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The Wealthy Cut Taxes, Leaving DeFi Lending Pools to Quietly Bear the Cost

The Wealthy Cut Taxes, Leaving DeFi Lending Pools to Quietly Bear the Cost

2026.09.07
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A risk tracing report on $130 million in on-chain default exposure.

Written by: Andjela Radmilac

Translated by: Saoirse, Foresight News

Imagine an investor buys Ethereum for $1,000, which later appreciates to $4,000, and now wants to cash out $1,000. If they sell one-quarter of their Ethereum to obtain cash, under U.S. tax rules for investment digital assets, this would trigger $750 in capital gains.

However, DeFi offers an alternative approach. Holders can deposit all their Ethereum into a lending protocol as collateral and borrow $1,000 worth of dollar-pegged stablecoins.

This loan is not considered taxable income; the Ethereum remains intact to benefit from future price appreciation. The holder can access spendable funds convertible to fiat currency without selling their original asset.

While this strategy saves holders a significant amount in taxes, it introduces fragile risk vulnerabilities. The initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for this $1,000 debt is 25% (against $4,000 in collateral). If Ethereum's price drops to $2,000, the LTV ratio doubles to 50%, and with accruing interest, it will climb even further.

Once this ratio breaches the protocol's preset threshold, smart contract code triggers collateral liquidation: external traders can repay a portion of the loan to acquire some Ethereum at a discount.

Although borrowers delay taxable sales, the lending pool must bear risks stemming from collateral price volatility, debt size, and whether borrowers are willing to proactively liquidate their positions before forced liquidation.

Individual tax decisions effectively become part of a shared credit market funded by other users, where most lenders only see a string of wallet addresses.

In a working paper on tax planning and DeFi credit risk, Lisa De Simone from the University of Texas at Austin, Peiyi Jin from the National University of Singapore, and Daniel Rabetti also from NUS, investigate these connections.

The study focuses on Venus, a DeFi lending protocol on the BNB Smart Chain, which relies on smart contracts to execute rules allowing users to stake crypto assets and borrow other tokens.

Sample period: November 12, 2020, to July 31, 2022, covering 15 major tokens on the Venus platform. The study analyzes approximately 13 million transactions, generating 1.36 million daily borrower observations (one record per active wallet per day), with roughly 3% of traders defaulting under the paper's definition.

Default in the DeFi context differs from mortgage delinquency and requires clarification. The paper defines default as the loan's LTV consistently exceeding the Venus protocol's 60% threshold for at least 7 days, during which the borrower makes no additional deposits and takes out no new loans; cumulative default debt exposure totals $133.34 million. At-risk loans are counted across multiple dates, so this figure represents cumulative daily exposure rather than principal actually lost in a single event.

Billionaire Strategies Enter Ordinary Wallets

The traditional version of this strategy is called "Buy, Borrow, Die." Investors purchase assets, wait for appreciation, then borrow against them to fund living expenses, never selling the assets or realizing gains.

Continuous borrowing defers capital gains taxes for years; U.S. estate laws allow heirs to step up the cost basis upon inheritance, wiping out most of the accumulated tax liability from the original owner's holding period.

Historically, this was exclusive to the wealthy: private banks served only high-net-worth clients with ample collateral and strong downside resistance. Banks could review clients' overall financial health, approve loan amounts, negotiate terms, and find opportunities to mitigate risk before forced collateral sales.

DeFi has completely transformed this highly manual due diligence-heavy business into code. The software doesn't assess comprehensive client qualifications; it merely reads wallet assets and applies the same collateral rules to all users.

Barriers to entry have dropped significantly, but at the cost of building the entire system on overcollateralization: borrowers must pledge assets worth more than the loan from the outset.

According to the Venus parameters described in the paper: eligible collateral worth $10,000 can secure up to $6,000 in debt. Borrowing the maximum leaves almost no buffer against price drops; borrowing only $2,000 provides a thick safety margin. Both accounts are continuously monitored by code connected to oracle market prices.

When collateral depreciation crosses the threshold, liquidators can repay part of the debt, acquire collateral at a discount, repair the account, and earn rewards. This mechanism is designed to protect the pool before collateral value falls below the debt. However, rapid asset dumping and insufficient market liquidity can undermine liquidations, while blockchain network congestion may prevent liquidators from executing operations in time.

Tax motivations further complicate borrower-side risks: reducing risk requires trading activity, repaying debt, or selling a portion of appreciated holdings.

Borrowers who take loans to postpone taxable trades often delay liquidating positions; this hesitation becomes more pronounced when paper profits are higher or when holdings near the holding period required for lower U.S. long-term capital gains tax rates.

Stablecoins multiply the appeal of this trading model. Dollar-pegged tokens convert highly volatile collateral into immediately usable dollar purchasing power. Traders can continue staking assets like Ethereum, borrow USDT or USDC, and redirect those funds elsewhere.

Many large holders are using crypto assets as collateral to borrow stablecoins, securing liquidity while retaining price exposure to the underlying assets.

When the loan opens, the protocol sees a normal collateral ratio. But the protocol cannot know that the borrower originally acquired Ethereum at a very low cost—selling would realize huge gains—or that holding for a few more months could yield substantial tax benefits. These factors ultimately dictate borrower behavior as loans approach danger zones.

The IRS: Venus as a Natural Experiment Ground

Researchers needed to distinguish tax-driven behavior from general crypto market volatility. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, effective November 15, 2021, provided a perfect research opportunity.

Section 80603 of the bill expands information reporting obligations for digital asset brokers. Traders consequently anticipated that much of their on-chain activity would soon be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

This bill altered traders' expectations regarding third-party tax reporting, creating an exogenous shock: potential U.S. taxpayers' behavior would be affected, while international users remained unaffected by the policy shift.

Implementing this tax reporting system took considerable time. Custodial brokers began reporting gross proceeds from sales/exchanges using Form 1099-DA starting January 1, 2025; subsequent IRS rules further require reporting of cost basis for certain transactions beginning January 1, 2026.

These regulatory rules only apply to institutions that actually custody user assets; non-custodial DeFi services currently fall outside regulatory coverage.

However, the paper's research value lies in market participants' expectations the moment the bill was enacted in November 2021—people anticipated future transaction records would be reported, rather than waiting for formal tax forms to be implemented.

By comparing data before and after the bill's passage (long before official regulations took effect), researchers captured the market's reaction to the expectation that "future transactions will be visible to regulators," rather than passive feedback to already-implemented tax forms.

Blockchains do not disclose user nationality or tax residency status. Researchers could only infer which wallets likely belong to U.S. users based on characteristics: trading concentrated during U.S. work hours, anomalous behavior on U.S.-specific holidays, and holdings of U.S.-regulated dollar stablecoins.

Each inference dimension carries potential misclassification risk, so the paper presents multiple calculation methodologies and employs strict criteria combining several conditions.

The entire research logic functions like this: one financial system experiences a policy shock. Two user groups face identical token market conditions and Venus protocol rules; only the presumed U.S. user group closely tracks this new reporting regulation. This isolates tax-induced behavioral changes from broader market volatility.

Main model results show that after the bill's enactment, presumed U.S.-connected borrowers saw a 24.5% decrease in the probability of transacting compared to international users. Borrowers carrying stablecoin debt experienced an additional 23% drop in trading activity. This aligns with the paper's logic: relying on stablecoins for cash allows appreciated collateral to remain staked.

In this paper, "liquidity" is narrowly defined at the wallet level: the probability of a borrower transacting any asset daily. Public perception of liquidity typically refers to exchange depth, bid-ask spreads, or large sell-order costs; this study measures user portfolio trading activity and whether appreciated assets are "locked up."

Borrowers with higher paper profits and higher LTV ratios exhibit these behaviors more prominently. In December each year (especially the final week), investors typically defer gains to the next tax year, causing trading activity to dip; once holdings hit the one-year mark and qualify for lower U.S. long-term capital gains tax rates, activity rebounds. These patterns confirm that observed changes genuinely stem from tax motives, not merely random noise around legislative milestones.

Researchers estimate that U.S. borrowers in the sample defer an average of $3,357.42 in capital gains taxes annually, representing roughly 17% of their concurrent portfolio size. This estimate assumes wallets belong to U.S. taxpayers, reconstructs positions via on-chain data, applies corresponding tax rates, and reflects only the approximate magnitude for the overall sample.

Costs Propagate Within the Pool

The study's final section analyzes how declining trading activity impacts loan quality. Borrowers with lower trading frequencies hold risky positions longer, miss repayment windows, and fail to top up collateral before thresholds are breached. Tax preferences originating outside Venus ultimately materialize as unresolved debt within the protocol.

Here lies reverse causality risk: defaults themselves can cause users to abandon wallets and cease trading.

Researchers employ an instrumental variable approach to isolate the drop in trading activity caused by the bill's shock (an external factor independent of the protocol itself), thereby eliminating reverse causality interference.

Model estimates indicate that for every 1% increase in illiquidity driven by tax factors, the number of defaulting accounts rises by 11.2%, and default loan volumes increase by 39.6%. A one-standard-deviation increase in illiquidity corresponds to approximately $350 in additional default debt per borrower, which is 2.7 times the model's baseline value.

While these percentages seem high, they are statistically bounded: the results apply only to the subset of samples affected by this policy event and sensitive to taxation. They should not be treated as a universal multiplier for all DeFi loans, but rather as an explanation of how motivation influences credit outcomes.

This exposes inherent blind spots in automated lending. Smart contracts read collateral prices, debt balances, accrued interest, and liquidation thresholds, but entirely exclude borrower acquisition costs and tax motivations from calculations.

Two wallets with identical Ethereum collateral and loan conditions appear equally risky in the Venus system. Yet one borrower might willingly sell to reduce risk, while the other does everything to avoid selling. This creates a borrower selection bias problem.

Overcollateralization withstands standard price fluctuations. But borrowers extremely reluctant to dispose of appreciated assets will maintain debt and reduce trading as safety margins thin, concentrating risk within populations whose motivations the protocol cannot identify.

When liquidations execute smoothly, external parties repay debt and dispose of collateral, sparing lenders from losses. Once liquidations fail, losses are absorbed according to the protocol's loss distribution mechanism by the protocol treasury, token holders, and liquidity providers. Individual tax preferences ultimately transform into financial consequences borne collectively by all pool contributors.

The paper also notes that taxation is merely one among many risk sources.

This study focuses solely on a single protocol across the 2020–2022 bull-bear cycle; U.S. user identity is inferred from behavior; default uses a specialized definition counting only accounts with prolonged high LTV ratios. The research simultaneously confirms that severe collateral price volatility and liquidation mechanism flaws likewise contribute to Venus loan issues.

Results would differ across protocols with stronger liquidity and different collateral parameters; environments featuring more sophisticated liquidation bots would also perform differently from the Venus seen in the sample period.

Nevertheless, this paper offers a perspective difficult to achieve with traditional lending data: observing the full lifecycle of collateral, debt, user behavior, liquidation, and position abandonment at the single-wallet granularity.

DeFi has migrated lending strategies once exclusive to private banks onto public chains, opening them to the general public. Yet automating away credit reviewers cannot erase human subjective motives. Tax considerations, attachment to appreciated assets, and reluctance to sell will penetrate through layers of code, ultimately costing everyone who funds the pool.