
Why Does BlackRock Care About the MEV Acquittal Case? A Trial of the "Sandwich Attacker Getting Sandwiched"
Author: Daii, Crypto Reference

A $25 million on-chain counterattack ultimately came down to an ancient legal question: what promises were made to whom? Understanding this is key to distinguishing what an acquittal actually protects, and which on-chain activities remain unexonerated. (Southern District of New York Federal Court, November 16 Opinion, BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund Prospectus)
Suppose you're buying something at a small shop, and someone sees your order first, buys it ahead of you, then sells it back to you at a slightly higher price. This front-runner makes a living daily by watching others' orders. One day, they spot a familiar large order, buy it as usual, but find it doesn't execute as expected; the goods stay in their hands, while the real money goes elsewhere. This dramatic scenario played out in 2023 on Ethereum. But the court's question wasn't who was more likable—it was whether that order and that signature actually constituted a legally binding false promise. (Court Opinion, pp. 11–16, 34–39)
On November 16, a U.S. federal judge acquitted brothers Anton and James Peraire-Bueno. BlackRock had previously included their criminal case in the prospectus for its staked Ethereum fund: if MEV is ultimately deemed illegal, the fund’s staking operations could be disrupted. Why would a dispute between on-chain trading bots end up in the risk disclosures of a Wall Street fund? The answer lies in an Ethereum block proposal: the network currently enters a new 12-second timeslot every cycle, but not every timeslot produces a block. (Court Opinion, pp. 1, 4–5, BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund Prospectus, “MEV” Risk Section, Official Ethereum Block Proposal Documentation)
First, get to know the person who profits from “line-cutting”
Ethereum transactions do not enter the ledger mechanically based on the order you click buttons. Transactions must first enter the pending queue before being placed into a block; who goes first or last alters prices in decentralized exchanges. MEV, or “Maximum Extractable Value,” refers to the extra value participants gain by controlling the inclusion, exclusion, and ordering of transactions. It comes in various forms such as arbitrage and liquidation, and not all MEV should be labeled as an attack. One of the most controversial forms is the “sandwich attack”: a bot spots your buy order, buys ahead of it to push up the price, forces your trade to execute at a worse price, and then sells afterward for profit. Retail traders bear the higher execution costs. (Court Opinion, pp. 4–5, 11–12, Ethereum Foundation MEV Documentation)
Today, professional bots typically hand over “buy first, sandwich the target trade, then sell” transaction bundles to block builders, which are then sent via an MEV-Boost relay to the validator responsible for proposing the block. Think of it like a sealed show program: the validator first sees the cover—the block header—and after signing it, the relay reveals the full contents. This design allows builders to compete for bids while preventing validators from copying others’ ordering schemes before payment or commitment. The bots originally assumed that as long as the entire transaction sequence entered the same block in the predetermined order, the coins they bought would be sold immediately, sparing them long-term holding risk. (Court Opinion, pp. 7–12, Flashbots MEV-Boost Documentation)
To further understand the everyday trading scenarios and mechanisms of MEV attacks, you can read my previous article on MEV attacks [link]. The key distinction here is that the three professional traders labeled as “victims” in this case themselves operated bots searching for sandwich opportunities; the fact that they suffered losses does not mean the retail users they previously sandwiched did not pay a cost. (Court Opinion, pp. 11–13)
How the brothers trapped the sandwiching bots
Court records show that starting in late 2022, the brothers studied the target bots’ behavior, set up 16 validators, and repeatedly tested which transactions lured them in. On April 2, 2023, when one of their controlled validators was scheduled to propose a block, they deposited eight “decoy transactions” into the public pending queue. The bots treated these as juicy targets for sandwiching and submitted combinations containing their own buys, the decoy trades, and their own sells. The prosecution’s initial indictment described the entire process as netting approximately $25 million in about 12 seconds; this is the government’s figure and narrative, not a judge’s independent civil accounting of each loss. (Court Opinion, pp. 12–15, U.S. Department of Justice Indictment, pp. 8–11)
First, consider what the relay holds. Block builders submit a complete list containing undisclosed transactions; initially, validators only see the block header without transaction contents and receive the list only after signing it. Two “fingerprints” in the block header must be correct: the parent block root indicates which previous block the new one follows, and the state root reflects the on-chain status at that time. Incorrectly filling either disqualifies the entire block from acceptance on Ethereum. A signature only proves who signed this block header, not that the header was filled out correctly. If a relay releases the list before confirming the block’s validity, a validator gets the chance to review others’ transactions and modify their own block. (Court Opinion, pp. 7–10, Flashbots Post-Mortem)
The vulnerability lay exactly in this gate. The open-source software used by the Ultrasound relay involved in the case verified at the time that the signature came from the validator scheduled to propose the block and checked for the existence of fields, but did not verify the values of the parent block root and state root. Even if the attempted block release was rejected by Ethereum nodes, the program still handed the full transaction contents to the validator. Flashbots’ post-mortem attributed this to a relay implementation flaw; public records do not explain why developers initially omitted the validity check, so it would be presumptuous to attribute it to “speed optimization” or “intentional bypass.” (Court Opinion, pp. 8–10, 14–16, 38–39, Flashbots Post-Mortem)
The brothers therefore zeroed out these two fields that should have served as specific fingerprints and signed them with their actual private keys. The signature verification passed because the signature indeed corresponded to this “zero-filled block header”; however, this header describes an invalid block, which genuine Ethereum nodes would reject. The relay, nonetheless, released the sealed transaction list first. The first purpose of zeroing out was to use a valid signature to obtain confidential contents, while simultaneously rendering the original block unchainable. There was no misuse of someone else’s private key here; the term “fake signature” refers merely to signing a block header filled with incorrect data. (Court Opinion, pp. 14–16, 36–39, Flashbots Post-Mortem)
The second purpose was to eliminate competition. With the original block rejected, it could not compete with the brothers’ subsequently submitted valid block for the same timeslot. Having already seen the bots’ buy-sell arrangements, they kept the bots’ initial buys, swapped in their own sell transactions, and prevented the bots’ final sells from executing as planned. The brothers’ validator was slashed 1 ETH for proposing two blocks in the same timeslot; court records show trader losses amounted to approximately $25 million. Afterwards, Flashbots modified the relay software: if the original block fails to publish successfully, it will not hand transaction contents to the validator. (Court Opinion, pp. 15–17, Flashbots Post-Mortem and Patch, Flashbots Patch Code)
A staggering example emerged during trial: one bot operator stated that on one occasion, their bot was willing to trade approximately $2.3 million in USDC for roughly $8.25 worth of SHIB at market price, because the algorithm expected to sell it back immediately at a more favorable rate. This was not a SHIB investment typical for ordinary holders expecting long-term ownership, but an instantaneous trade predicated on the premise that “the following two steps would fully execute.” This illustrates that once bundled transactions are unwound, originally modest spread gains can balloon into massive exposures. (Court Opinion, p. 12)
In May 2024, U.S. prosecutors indicted the brothers on charges of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to launder money, arguing that the decoys, invalid block headers, and subsequent fund transfers constituted a scheme. After nearly four weeks of trial, 2025 ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. On November 16, 2026, after reviewing trial evidence, the judge granted a motion for acquittal and closed the case; this ruling was issued by the judge due to insufficient evidence, not a jury vote deeming the overall strategy justified. (U.S. Department of Justice 2024 Indictment Announcement, Court Opinion, pp. 1, 45–46)
The judge didn’t ask “how big was the loss,” but “where was the lie”
Prosecutors proposed two core paths of “lying.” First, the decoy trades appeared to promise, from the bots’ perspective, that they would be sandwiched and included in the final block as originally planned. The judge rejected this: a transaction appearing in the public queue merely expresses “I intend to make this trade”; it does not promise to let others sandwich it, nor does it guarantee that any bundle will definitely make it on-chain. The spread the bots hoped to earn does not automatically become a contractual obligation owed by the decoy party to them. Especially on open networks lacking unified terms of service, one cannot write market participants’ expectations as guarantees already spoken by the opposing side. (Court Opinion, pp. 28–35)
Second, prosecutors argued that signing a block header equates to promising to publish the complete block as-is. The judge again rejected this: under the mechanism at the time, the signature identified which validator signed it and exposed them to potential penalties for misconduct; it does not guarantee the block will definitively be valid or posted on-chain. More fatally, the relay never checked those two zero-filled fields; since the receiver’s approval did not depend on the fields being authentic, prosecutors struggled to prove these erroneous fields constituted a “material misrepresentation” inducing the other party to release transaction contents. The vulnerability was indeed exploited, millions of dollars were certainly drawn into dispute, but wire fraud charges still require proof of specific statutory elements. (Court Opinion, pp. 36–40)
Prosecutors also attempted to string together a series of covert actions to demonstrate the overall scheme was fraudulent. The judge acknowledged the trading strategy might be repugnant but stated that concealing the strategy, exploiting software flaws, and executing complex post-trade transfers cannot substitute for the material misrepresentation required for wire fraud. The conspiracy to launder money charge in this case rested on proceeds from wire fraud; with the primary link unable to stand, the secondary charge collapsed as well. The opinion clearly drew boundaries from the outset: it does not rule on whether the conduct was ethical, nor on other unprosecuted charges or civil disputes. (Court Opinion, pp. 1, 40–46)
The value of this acquittal lies first in drawing a testable line in criminal law: one cannot skip the proof of “whom the defendant made what misrepresentation to, and whether the other party altered their behavior based on it” simply because on-chain conduct caused massive losses. It also reminds protocol designers that economic penalties, code conventions, and legal commitments are three distinct things. If a critical step requires trust, software should verify it; if an action must be contractually bound, terms demonstrably accepted should be written down. An acquittal does not mean “all MEV is legal,” only that this specific prosecutorial theory and body of evidence did not cross the threshold for criminal conviction. (Court Opinion, pp. 28–46)
What BlackRock cares about is that returns flow through the same “ordering pipeline”
BlackRock’s iShares Staked Ethereum Trust ETF does not hand fund assets over to these brothers. Instead, it allows service providers to stake the fund’s ETH in validation to earn protocol rewards, transaction tips, and potential MEV returns. The prospectus specifies that staking service providers will incorporate MEV into revenue sources; if MEV is determined to violate applicable laws, the fund’s staking program could be disrupted, potentially affecting share value. The document also anticipates staking approximately 70% to 95% of the ETH under normal conditions and discloses that sponsors and the service chain collectively take 18% of gross staking yields, with the remainder retained by the fund. Returns do not emerge from thin air: block ordering carries a price, and the fund is actively participating in sharing that value. (BlackRock Staked Ethereum Fund March 2026 Prospectus, “MEV”, Staking Arrangements & Revenue Allocation Sections)
But concepts must not be conflated here. BlackRock’s documents refer to MEV-related compensation earned by validators, not that the fund operates sandwich bots itself, nor that it participated in the relay-vulnerability exploit in this case. MEV can stem from different trading arrangements; within the same revenue pipeline, there may be openly bid ordering income alongside sandwiching income that passes slippage costs onto retail users. The court did not categorize them one by one, nor did it issue a “legal license” for the entire industry. For the fund, this acquittal reduces the threat of the broadest criminal interpretation, but does not eliminate regulatory, contractual, reputational, and specific-strategy legal risks. (BlackRock Prospectus, “MEV” Risk Section, Court Opinion, pp. 1, 45–46)
Another layer of BlackRock’s maneuvering is particularly noteworthy: its staking agreement requires Coinbase to establish legally binding arrangements with validators and demands that validators commit to controls including anti-money laundering protocols, sanction address screening, and regular testing; upon validator breach, the fund can demand Coinbase pursue accountability. This stands in sharp contrast to this case: prosecutors failed to prove that the validators involved accepted a specific commitment to “publish exactly as signed after approval,” whereas the fund strives to embed critical obligations directly into contracts. Contracts cannot guarantee absolute safety, either; the prospectus explicitly notes that if Coinbase or validators fail to perform, recovery costs and staking losses may still fall on the fund and its holders. (BlackRock Prospectus, “Staking Addendum” & “Approved Validator Schedule” Clauses)
After the acquittal, the real question is who bears the ordering cost
This case leaves readers with a more practical decision-making framework. Upon seeing “staking yields,” first ask whether the income comes from protocol emissions or priority fees voluntarily paid by traders, versus contributions from worse execution prices borne by others; then ask how returns are distributed among the fund, custodians, and node operators; finally, ask how broken commitments are enforced—through on-chain penalties, software verification, or actionable contract recourse. BlackRock’s documents at least codify MEV revenue, the 18% fee split, and provider obligations into verifiable text, yet still fall short of telling investors exactly which trading strategies underpin each dollar of MEV. (BlackRock Prospectus, “MEV”, Revenue Allocation & Staking Service Terms)
For ordinary on-chain traders, the most direct lesson is certainly not to emulate the brothers’ tactics. Before trading, check slippage limits, price impact, and execution paths, using transaction protections when necessary to reduce exposure in the public pending queue; but “private sending” still relies on providers’ confidentiality and execution commitments, and cannot be treated as zero-risk insurance. For protocols and institutions, more critical steps are verifying the complete data bound to signatures, clarifying block builder and validator obligations, and documenting who accepted what rules. The market may ultimately opt to harden code, patch gaps with contracts, or seek regulatory boundaries; this ruling simply tells us we cannot rely on criminal law to instantly fix all missing designs. (Court Opinion, pp. 7–12, 36–46, Ethereum Foundation MEV Documentation, BlackRock Prospectus Staking Service Terms)
This is why BlackRock takes this case seriously, and why the acquittal remains worthy of close reading by all on-chain participants: a seemingly mere $25 million tug-of-war between bots actually elevates “transaction ordering rights” from technical details onto legal frameworks and investor ledgers. The court did not grant a moral pardon for MEV, but posed an evidentiary challenge: losses do not equal fraud; returns do not come without costs. What truly determines the industry’s next direction is whether revenue sources, technical verifications, and liability assignments can be meticulously documented and clarified. (Court Opinion, pp. 1, 36–46, BlackRock Prospectus MEV Risks & Staking Agreement)















