
After Being "Openly Robbed" of $20 Million, Upbit Completely Abandons BONK
By: Ma He, Foresight News
On August 7, South Korea's largest cryptocurrency exchange Upbit officially announced that it will terminate trading support for BONK on September 7 at 15:00 (KST), involving the BONK/KRW and BONK/USDT trading pairs, with withdrawal services retained until October 7. Upbit stated that after evaluating BONK, it found security incidents such as hacker attacks of unknown cause or unresolved issues occurring in the distributed ledger used by the operators for issuing, transmitting, and storing virtual assets, as well as behaviors where the issuer or operator failed to disclose important matters regarding virtual assets in a timely manner through appropriate electronic transmission media. After comprehensive consideration, it was confirmed that there were many deficiencies, which could lead to user losses.

After the news was announced, the BONK price fell from $0.0000028 to $0.0000025, a drop of about 10%, and its current market cap is $222.26 million.
Foresight News previously reported specifically on this event in "4.4 Million Pries Away 20 Million: BONK Suffers a Legal Open Robbery". One month ago, BonkDAO just experienced a governance attack that shocked the industry, with about $20 million in treasury assets being "legally" transferred away.
BONK Attacker Cashed Out Approximately $13.58 Million
On June 30. The attacker submitted proposal BIP #76 via the Realms governance platform in the Solana ecosystem, titled "Sowellian BonkDAO". The proposal was superficially packaged as a governance optimization plan, but the core instruction was to directly transfer about 4.426 trillion BONK tokens from the BonkDAO treasury to an address controlled by the attacker. At that time, the BONK circulating supply was about 88 trillion, and the 1% voting threshold was about 880 billion. Between July 4 and 5, the attacker bought through exchanges such as Binance and Bybit, supplemented by some DeFi lending, accumulating about 882.285 billion BONK tokens, at a cost of about $4.4 million, just meeting the quorum requirement.
On July 6, the proposal entered voting. Only 7 addresses participated in the entire process, and the address controlled by the attacker contributed 99.878% of the affirmative votes. After the vote passed, the smart contract immediately executed the transfer automatically, and about 4.426 trillion BONK tokens (worth about $20 million at the time) were transferred from the treasury to the attacker's wallet. The entire process did not trigger any timelock, nor were there additional multisignature or manual review steps.
After obtaining the funds, the attacker acted quickly. Within about 9 hours after the transfer was completed, about $190,000 worth of BONK was transferred to OKX. The remaining about $19 million was transferred to a newly created multisignature wallet, which Chainalysis described as a "BONK 2.0" shadow DAO, jointly controlled by the malicious voting wallet, the fund receiving wallet, and a third-party address financially linked to the voting address.
At the same time, the attacker began to sell off the portion of BONK used to obtain voting rights. About 1 hour after the voting was completed, the relevant addresses began to liquidate positions worth about $5.3 million. In the following weeks, on-chain monitoring showed that the attacker continued to transfer funds to platforms such as Coinbase.
On July 17, the attacker transferred 1.186 trillion BONK tokens (worth about $4.11 million) into Binance.
On July 19, according to on-chain analyst Yu Jin's monitoring, the BONK treasury attacker transferred another 400 billion BONK tokens to Coinbase, worth about $1.11 million. Within 12 days since the relevant tokens were transferred out of the treasury, the BONK price fell from $0.0000047 to $0.0000027, a cumulative drop of about 41%.
On July 20, that attacker had completed the liquidation; 30 minutes prior, the last 400 billion BONK tokens in hand ($1.17 million) were also deposited into Coinbase.

Data statistics show that the attacker's cumulative cash-out scale was about $13.58 million.
High Difficulty, Fund Recovery Still Without Result
Bonk officials responded quickly after the incident, confirming that "BonkDAO encountered a malicious governance proposal, resulting in about $20 million worth of BONK being transferred out of the treasury". The team stated that they had identified the exchange wallet addresses used by the attacker to build positions in advance and notified law enforcement departments, while maintaining communication with exchanges, cross-chain bridges, and the Solana Foundation, attempting to recover funds and lock down the responsible parties.
On July 13, BonkDAO released a follow-up update: relevant wallets have been marked and are under continuous monitoring, and the team is exploring all possible recovery paths; emphasizing that the BONK token itself and user personal assets were not affected, and the token contract is secure; planning to release a formal post-incident analysis report subsequently, and the project team also called on the community to focus on governance mechanism improvements.
On July 23, officials further stated, confirming that recovery work is still ongoing.

As of now, no official announcement has been seen on public channels regarding large amounts of funds successfully returned to the treasury, nor has there been formal confirmation of large-scale funds being successfully frozen or recovered.
On July 7, some exchanges almost simultaneously listed BONK as a trading caution target. One month later, Upbit determined that the issues were not eliminated and formally decided to terminate trading support first. Since South Korea implemented the "Virtual Asset Investor Protection Act" in July 2024, DAXA (Korea Digital Asset Exchange Association) has strict statutory obligations for projects involving significant governance loopholes and security hazards. Upbit delisted BONK out of compliance risk avoidance and mandatory legal review.
Currently, other exchanges have not yet taken action temporarily.
It needs to be pointed out that since the transfer was executed automatically in full compliance with on-chain governance rules, the difficulty of recovery is significantly higher than traditional hacker incidents.
The attacker purchased sufficient voting rights (about 1% of supply), submitted a proposal, passed the vote, and then the smart contract automatically executed the transfer. The entire process was fully compliant with the governance rules of BonkDAO on Realms at the time. There was no private key leakage, no contract vulnerability, and no unauthorized call. Most jurisdictions remain conservative in their attitude towards pure governance attacks; courts are more inclined to view "code is law + vote passed" as valid internal decisions rather than theft in the traditional sense, which significantly weakens the strength of criminal filing and civil freezing.
From on-chain data, the attacker has also completed the sell-off and transfer of part of the assets, further compressing the scale of freezeable assets. In addition, the attacker's identity is not public, and factors such as high cross-border enforcement costs and long time periods make the probability of recovering most of the losses relatively low.
Governance Issues Urgently Need to Be Resolved
The core controversy of this event lies in: when the voting threshold is too low, the participation rate is extremely low (only about 2.9% of members participated), and there is a lack of timelock and abnormal proposal interception mechanisms, the attacker used $4.4 million to leverage $20 million in assets, the return on investment was extremely high, and the entire process was compliant.
Any DAO holding a large treasury, if the long-term voting participation rate is extremely low and the quorum is set very low, is equivalent to exposing the control of the treasury to the open market. Whoever can concentrate-buy the minimum threshold tokens in a short time may take away the treasury. This is not a theoretical risk, but an executable path that has been verified.
If the treasury sets an execution delay of 3-7 days or even longer, the community and project party at least have time to discover anomalies, initiate an emergency vote to veto, or intervene through multisig. In reality, many mature DAOs (especially those with large treasuries) will mandate timelocks for proposals involving the treasury.
When community activity is sluggish for a long time, relying solely on token weighting is essentially using "money" to decide governance, rather than "people". For projects with large treasury scales, the project party should consider introducing higher quorums and dual thresholds (requiring both a certain proportion of voting rights and a certain number of independent addresses). In addition, additional approval mechanisms can be added for large proposals, such as a multisig committee.
Governance security can never be completely solved by post-incident remediation; it must be considered based on the "worst-case scenario" at the design stage.















