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70 Years of US Dollar Exodus: Stablecoins, Not a New Invention?

70 Years of US Dollar Exodus: Stablecoins, Not a New Invention?

2026.08.14
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From London Bank Ledgers to Self-Custody Wallets, Who Owes You $1?

By Lacie Zhang, Researcher at Bitget Wallet

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Some say that the true global reserve currency has never been the US dollar itself, but rather the Eurodollar. The name originated from a bank’s telex address, but eventually came to refer to all US dollars held outside the United States.

Seventy years ago, to avoid having their US dollar accounts frozen within the US, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries deposited their dollars into Nordbanken, established in Paris, and Moscow Narodny Bank, established in London. Nordbanken's telex address was exactly "Eurobank"—the origin of the name Eurodollar. However, it was Britain that turned these dollars into a large-scale credit market. After the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain tightened foreign exchange controls, and bankers in London began lending out these overseas dollar deposits, giving birth to Eurodollar credit operations. By 1957, the Bank of England further relaxed its policies, and London became the center of the Eurodollar market.

Surprisingly, the explosive growth of the Eurodollar market was mainly driven by the United States itself: domestic deposit interest rates were too low, providing little incentive for offshore dollars to flow back; during the 1970s oil crisis, most of the oil-producing nations' dollar profits were not repatriated either. Instead, they were deposited locally in London or other offshore banks. Thus, the Eurodollar market expanded from a few million dollars to a trillion-dollar scale. From that moment on, "Eurodollars" no longer belonged solely to Europe.

The story of Eurodollars unfolded along two parallel tracks: on one track, the institutions backing dollar credit constantly changed, shifting from bank ledgers to fintech company databases, and then to stablecoin issuers' balance sheets; on the other track, the relationship between users and accounts quietly evolved—from completely entrusting funds to institutions for safekeeping to today's ability to control assets oneself.

Yet, running through both tracks and unchanged over seventy years are three things: dollars can continue to expand outside the US; their final settlement has always relied on the US; and the entity managing your account and the entity truly promising redemption are never necessarily the same. In other words, the question of "who owes you a dollar" has never disappeared, but its answer has constantly shifted. The story this article tells is how this question intertwined with two major shifts up until today.

1. Dollars Leave the United States

The moment deposits moved to London, something easily overlooked happened: the institution originally owing this money was a New York bank, but now it became a London bank. The currency unit remained the same, but the guarantor had changed.

If that were the only thing, the story would have ended there, but London banks soon discovered something more interesting: they could not only accept dollar deposits but also artificially create additional dollars around those deposits.

When a bank extends a dollar loan to a business, its asset side gains a claim against the borrower, while its liability side simultaneously records a new "dollar deposit"—which can immediately be used to pay suppliers, buy equipment, or settle other debts. Milton Friedman, a leading figure in monetary economics, later put it perfectly when commenting on this: the source of Eurodollars is not a printing press, but "a bookkeeper's pen."

Banks did not conjure wealth out of thin air; they were simply leveraging an old credit game rule: as long as payment promises are accepted by the market, dollars written in a ledger can be used as real dollars. This pen proved something for the first time: the bearer of dollar credit does not have to be a US-based bank.

What truly fed and grew this market was a regulatory wall. US Regulation Q set caps on the interest rates banks could pay depositors. London banks faced no such wall and could naturally offer higher rates to attract business. Economic historian Catherine Schenk found in British archives that in June 1955, thanks to interest rates significantly higher than what US peers offered, Midland Bank in London alone absorbed about $49 million in 30-day dollar deposits in a single month. After the 1957 sterling crisis, the UK also barred its domestic banks from using sterling for trade financing with third countries. London banks consequently pivoted entirely to dollar business, and governments and enterprises seeking funding began bypassing New York and going straight to London.

As global appetite for dollars grew, American banks themselves were tied hands and feet—this gap nurtured an entire dollar market capable of self-sustaining and expanding outside the US. Around 1960, the market was worth about $1 billion; ten years later, nearly $50 billion. Following the 1973 oil crisis, the massive dollar earnings of oil-producing nations flowed back into the banking system via London. By 2007, offshore dollar deposits had surged to approximately $8.9 trillion, exceeding 150% of US domestic bank deposits. Today, the US dollar credit outstanding for non-bank borrowers outside the US, as tracked by the Bank for International Settlements, exceeds $14.3 trillion.

Long ago, the dollar ceased to be solely America's affair, but from its inception, the Eurodollar carried an inescapable paradox: London banks could create dollar deposits, but they could not create Federal Reserve reserves. They could write "I owe you a dollar" in their ledgers, but once they truly needed to redeem that promise for cash, or if the market suddenly tightened, they still had to turn back and seek help from US correspondent banks and clearing systems.

Dollar credit had stepped out of the US banking system for the first time, but it had never left the US clearing system—this distinction only reveals itself when a crisis hits.

2. Three Crises, Three Layers of Power

In normal times, a dollar in cash, a dollar in a New York bank account, and a dollar in a London bank account look identical. No one bothers to think deeply about who guarantees them behind the scenes or which systems they must pass through to become truly accessible. A crisis is the only thing that strips away this facade.

Clearing Authority: A Promise Like "I Owe You" Does Not Mean the Money Has Arrived

On the morning of June 26, 1974, in New York, a group of traders in the trading hall had yet to realize that the dollar funds in their accounts would never actually arrive.

Just hours earlier, they executed a forex trade with Germany's Herstatt Bank. The Deutsche Marks had already been delivered in Frankfurt, and now they were only waiting for the corresponding dollars to be paid on the New York end. Due to the time difference, the afternoon in Germany corresponded to the morning in New York. And right in that German afternoon, regulators issued an order shutting down Herstatt Bank on the spot.

What New York traders received was not money, but a bank that no longer existed. Only then did they understand: what they held in hand was merely a promise of "I owe you," not money itself. Between the promise and the actual receipt of funds stood counterparties, correspondent banks, time zones, and clearing systems—as long as any single link in this chain collapsed, accounting claims would not automatically transform into spendable dollars.

This event later gave rise to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and left behind a term still used today: Herstatt risk. It exposed for the first time the most fundamental layer of power in the Eurodollar system: being able to issue a dollar payment promise does not guarantee that the money will actually arrive. Whoever controls clearing holds the real power.

Ultimate Liquidity Authority: Having Funds on the Books Does Not Equate to Being Able to Borrow

In 2008, European bankers found themselves trapped in a bizarre situation.

On paper, they sat atop vast dollar assets—US mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and various dollar-denominated instruments. Yet underneath these assets lay no stable base of dollar deposits. Survival depended entirely on rolling over short-term funding like money market funds, commercial paper, and interbank borrowing, walking a tightrope.

Under normal conditions, this model ran cheaply, provided borrowing channels remained perpetually open. After Lehman Brothers collapsed, the market began doubting the actual value of assets held by every bank, and providers of short-term funds collectively halted roll-overs. Overnight, these European banks, holding trillions in assets, couldn't muster enough cash to cover maturing liabilities, plunging the globe into a "dollar shortage."

An awkward question confronted everyone: since these banks were not in the US and fell outside the Federal Reserve's direct jurisdiction, who would supply them with dollars?

The answer remained the Federal Reserve. Through central bank currency swaps, the Fed lent dollars to foreign central banks, which then distributed them to local banks. By December 2008, swap balances briefly spiked to approximately $583 billion, accounting for a quarter of the Fed's total assets at the time. When the pandemic hit in 2020, the same mechanism was reactivated, with balances nearing $450 billion at their peak.

The truth laid bare at this moment: offshore banks could create dollar deposits through lending, but they could not manufacture the "hard dollars" truly required for clearing and debt repayment. When everyone simultaneously tried to convert their "bank promises" into "top-tier real money," the ultimate backstop remained solely the Federal Reserve—this is the second layer of power: the lender-of-last-resort function. Whoever provides the backstop during a crisis is the true pillar of this system.

Pricing Authority: He Who Calls the Shots Wins Half a Century

London bankers were also secretly holding onto a third asset.

The borrowing costs reported by London banks later evolved into LIBOR—a global benchmark for pricing loans, bonds, and derivatives. At its peak, financial contracts linked to it totaled millions of billions of dollars. This meant that London banks could do more than just manufacture dollars outside the US; they acquired something even more potent: the power to price dollar funding worldwide.

But this pricing mechanism had a fatal flaw: it relied on numbers banks "self-reported," not actual transaction figures. The day the scandal broke, this loophole was brutally exposed: Barclays alone paid a $450 million fine to US and UK regulators for rate manipulation.

Following the collapse of trust, the mouth-derived LIBOR was replaced by SOFR, backed by actual repurchase agreements. In June 2023, the US dollar LIBOR quotation panel was permanently shut down. The Eurodollar did not disappear, but the era of London bankers calling the shots had ended.

Herstatt, the dollar shortage, and the end of LIBOR—the three incidents each peeled back three hidden layers of power: clearing authority, ultimate liquidity provision, and pricing authority. Offshore banks obtained the capacity to expand dollar credit, yet never truly seized ultimate control of this system. The ensuing financial innovations altered not this power architecture first, but rather the thread closest to everyday users: the bond between you and a dollar account.

3. Dollar Accounts Enter Mobile Phones

Over the past decade, the greatest success of fintech has been compressing an entire suite of banking procedures into a smartphone app. Account opening, currency exchange, and cross-border transfers that once required branch visits, paperwork, and days of waiting can now be completed in minutes. The gateway to dollar accounts has moved from teller counters to software interfaces.

Revolut and Wise represent this generation. They appear as twin brothers: both support multi-currency holdings, FX conversion, cross-border transfers, and card spending, with almost no functional difference for average users. Yet the legal structures underpinning the digits in these two apps are entirely different.

Revolut chose the path of "becoming a real bank." In 2018, it secured a Lithuanian banking license, enabling it to offer banking services across multiple European countries—qualifying user deposits transformed into genuine bank deposits protected by local deposit insurance schemes. In 2026, it began gradually onboarding UK customers through a UK banking entity. Consequently, balances within the same app may fundamentally differ depending on region and legal entity—some are already protected bank deposits, others remain electronic money, and some are merely client funds managed by partner institutions.

Wise took a different route, operating more like an "electronic money machine" that generally does not convert user funds into absorbed bank deposits. The balance you see in Wise represents an e-money issuance that Wise promises to pay you, backed by client funds strictly segregated from Wise's own capital. Should Wise go bankrupt, you are theoretically entitled to priority recovery from this segregated pool—but full recovery and speed depend entirely on accounting transparency and the efficiency of local insolvency proceedings.

One leans closer to traditional banking, relying on heavier regulation and deposit insurance as a backstop; the other avoids bank-like credit expansion, sustaining its promise through fund segregation. The difference lies solely in: who provides the backstop, how funds are stored, and through which pathway users recover their money should a platform shut down.

Yet they share one commonality: account records always reside within the institution's proprietary database. You can tap a button in the app to initiate actions, but account opening, freezing, transfers, and withdrawals ultimately remain controlled by the institution's systems. What you hold is a contractual right, not direct control over underlying funds.

Traditional fintech relocated dollar accounts from counters to mobile phones without altering the fundamental question of "who holds custody." It redesigned the entry point but failed to redistribute control. This omission is precisely where the significance of the upcoming stablecoins and self-custody wallets lies.

4. Stablecoins: Dollars Move from Closed Accounts to a Borderless Ledger

The true breakthrough of stablecoins is not creating a risk-free currency, but changing how this dollar "payment promise" exists and circulates.

Banks and e-money institutions keep books in their internal ledgers—you can glance at them anytime in an app, but moving money still requires routing through the institution's systems. Stablecoins seal the dollar redemption promise into tokens that can be directly held and transferred on public blockchains. What you hold in your hand is no longer a row of digits in an institution's database, but an asset that flows freely between wallets, exchanges, and on-chain protocols.

Eurodollars moved dollar credit from New York's ledger to London's ledger; stablecoins went a step further—transferring dollar balances from any single institution's ledger onto a public ledger owned exclusively by no one.

To be more precise, stablecoins split "one dollar" into two functions: redemption and transfer. The redemption half is nothing new—issuers back their promises with reserve assets, primarily US Treasury bills and bank deposits, custodied at traditional financial institutions, with final redemptions routed through conventional channels. This half never left the old world. The genuinely novel aspect is the transfer half: dollar balances can now, for the first time, detach from any single institution's internal system and change hands directly on a public ledger. Stablecoins are not "dollar without banks," but rather dollars whose redemption remains anchored in traditional finance while transfer migrates to public ledgers.

The driving force behind both Eurodollars and stablecoins is actually the same: global demand for dollars has always far exceeded the scope traditional banks are willing to cover at low cost. Ordinary people in high-inflation nations seek to preserve purchasing power, cross-border businesses need to settle trade payments, migrant workers send remittances home—they are not completely cut off from dollars, but are consistently blocked by foreign exchange controls, account-opening barriers, exorbitant fees, and sluggish verification processes.

Demand does not vanish because traditional finance fails to meet it; it simply seeks new outlets. In the 1950s, this demand found London's banks; today, it has found stablecoins and a borderless public ledger.

Yet deep down, stablecoins perpetuate the Eurodollar's "duality"—globally circulating, yet ultimately tethered back to the US financial system. The bulk of mainstream stablecoin reserves consists of US Treasuries and bank deposits. While tokens traverse chains worldwide, reserve custodianship, asset management, and final redemption remain firmly bound to traditional financial infrastructure. Viewed another way, stablecoins have not weakened the dollar system; instead, they are constructing a broader global distribution network for US Treasuries and dollar assets.

This network is no small business: as of July 2026, the total stablecoin market cap reached approximately $312 billion, settling roughly $33 trillion on-chain throughout 2025. The largest issuer, Tether, holds US Treasury exposure of about $141 billion—comparable to the top twenty sovereign holders of US debt if ranked alongside nations.

Yet stablecoins are not mere digital replicas of Eurodollars. Eurodollars expanded balance sheets through bank deposit mobilization and lending, with banks bearing credit and maturity risks themselves; mainstream stablecoins resemble packaging existing dollar assets in original form for redistribution, relying on reserves like cash and short-term Treasuries to back redemptions. Their transfer mechanisms also diverge sharply: Eurodollars must navigate correspondent banks and clearing networks, whereas stablecoins settle directly on-chain. Previously, obtaining offshore dollars required a bank account; now, an on-chain address suffices.

Hence, regulation arrived. This is hardly surprising. Looking back at Chapter Two, the three layers of power inherent to Eurodollars were ultimately clawed back one by one: clearing risk birthed the Basel Committee, the dollar shortage elevated the Fed as the system's ultimate backstop, and the death of LIBOR stripped pricing authority from London's banks. Regulators never stifle the birth of offshore dollars, nor do they allow them to grow so large as to endanger the system without intervening.

The exact same script is fast-forwarding upon stablecoins. The EU, Hong Kong, and the US have successively enacted legislation dictating who qualifies to issue stablecoins, what must back reserves, and whether users enjoy instant redemption rights. The US's 2025 GENIUS Act even codified bankruptcy protocols: should a compliant issuer fail, stablecoin holders stand first in line for reserve assets. Consider this: holders of London IOUs waited seventy years without ever seeing their seniority codified in any statute; stablecoin holders awaited this very clause for barely over a decade. Regulatory entry constitutes this new breed of dollar's coming-of-age ceremony.

5. Self-Custody Wallets: Accounts No Longer Necessarily Belong to Any "Creditor"

Regardless of how different they seem, banks, e-money institutions, and custodial platforms share the exact same fundamental relationship with users: you entrust assets to them first, they record a balance for you, and services revolve around that balance. Self-custody wallets do not alter who redeems the dollar, but rather reshape the control dynamic between users and their assets.

Self-custody wallets, represented by Bitget Wallet, do not accept your deposits, do not fabricate platform balances in their own ledgers, and do not owe you any stablecoins. Assets are recorded on the blockchain, and transferring them requires private key signature. The wallet provides address generation, key management, transaction signing, on-chain connectivity, and financial service gateways, but acts not as a creditor safeguarding your assets.

This overturns the organizational logic of traditional financial services. Historically, you had to become a customer of a specific institution, deposit funds into its managed accounts, before accessing payments, trading, or wealth management. Now, you can first own and control your on-chain assets, then connect them to services via a wallet. Addresses do not rely on any single wallet provider; as long as you retain the private key, migrating to a different wallet application grants access to the identical address.

Therefore, self-custody addresses "who can move the funds," while stablecoin issuers solve "who ultimately redeems them." Whether stablecoin reserves are adequate, if the issuer can honor redemptions, or if regulators approve, remains dictated by the issuer and legal frameworks; wallets resolve a separate layer of risk: whether you must surrender asset control to a platform to utilize financial services.

This marks the fundamental divergence between self-custody wallets and all prior financial accounts: the unprecedented decoupling of financial services and asset custody. Payments, trading, yield generation, and asset management can be integrated within a single interface, yet control over asset transfers need not be surrendered. The redemption responsibility behind the dollar remains with the issuer, but control over account transfer rests, for the first time, in the user's hands.

Conclusion: Convergence of Two Migrations

Over seventy years, the dollar has undergone two interwoven migrations.

One occurred regarding "who bears dollar credit." Eurodollars proved that banks outside the US could mint dollars; fintechs repackaged dollar accounts into globally usable software products; stablecoin issuers sealed dollar redemption promises into tokens circulating on public ledgers.

The other unfolded between "users and accounts." Revolut and Wise altered how ordinary people touch dollars, yet accounts remained institution-managed; stablecoins broke free from singular bank account constraints, yet remained potentially locked into custodial platforms; self-custody wallets allow you, for the first time, to access a full suite of financial services without initially surrendering asset control.

Seventy years ago, dollars flowed from New York's ledger to London's; later, they burrowed into fintech databases, and in the guise of stablecoins, arrived at a public ledger. Ledgers have swapped repeatedly, custodians cycling through endlessly, but the underlying promise behind the dollar never vanished.

The true transformation occurs at the final step. As stablecoins enter self-custody wallets, you still must trust issuers to honor commitments, yet you no longer need to hand this money over to another platform for safekeeping. Credit relationships persist, but control remains, for the first time, firmly in your own hands.

The dollar has never shed its debtor. But this time, the account finally no longer needs to belong to one.