt supply outstripping market demand. In response, the central bank will initially stimulate the economy by cutting short-term rates, then begin printing money to buy bonds. Eventually, the central bank will incur losses, even falling into negative net equity.

Meanwhile, the central government will need to borrow more to pay off old principal and interest, while the central bank monetizes the government debt through money printing. All of these factors push the nation toward a sovereign debt crisis.

This crisis is equivalent to a heart attack for the economy: heavily debt-financed spending is sharply curtailed, and the normal blood flow of the economic circulation system comes to a halt.

In the early stages of the final phase of a big debt cycle, markets typically exhibit the following characteristics: longer-term interest rates rise first; the domestic currency depreciates, especially against gold; and due to weak demand for long-term bonds, the government treasury begins shortening the maturities of newly issued bonds.

By the later stages of this process, when problems are most severe, governments typically resort to seemingly extreme measures, such as imposing capital controls or placing extraordinary pressure on creditors to buy bonds and refrain from selling them.

My book provides a more complete explanation of this mechanism and illustrates how it unfolds using extensive charts and data.

Summarizing the U.S. Government's Situation in the Simplest Terms

Now, imagine you are running a large corporation called "the U.S. Government." This analogy can help you understand the U.S. government's financial position and the choices facing American leaders.

This year, the entity's total revenue is roughly $5.5 trillion, while total expenditures reach about $7.5 trillion, leaving a budget shortfall of approximately $2 trillion. In other words, it spends about 40% more than it brings in.

Moreover, there is little room to cut spending, as nearly all expenditures are either prior commitments or essential obligations.

Due to years of heavy borrowing, the entity has accumulated massive debt. Total debt stands at roughly six times annual revenue, or about $32 trillion, averaging approximately $240,000 in debt per American household it supports.

Annual interest expenses on this debt are about $1 trillion, equivalent to roughly 20% of the entity's revenue, and half this year's budget deficit, which still must be financed through borrowing.

However, the $1 trillion in interest is not the only payment going to creditors. In addition to interest, approximately $10 trillion in maturing principal must be repaid. The government hopes creditors will simply roll this money back over to it or provide new loans.

Therefore, to avoid default, the U.S. government needs to pay out a combined total of roughly $11 trillion in principal and interest, equaling about 200% of full-year fiscal revenue.

This is the current situation.

So, what happens next? We can envision it.

Whatever the final deficit turns out to be, the government must fund it through borrowing. Currently, there is much debate over the scale of the deficit. Given recently passed budget reconciliation legislation, most independent forecasting agencies project that U.S. debt will reach $55 to $60 trillion over the next decade—roughly seven times fiscal revenue at that time—due to the need to borrow another $25 to $30 trillion.

Naturally, in ten years, the entity will face even heavier debt-servicing pressures, further crowding out other government spending. Without a plan to address this, markets are likely to experience inadequate demand for the debt the government will need to issue.

My Three-Part, 3% Solution

I am certain that the U.S. government's fiscal condition has reached a turning point. If it is not addressed now, debt will accumulate to a level that cannot be resolved without inflicting massive trauma.

Most importantly, this adjustment must occur while the overall system remains relatively strong, rather than waiting until it becomes weak. Because once the economy enters a contraction, the government's borrowing requirements will surge.

Based on my analysis, this problem requires addressing via what I call the three-part, 3% solution. Its goal is to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3% of GDP by balancing three levers:

  1. Spending cuts;
  2. Increased tax revenue;
  3. Lower interest rates.

All three must happen simultaneously to prevent any single lever from being pulled too far. Overreliance on any one component during the adjustment process will inflict severe damage on the economy.

Furthermore, these changes should stem from sound fundamental adjustments, not forced interventions. For instance, if the Federal Reserve forcibly suppresses interest rates unnaturally, the consequences would be dire.

According to my projections, adjusting government spending and tax revenues each by roughly 5% relative to current plans, while allowing interest rates to decline by about 1 to 1.5 percentage points as a result, would reduce interest expenses by 1% to 2% of GDP over the next decade. This would also lift asset prices and economic activity, subsequently generating greater revenue for the government.

Frequently Asked Questions and My Answers

The book covers far more than this, including a description of the overarching big cycle. The big cycle consists of debt, credit, and monetary cycles, domestic political cycles, international geopolitical cycles, natural events, and technological progress, which collectively drive all major global changes.

The book also includes my views on potential future trajectories and some perspectives on how to invest amid these shifts. However, here I will first answer several questions I frequently get when discussing this book. If you wish to delve deeper, I invite you to read the entire work.

Question 1: Why do large-scale government debt crises and big debt cycles occur?

The emergence of large-scale government debt crises and big debt cycles can be clearly measured by three indicators:

  1. Government debt service relative to fiscal revenue continues to rise, eventually severely crowding out necessary government expenditures;
  2. The volume of debt sold by the government vastly exceeds market demand, causing interest rates to rise and dragging down the market and economy;
  3. The central bank attempts to counter these conditions by lowering interest rates, but this further reduces the attractiveness of bonds, ultimately forcing the central bank to print money to buy government bonds, causing currency depreciation.

These conditions typically deteriorate gradually over a long cycle lasting decades until they become unsustainable. This occurs because one or more of the following outcomes eventually materialize:

  1. Debt service spending severely crowds out other expenditures;
  2. The supply of debt that must be sold far outstrips purchasing demand, forcing interest rates to spike sharply and causing significant market and economic downturns;
  3. The central bank prints heavily and purchases government bonds to fill the market demand gap, leading to sharp currency depreciation.

Regardless of which scenario occurs, bond returns will remain poor until bonds become cheap enough to attract buyers again, or until debt is restructured.

These metrics are easy to measure, allowing us to watch events step-by-step march toward an imminent debt crisis. When debt-financed spending begins to contract, it acts like an economic heart attack induced by debt.

Throughout history, these debt cycles have occurred in virtually every country, often more than once, providing hundreds of historical cases for study. Wherever there are written records, similar events can be found.

Phrased differently, every monetary regime in history has ultimately collapsed, and the debt cycles I describe represent the underlying mechanism behind these collapses. The decline of all past reserve currencies, such as the British pound and the Dutch guilder before it, were caused by this process. My book details the 35 most recent cases.

Question 2: Since this process repeats itself, why do people still fail to understand the underlying operating mechanism?

You are right; this mechanism indeed lacks thorough understanding. Interestingly, I cannot even locate existing literature dedicated to studying this complete process.

My speculation is that in countries with reserve currencies, monetary regime collapses typically occur only once per generation; whereas when this happens in non-reserve-currency countries, people tend to dismiss it as solely those nations' internal problems, assuming countries with reserve currencies are immune.

I discovered this mechanism because I witnessed it firsthand while investing in the sovereign bond market. This prompted me to study numerous historical parallels to better navigate events like the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis.

Question 3: How worried should we really be about an America-style heart attack debt crisis? People have heard for years that U.S. debt is about to blow up, yet the crisis never arrives. What makes this time different?

I believe we should be highly concerned, precisely because the aforementioned conditions have already manifested.

Some people expressed concerns about debt crises in the past before conditions became so severe, and I believed their worries were justified at the time. Had action been taken earlier, the deterioration to today's extremes could have been avoided, much like doctors warning patients long ago against smoking and poor diets.

I speculate that broader attention was not given to this issue partly because people did not fully grasp it, and partly because past warnings came too early, slowly breeding societal numbness and complacency over time.

It is like a person whose arteries have accumulated massive plaque, who still eats high-fat foods and never exercises, telling their doctor: "You've been warning me that something will go wrong if I don't change my lifestyle, but I haven't had a heart attack yet. So why should I believe you now?"

Question 4: What could serve as the trigger for a U.S. debt crisis today? When will it happen, and what will it look like?

The trigger will be the simultaneous convergence of the various factors mentioned earlier.

Regarding timing, policy decisions and external shocks can either accelerate or delay the crisis, such as major political shifts or wars.

For example, my forecast, shared by most, is that the U.S. budget deficit accounts for roughly 7% of GDP. If this can be brought down to around 3%, the risk would decrease significantly.

A massive external shock would bring the crisis sooner; absent such a shock, it would be delayed. With proper policy management, the crisis might be entirely avoided.

If the current trajectory remains unaltered, my guess is that the crisis will materialize in roughly three years, give or take two. Of course, I acknowledge this timeline prediction may well be inaccurate.

Question 5: Has any country historically achieved significant fiscal deficit reductions like those you describe, ultimately yielding positive results?

Yes, I know of several cases.

My proposal would reduce the fiscal deficit by approximately 4% of GDP. The closest comparable success story occurred in the United States between 1991 and 1998, when the U.S. fiscal deficit fell by roughly 5% of GDP.

My book also lists several analogous examples from other countries.

Question 6: Some argue that because the U.S. dollar dominates the global economy, the United States is generally less susceptible to debt problems or debt crises. What do you think this perspective overlooks or underestimates?

If they truly believe this, it indicates they misunderstand the underlying mechanisms and have failed to learn from historical lessons.

More specifically, they should examine history to understand why every past reserve currency ultimately lost its status.

In simple terms, a currency and the debts denominated in it must be able to effectively store wealth. Otherwise, they will be debased and ultimately abandoned.

The mechanism I describe explains exactly how a reserve currency gradually loses its capacity to store wealth.

Question 7: Japan's government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 215%, the highest among all advanced economies. Japan is often cited as a prime example proving that a country can sustain high debt levels for extended periods without triggering a crisis. Why does Japan's experience offer no reassurance to you?

Japan's situation is precisely a textbook example of the problem I described, and it will continue to prove this point in the future. It actually demonstrates how my theory operates in reality.

More specifically, due to excessive sovereign indebtedness, Japanese bonds and other debt assets have been profoundly poor investments.

At sufficiently low interest rates favorable to Japan, market demand for Japanese debt assets remained inadequate. To bridge this gap, the Bank of Japan printed heavily and purchased vast quantities of Japanese government bonds.

As a result, since 2013, holders of Japanese bonds have lost 51% compared to those holding U.S. dollar-denominated debt assets, and 76% compared to holders of gold.

Converted to a common currency, from 2013 to the present, wages for ordinary Japanese workers have fallen 55% relative to those of ordinary American workers.

My book dedicates an entire chapter to analyzing the Japan case and provides an in-depth explanation of this issue.

Question 8: Which other regions around the world face particularly problematic fiscal conditions that may be receiving insufficient attention?

Most economies face similar debt and deficit problems. This applies to the UK, the EU, China, and Japan.

Therefore, I expect most economies will undergo similar debt adjustments and currency depreciations. This is also why I believe non-government-created currencies like gold and Bitcoin may perform relatively well.

Question 9: Faced with this risk, how should investors respond and allocate their assets?

As general advice, I believe investors should maintain broad diversification across different asset classes and countries.

Investors should favor countries with healthier revenue streams and balance sheets, which are not embroiled in severe domestic political conflicts or external geopolitical tensions.

Regarding asset allocation, one can underweight fixed-income assets like bonds, overweight gold, and hold a small position in Bitcoin.

Allocating a small portion of capital, perhaps 10% to 15%, to gold can reduce overall portfolio risk. I also believe doing so may potentially enhance portfolio returns.