
Analysis of Crypto Crime Jargon: Script Traits, Script Washing, and Script Padding
Author: Bitrace
There is a significant amount of regionally distinct, culturally specific, and industry-vertical jargon within organized crime networks across East and Southeast Asia, posing a high barrier to comprehension for investigators and researchers—especially those unfamiliar with the Chinese language and Chinese culture.
Bitrace plans to continuously disclose and analyze this industry-specific jargon to assist relevant personnel in their work more effectively. This article is the second in the series, introducing a specialized term in the Chinese online cryptocurrency money laundering field—Liao (料).
Liao Laundering
In multiple verticals of the gray and black markets, "Liao" carries different meanings. In the cryptocurrency money laundering sector, it specifically refers to fiat currency associated with illegal activities such as fraud, extortion, online gambling, and human trafficking. In most cases, it denotes the electronic balance in bank accounts or other financial platform accounts awaiting laundering.
Current methods for laundering Liao take various forms, including Card-to-USDT, QR-to-USDT, Cash-to-USDT, and Cash-to-MaterialAssets (typically involving precious metals or other highly liquid goods). Despite these differing formats, the underlying logic remains consistent: converting traceable electronic fiat currency into untraceable cryptocurrencies, goods, or cash to evade law enforcement crackdowns or financial platform scrutiny.
This article uses the most common method, Card-to-USDT, as an example for illustration.

In a typical emotional fraud money laundering model, a first-hand Card-to-USDT guarantee public group merchant must first place collateral on a guarantee platform. They then accept orders, using bank cards to collect fiat funds directly from victims. Subsequently, they purchase USDT at a premium through partnered second-hand Card-to-USDT guarantee public group merchants, before transferring a portion of the acquired USDT to the fraudsters. While this example shows first-hand and second-hand merchants collaboratively completing fund laundering and profiting, actual money laundering operations are far more complex, featuring deeper hierarchical layers and more diverse exchange techniques.
Generally speaking, the lower the tier and the closer it is to the victim, the higher the probability of judicial freezing of funds, and the greater the risk of frontline launderers being apprehended. Conversely, money laundering merchants at these tiers can command higher commission rates. In other words, first-hand Liao carries more risk than second-hand Liao.
Type of Liao
In the previous section, we learned that Liao can be risk-classified according to different laundering stages, with market pricing applied to money laundering services at each corresponding stage. This section will introduce additional classification methods for Liao.
Classification by Victim Type
Pupil Liao: Refers to defrauded funds originating from student victims. Fraudsters typically approach victims under the guise of video game top-ups or idol fan support, coercing them to secretly transfer parental funds under threats of job loss or legal investigation against the parents;
Part-time Job Liao: Refers to money scammed through fake communities or apps that lure victims into transferring funds to designated accounts or purchasing specified fraudulent goods under the pretext of part-time work earnings. The primary victims of this fraud are typically stay-at-home mothers, college students, etc.;
Porn Liao (or Se Liao): Denotes illicit proceeds obtained when victims are lured into investment schemes, wealth management, or completing tasks under the premise of prostitution or viewing pornographic content;
Pig Butchering Scam Liao: Involves creating a false persona to romance targets online, thereby inducing victims to participate in fraudulent investment projects and ultimately illegally obtain large sums of money. When the victims are Chinese, this technique is known as Pig Butchering Scam. When the victims are Westerners, it is referred to as Sheep Butchering Scam.
Classification by Crime Type
Online Gambling Liao (or BC Liao/Spinach Liao): Refers to fiat currency deposited by gamblers into online gambling platforms. Such funds require preliminary laundering before circulation, a process commonly known as Running Point;
Ponzi Scheme Liao: Refers to funds paid upward by pyramid scheme participants in a Ponzi scheme. Since these schemes often operate for several months, launderers have ample time to execute their operations;
Chinese Authority Impersonation Liao: Denotes funds illicitly obtained after impersonating Chinese public security, procuratorate, or judicial department staff to deceive ordinary citizens. Due to the high number of Chinese international students targeted by this scam, the FBI specifically coined this translation in its reports.
Liao Adulteration
As previously introduced, various common types of Liao exist. Differences in illegal activity types, lifecycles, and victim demographics lead to variations in the timing and intensity of law enforcement intervention. To money laundering practitioners, this translates to varying levels of "toxicity" across different Liao types, necessitating distinct commission structures.
For instance, gamblers rarely proactively report their involvement with online betting platforms, making gambling-related Liao relatively low-risk and subject to the lowest commission rates. Similarly, during the final months before a Ponzi scheme collapses, victims seldom file reports until they definitively lose access to their funds. Lower commissions apply initially, while higher percentages are charged for the final collection ("the last cut"). Conversely, in impersonation cases targeting Chinese authorities, victims almost always swiftly contact law enforcement, making these funds the most prone to judicial freezing and incurring the highest laundering costs.
Consequently, a common deceptive practice exists within the money laundering circle known as Liao Adulteration. This occurs when a Liao Owner claims the funds require laundering are low-risk, but actually delivers higher-risk materials instead. The objective is to reduce laundering expenses, but the cost is that the laundering gang underestimates the Liao's toxicity, resulting in frozen bank accounts or flagged cryptocurrency wallets.

Take the Tron address TGEXn4HzdRHz83cNqGCobAzg558VFR9K2d, which was frozen by Tether on September 2, 2026, as an example. This address belonged to a downstream Running Point node for an online gambling platform. It received substantial unspecified funds from Coinbase, triggering joint regulatory enforcement by exchanges and Tether, ultimately resulting in losses exceeding $625,000. This illustrates the consequences of Liao Adulteration.
Final Remarks
From the perspective of case investigators, this article briefly outlines laundering methodologies, fund typologies, and financial threats within the cryptocurrency money laundering space, aiming to assist researchers across different countries in more effectively conducting intelligence gathering on Chinese-language money laundering networks.
Exchange risk control departments and OTC practitioners should also remain vigilant against such threats to prevent their operational addresses from facing judicial restrictions.













