
From Public Value to Token: The Bridge That Must Be Built
Written by: Fugui
Water on One Side, Fire on the Other
In 2026, the crypto circle has entered a strange era of polarization.
The RWA market scale has surged to hundreds of billions of dollars, with Wall Street money lining up to buy tokenized treasuries. Meme coins' total market cap is also jumping between hundreds of billions to hundreds of billions, while groups at 3 AM are still shouting about 100x tokens. Stablecoins grow larger day by day, ETFs have been approved, and prediction markets are as bustling as a wet market. Everyone is crunching numbers: TVL, fees, cash flow, P/E, NVT, DAU. These are calculated meticulously; capital markets love doing this.
Yet, at the exact same time, a batch of things are quietly rotting away.
In February 2026, the Ethereum Foundation published a blog titled "This Is Fine (Until the Grant Runs Out)", which translates to "Everything is fine until the money runs out". The article introduces a plan called Project Odin, specifically designed to help teams that previously received large EF grants but no longer know where their next funding will come from. By June, the EF announced layoffs of approximately 20%, with 54 people departing. Vitalik voluntarily stepped down from the core decision-making layer. The foundation stated it would fully contract, abandon its core control position over the ecosystem, and transform into a regular co-builder node focused solely on CROPS (Censorship Resistance, Openness, Privacy, Security).
The world's most important blockchain ecosystem can no longer afford its own public goods.
This is not an isolated case. Security researchers are hunting for vulnerabilities across the entire Ethereum ecosystem. One vulnerability could save hundreds of millions of dollars, but the finder might not receive hundreds of millions in return. Open-source tools like WEBCAT, which help browsers verify code integrity, received a grant from the EF in July—ask how it makes money, and there's no answer. The more it resembles public infrastructure, the harder it is to charge every beneficiary.
Gitcoin Grants has distributed tens of millions of dollars cumulatively. GTC has fallen continuously from its peak to fractional cents, experiencing a drawdown of over 99% from its all-time high. Helium's hotspots exceeded a million, covering over 170 countries. Helium Mobile's user base once expanded rapidly to hundreds of thousands, Data Credit burn volumes rose significantly, and net deflation was observed in certain quarters—but by mid-2026, Helium Mobile had been acquired by Noble Mobile, shifting revenue focus to carrier offload, while consumer subscriptions no longer directly flowed back to HNT. VitaDAO invested in 31 longevity research projects, with tens of millions of dollars in IP assets sitting in vaults, yet VITA holders have never received a single cent in dividends. Friend.tech packaged attention into Keys, extracting tens of millions in early fees, before TVL and activity collapsed avalanche-style, leaving countless Keys at zero. RWA seeks cash flow, Meme seeks traffic, but no one is pricing public goods.
It's Not About Lack of Money, But Missing a Ruler and a Ledger
Some might say, this is a bear market problem.
No! In bull markets, public goods also lack money. During the massive bull run of 2021, GTC still plummeted, and open-source developers were still sustained by passion alone. Some claim VCs are unwilling to invest in long-term projects. VCs seek risk-adjusted returns; that is their core duty. Choosing not to invest is not a mistake.
There are two real problems.
The first problem is: we lack a ruler. Traditional capital markets ask a project a very clear list of questions: What is the Revenue? What is the EBITDA? What is the Cash flow? How large is the TAM? What is the growth rate? What is the CAC? What is the LTV? Once these questions are answered, you get a rough idea of what a company is worth. But how do you handle public goods projects? An open-source cryptography library discovers a vulnerability that could cause $1 billion in losses before it happens. Its own Revenue is 0. Does it lack value? Obviously not. A DeSci project funds 30 longevity research projects, publishes papers, opens data, and may extend human lifespan by three years in ten years, but its protocol income this year is 0. A decentralized social protocol lets users truly own their data and social relationships, takes no cuts, sells no ads, and its revenue is also 0. When revenue is zero, all traffic-based valuation methods fail. P/S, P/F, DCF, the numerator of MV=PQ—all rely on economic flows. Public goods protocols actively suppress profits by design. These methods don't "underestimate"; the formula isn't defined. If the denominator is zero, what are you calculating for P/S?
The second problem is even more critical: even ledgers are incomplete. Many projects shouting about building public goods boast astonishingly low transparency. After receiving a grant, where did the money go? What are the core contributor salaries? How many off-chain assets (e.g., lab equipment, clinical data, IP licenses in DeSci) are actually there? What stage are research milestones at? Were the funded papers genuinely produced or just named-dropping? Are contributor rewards internally divided among the team? This information cannot be verified on-chain. If project teams don't proactively disclose it, outsiders have no idea. DeSci is particularly severe—on-chain voting and IP-NFTs look transparent, but lab operating costs, data quality, contributors' actual working hours, and failure rates during research are all off-chain. Investors donate money but can't even obtain a decent quarterly report. They aren't unwilling to continue investing; they are afraid.
Even more troublesome are the metrics on-chain that appear "observable"—they aren't clean either. TVL can be faked with self-flow. Active addresses can suffer from Sybil attacks. Trading volumes can be circular. High NVT doesn't mean a bubble; low NVT doesn't mean undervalued—an open-source library is called by 100,000 projects, but these calls generate zero on-chain transactions, so NVT sees nothing. A security tool protects the entire ecosystem; when nothing goes wrong, no one knows it exists, and when something does, everyone realizes its importance.
Thus emerges a very awkward disconnect: Meme coins are easiest to calculate. Measure attention, and market cap appears, yet their social value is basically zero. DeFi is also easy to calculate. TVL and Fees sit there, but nobody looks at financially inclusive access, which is genuinely important. DePIN's Revenue can be calculated, but nobody delves into how many remote areas it covers or its service resilience. DeSci's Token price jumps daily, but true scientific output—papers, data, clinical milestones—is barely tracked, with finance and off-chain assets remaining black boxes. DAO Treasuries are public, but how do you calculate coordination efficiency and governance quality? Decentralized social DAU is rising, but has user data sovereignty truly landed in users' hands? Open Source fares worse. Revenue is roughly 0, but the number of systems relying on it is what truly matters.
The problem was never that value doesn't exist. It's that the market has long gotten used to using price to prove value: what can be calculated gets factored into valuations, what can be monetized gets counted as assets, and values shared by society as a whole but unable to enter cash flows directly are often left out like this.
ESG Is Not the Answer, But It Is an Entry Point
The traditional world has actually been solving this problem for a long time; it's just that few in the crypto circles know.
Everyone has heard of ESG, Environmental, Social, Governance. But many understand it superficially as "putting a green label on good companies." That's too shallow. Digital Asset Research transformed it into ESGN—adding a Network Health dimension, specifically tailored for crypto assets: energy consumption, developer distribution, token holding concentration, code quality, degree of decentralization, totaling over 250 indicators. ChainScore Labs even proposed a concept called Sustainability Premium—after Ethereum's merge reduced energy consumption by 99.9%, avoiding climate regulations and institutional blacklist risks, lowering capital costs and improving liquidity, this itself constitutes a premium.
ESG solves "besides profit, what impact does the enterprise have on the world." But ESG is merely an entry point, far from everything.
GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) goes further. It doesn't ask "does this make money for the company?" It asks "what significant impact does this organization have on the economy, environment, and people?" Impact Materiality and Financial Materiality are two different things. A project might reduce a company's earnings slightly but has a major positive social impact; GRI requires you to disclose it regardless.
IRIS+ is more practical, a dictionary of over 500 standard indicators maintained by GIIN. It breaks Impact down into five questions: What happened? Who benefited? How much impact? Contribution (did you cause it)? Risk (what are the downsides?). Mapping these five questions directly onto Web3 feels completely seamless—a DeSci project, what scientific results did it produce, who benefits, how many people were impacted, did you truly create it, is there Impact Washing, and where did the money go? All asked clearly.
SROI (Social Return on Investment) is more direct. It asks: For every $1 of social capital invested, how much social value is generated? A typical statement is "for every £1 invested, £4.28 of social value is created." For many Web3 public goods, Financial ROI approaches 0, but Social ROI is vastly greater than 0.
The UK Green Book defines social value even more broadly: economic prosperity, justice, safety, climate, environment, health, wellbeing, distributive effects—all count. Monetizable ones are calculated as Net Present Social Value, non-monetizable ones undergo standard comparative analysis. Not everything must be converted to dollars.
Then there is the Digital Public Goods Standard, used by the Digital Public Goods Alliance. To judge if a digital project is a public good, it looks at nine dimensions: SDG relevance, open-source licensing, ownership, platform independence, documentation, privacy, security, etc. This system is already operational.
The traditional world not only has rulers but mandates companies to disclose according to them. Public companies must publish annual reports, ESG reports, and corporate social responsibility reports. Auditors must sign off; fraud faces penalties. Crypto public goods projects lack even a standardized disclosure format. Grant-winning teams write a blog post after spending the money to consider their task done; those without grants don't even write blogs. We don't demand they audit like listed companies, but basic categorized disclosure—finance, impact, governance, risk—must have a standard format. Otherwise, investors and funders cannot even perform cross-comparisons.
Since the traditional world has started evaluating digital public goods, why does crypto still use Twitter popularity, TVL, and Token prices to judge everything?
Social Value Does Not Equal Token Value
But here we must pour a bucket of cold water, otherwise it will just turn into another pile of garbage crypto narratives.
Absolutely do not assume that giving a project a high ESG score means its Token should rise. Social value does not equal enterprise value; enterprise value does not equal protocol value; protocol value does not equal Token value. This is a long transmission chain. If any link breaks, the value cannot pass through.
A DeSci project generates $100 million in social value annually—promoting open research, shortening cycles, increasing collaboration. But if users don't need to hold its Token, researchers don't need to stake, the Token doesn't participate in service payments, the Treasury lacks value capture mechanisms, Tokens lack governance budget rights, and Tokens aren't data access rights—then what relationship does this $100 million social value have with the Token's market cap?
α≈0. The project is an excellent public good, but not an excellent Token investment target.
Think in reverse: A DePIN network sees increased social demand, higher service usage, higher Token staking demand, increased Token burns, higher node security needs, growing Treasuries—only then does social value truly transmit to Token demand. This chain is visible on well-running DePINs, but cases like Helium Mobile being acquired where subscription revenue no longer flows back to HNT structurally sever α and β.
So the key isn't "does this project have social value," but three questions: How much social value did it create? How much of that value did the protocol internalize (α, Public Value Capture Ratio)? Of the protocol value, how much is truly borne by the Token (β, Token Capture Ratio)?
These two coefficients are an order of magnitude more important than the ESG Score itself.
But we must clarify: α and β cannot be precisely calculated in reality. Choices of shadow prices, boundary definitions for attribution, and differing counterfactual assumptions will cause α valuations for the same project to vary by 2 to 3 times, while β will fluctuate dramatically due to subtle differences in Token mechanism design. Anyone claiming they've "precisely calculated α=0.37, β=0.62" either doesn't understand or is selling something. What can be done realistically is providing a range, applying risk discounts, and continuously calibrating with real data. The range might be wide, but a wide range beats false precision.
Why is VitaDAO's α so low? VITA holders have never received dividends; VitaDAO's own guidelines explicitly state VITA is not an economic instrument. Because scientific research cycles span a decade while Token liquidity cycles last six months, mismatch. Why did Friend.tech's β look high initially before collapsing? Because it packaged "attention" directly into speculatable shares, essentially turning social relations into a zero-sum game, destroying the public goods attribute via financialization. Farcaster and Lens both chose not to issue tokens, precisely demonstrating that forcing token issuance on social graphs as public goods harms the ecosystem.
Filecoin did something very smart in September 2026: ProPGF Batch 3 awarded ~$1.4 million in grants to 19 projects. This wasn't simple money dumping; they introduced a framework called Filecoin Kernel, dividing public goods into Essential (things the network cannot function without, e.g., client diversity, RPC, indexing, documentation) and Important (things whose silent failure would cause cascading impacts, e.g., coordination and settlement). They began answering a cold question: If this project vanished, would the Filecoin network truly suffer harm?
This is the mindset mature protocols should have: Public goods are not a moral issue; they are budget, governance, priority, and disclosure issues.
A Six-Layer Framework: From Cash Flow to Market Pricing
So what we truly need is not another ESG scoring card, but a system that engineeringizes, audits, and transmits "non-economic value" to Tokens. Moreover, this system must inherently carry disclosure standards from Day 1—if you don't disclose in this format, no one can value you.
Call it PIVF or PVATV; the name doesn't matter. The core structure consists of six layers. There are strict transmission relationships between layers. If the upper layer fails to transmit, there's no point calculating the lower layer.
Layer 1: Economic Value. Cash flow, revenue, usage value. What is the annualized Revenue? Protocol Fees? Treasury income? What is the PSRF (Protocol Sustainable Revenue Floor)—the sum of core contributor salaries, key infrastructure expenses, security audit reserves, and inflation buffers, representing how much money is needed yearly to survive? Annualized revenue above PSRF, the project survives; below PSRF, supply cutoff risks. This layer is the foundation. Not making money isn't shameful; pretending the building is tall while the foundation is empty is. All projects must disclose quarterly: revenue details, expense details, Treasury balances, PSRF coverage. This is the most basic transparency requirement.
Layer 2: Public / Social Value. Externalities, public goods, social impact. How many downstream projects depend on an open-source library? How many genuinely ongoing studies did a DeSci project fund? How many regions lacking traditional infrastructure does a DePIN network cover? How many users' real data did a privacy tool protect? This layer uses Theory of Change to map causal chains: Input → Activity → Output → Outcome → Impact. Customize auditable indicators from IRIS+ metrics by track: DAOs track active contributor addresses, proposal execution rates, fund usage reports; DeSci tracks funded project counts, IP-NFT quantities, open-access paper counts, experimental progress reports, off-chain asset lists; DePIN tracks active nodes, geographic coverage, real data utilization rates, service SLAs; Open Source tracks downstream dependency counts, critical vulnerability fixes, code reuse frequency. Each indicator must have a corresponding data source—on-chain verifiable ones provide contract addresses, off-chain ones provide raw document links or third-party audit reports. Indicators without disclosed data sources do not count.
Layer 3: Impact Attribution. This layer is most easily skipped and most prone to loopholes for Impact Washing. Even if value exists, was it really caused by this project? Five questions must be answered sequentially: What exactly happened? Who exactly benefited? How much is net of deadweight? What is your contribution margin versus other actors? What are the negative side effects? Sybil addresses get discounted, parts that would happen anyway (deadweight) are deducted, portions transferred from other projects (displacement) don't count, multi-party collaborations split shares by contribution ratio, severe negative impacts set red lines that cannot be offset by public good credits. This layer is essentially an anti-cheat layer. If "funded project count" directly ties to Token buybacks, teams will flood quantity over quality; if "paper count" becomes an influence metric, spam papers will follow; if "active addresses" scores points, Sybils will swarm. So this layer must require: multi-dimensional indicator cross-validation, third-party independent audit sampling, dMRV (digitized Measurement, Reporting, and Verification) raw data on-chain storage, challengeability, and slashing. Without this layer, the entire framework is just old narratives in new bottles.
Layer 4: Protocol Capture. Social value exists, attribution is clear. How much can the protocol itself internalize? This is α. α depends on mechanism design: must service payments use Tokens? Do validators need staking? Does the Treasury have continuous income sources? Does the burn mechanism actually work? Can governance rights influence real economic parameters? High or low α depends on mechanisms, not ideals. α is not a fixed number; it's a range varying with protocol parameters. Sequencer revenue, MEV distribution, protocol fee switches are all α regulators.
Layer 5: Token Capture. Of the value captured by the protocol, how much can the Token bear? This is β. β depends on Token design: Does the Token have value capture rights? Will Treasury income flow back to Holders? Is the buy-and-burn mechanism written into contracts? Is the Staking yield backed by real income rather than inflation subsidies? Can Governance Tokens truly decide budget allocation? Similarly, β is a range, not a point estimate. Many projects' Token designs look like they have capture, but in reality, Treasury multisigs are controlled by teams, buybacks can be canceled anytime, Staking yields are pure inflation—such β must be heavily discounted.
Layer 6: Market Calibration. After calculating the first five layers, you get a fundamental Token value range. Only now do we turn to the market: NVT, MVRV, Treasury NAV, Market Cap / active developer ratio, net deflation status—these on-chain native indicators remain as calibrators. If PIVF-calculated value deviates from market cap by over 50%, three possibilities exist: the market hasn't recognized it yet (undervaluation opportunity), your shadow price assumptions are too optimistic (model risk), or the project has fatal unseen risks (e.g., team rugpull, regulatory crackdown). Always respect the market, but never blindly follow it.
The final output is not a precise price, but a range. Accompany it with three diagnostic indicators: PSRF coverage (>1 means sustainable), Impact / Market Cap ratio (significantly >1 suggests potential undervaluation, but requires αβ transmission chain verification), comprehensive risk discount rate (higher means more caution). All input data must cite sources, disclose assumptions, and provide confidence intervals. This is the responsible approach for investors.
How to Build Bridges and Deal with Free Riders
The framework is laid out, but the most critical question remains unanswered: How to "inject" non-economic value into Tokens? You can't just claim social value exists and expect Tokens to auto-appreciate. Bridges must be built section by section, and self-discipline isn't enough; institutions are required.
Bridge 1: Public goods funding flows. QF (Quadratic Funding) and RetroPGF (Retroactive Public Goods Funding) are already running at scale. Gitcoin distributed tens of millions via QF; Optimism RetroPGF iterated multiple rounds cumulatively distributing hundreds of millions before pausing; OSO (Open Source Observer) unified GitHub, npm, and on-chain deployments into auditable influence metric pipelines, allocating tens of millions OP before RetroPGF paused. Money enters project treasuries, can buy and burn tokens, reward contributors, boost product adoption, thereby elevating economic value. Here, Tokens act as both funding currency and value yardsticks.
But there's a fundamental dilemma here, unavoidable: the Free-rider Problem. Even if all institutions agree an open-source security library creates $1 billion in social value, as long as it's free, individual institutions lack the economic incentive to contribute actively—others maintain it for free, I use it for free, why not? This isn't a moral issue; it's a classic Prisoner's Dilemma in game theory. Capital's goodwill and ESG consciousness cannot solve this. Mandatory mechanisms for internalizing externalities are required: Protocol-level Tax and Pigouvian Subsidies. The simplest example: L2 ecosystems can mandate a fixed percentage (e.g., 10% to 20%) of Sequencer revenue be automatically injected into RetroPGF pools via preset contracts, requiring no voting consent, no altruism, just hard-coded code. Taxes are paid simultaneously with transactions. Ethereum's EIP-1559 burn acts as a protocol tax; L2 Sequencer fee splits too; MEV smoothing distributions as well. The maintenance costs of public goods should be proportionally borne by economic activities enjoying them, not reliant on folks like Vitalik dipping into private funds.
Bridge 2: Influence Certificates. Hypercerts, an ERC-1155 semi-fungible Token by Protocol Labs, records "who did what, for whom, when, and what impact", turning completed beneficial work into tradeable, divisible, attributable on-chain assets. Projects accumulate Hypercerts as reputation collateral; influence markets let social value be speculated and allocated, feeding back to builders. Influence certificates represent social value assuming asset form for the first time. dMRV and dynamic oracles are crucial here: influence cannot rely on self-reporting; it requires continuous, auditable data streams fed into the system.
Bridge 3: ESG compliance premiums. High ESG ratings grant institutional capital compliant access, better liquidity, lower discount rates. Global ESG asset pools exceed $30 trillion; for marginal-profit projects, this is the key channel exchanging "non-economic compliance" for "economic liquidity". ChainScore Labs' Sustainability Premium is no fluff—why did institutions prefer allocating to Ethereum post-merge? Green premiums are tangible.
Bridge 4: Attention-driven demand. But it must be verified, genuine attention, not Friend.tech securitizing "follows" directly. Real attention → user and developer adoption → network effects → Token demand (gas/governance/staking). dMRV, oracles, OSOs verify attention as "real adoption", preventing pure Meme idling.
Regarding monetization, a technical detail must be added: Shadow price anchor points cannot be static fiat values. If shadow prices are denominated in USD, fiat inflation and crypto bull/bear cycles will severely decouple impact monetization results from Token market capital supply. In bear markets, Tokens drop 80%; the dollar-denominated "social value" remains unchanged, but project teams absolutely won't secure matching grant levels. A more robust approach is using algorithmic dynamic oracles calibrated against a basket of external purchasing powers—e.g., hours of moderately skilled developer labor, cost of a standard security audit, marginal cost of 1GB-year decentralized storage—anchored via relative prices of real production factors, not fixating on a single USD figure. This way, shadow prices auto-adjust to productivity shifts and crypto cycles, avoiding overvaluing public goods with无人接盘 (no buyers) in bear markets or undervaluing crucial elements in bull markets.
Token design itself must change. Governance rights cannot be idle; they must influence real economic parameters—Uniswap's December 2025 UNIfication proposal activated the fee switch, burning 100 million UNI with 99.9% approval, first burn ~$100m equivalent, governance decisions themselves becoming value sources. Work utility must generate real on-chain demand—in DePIN, paying for compute/storage/network services must use Tokens, validators must stake, burn mechanisms create deflation, forming the hardest Token value backing. Influence utility is novel: influence-tracing dividends, influence buybacks (fixed revenue proportion used for buy-and-burn, volume tied to multi-dimensional influence output metrics and independently audited, not reliant on single manipulable metrics), influence certifications (third-party audit results on-chain).
Not all projects suit token issuance. Farcaster thrives with 40k-60k active DAU without tokens; Lens hasn't issued tokens; VitaDAO deliberately designs VITA as a non-economic instrument. There's inherent tension between public goods attributes and Token value capture. Projects with strong public goods attributes, unclear revenue paths, and free-rider problems unsolvable via mechanism design may honestly rely on grants/donations/treasuries/protocol taxes. Forcing token issuance usually ends as Meme drama, team fragmentation, or Impact Washing tools.
The Pleasant Part Is Over, Now for the Harsh Realities
Any new system attracts harvesters upon release. This framework is no exception, and in crypto, bad actors innovate faster than good ones.
Pitfall 1: Impact Washing. Once social value enters Token valuations, projects will start buying third-party certs, flooding users, inflating research citations, manipulating DAO votes, spoofing DePIN devices, manufacturing fake public welfare campaigns. Once "funded project count", "paper count", or "active addresses" directly tie to Token buybacks or Treasury allocations, volume flooding is inevitable—not if, but when. The solution isn't cancelling metrics, but treating the Impact Score itself as a protocol requiring attack and audit; Sybil addresses via identity clustering and sample verification; reading floods via QAA counting only behavioral-consequence interactions; citation floods via DORA principles plus expert sampling; short-term airdrop participation filtered by 30/90/365-day continuous engagement; scoring sources via multi-party oracles plus stake plus challenge plus slash; duplicate calculations clarified via explicit contribution chain boundaries; severe negative impacts separated with red lines unoffsettable by public good credits. Must require multi-dimensional cross-validation, independent third-party audits, allow anyone to submit evidence challenging any influence claim—otherwise, new systems will be gamified faster than old narratives.
Goodhart's Law always holds: when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. Hence why Layer 3 Attribution must exist independently, and outputs must be ranges, not points.
Pitfall 2: Shadow Price Subjectivity. SROI and IWA experience show differing valuation methods for the same externality can diverge by over 3x. Ready-made monetization coefficients for open-source public goods are nearly absent; dynamic oracle parameter selection (basket weightings, update frequencies) introduces new subjectivity. Thus we must admit: our capability lies in converging estimation ranges, not eliminating uncertainty. Someone telling you "this project is precisely $3.72" is likely scamming you. Someone saying "this project's influence range is X to Y, confidence Z, primary assumptions A and B" is serious.
Pitfall 3: Attribution Difficulty. Public goods impacts are rarely single-entity results; an open-source tool integrates into multiple projects; a foundational library security upgrade protects the ecosystem. Precisely attributing to single protocols is extremely difficult. SROI attribution discount discipline alleviates but cannot eliminate it. Counterfactual estimates ("what if this project didn't exist") are themselves unprovable assumptions.
Pitfall 4: Market Recognition Lag. Current crypto markets are speculative-driven; valuation premiums for non-economic indicators may go unrecognized long-term. Jin et al.'s research shows environmental pricing effects only surface post-specific events. S and G dimensions barely have event studies proving pricing. Practitioners and academia are disconnected—Burniske, Woo, Samani frameworks exist mostly in blogs/reports, not peer-reviewed literature. Building a solid framework, the market may take two to three years to react; projects must prepare psychologically.
Pitfall 5: Governance Capture. Influence metric definition/weighting, third-party auditor selection, challenge/slashing ruling mechanisms can be captured by whales/core teams, becoming "self-rating" tools. Requires non-token-weighted voices (citizen juries, DID-based reputation), auditor rotation, influence parameter governance with supermajority voting and time locks.
Pitfall 6: Transparency Fraud. Layer 3 Attribution requires raw data on-chain storage, but off-chain data can be forged—labs can Photoshop, nodes can run VMs, users can hire volume-bot firms. dMRV isn't a panacea; it only guarantees "on-chain records aren't tampered", not "uploaded data is authentic". Requires physical-world verification nodes, random spot-checks, reputation system linkage, heavy penalties for fraud.
But these pitfalls are not reasons to abstain. 2010s ESG data infrastructure was equally crude; MSCI and Sustainalytics slowly polished theirs, enduring numerous greenwashing scandals along the way. The problem is crypto hasn't even started this step. EF contracting, DeSci black-box operations, public goods teams unable to draft standardized disclosure reports—these issues won't auto-vanish by ignoring them.
Rulers and Language Are Indispensable
In truth, crypto currently lacks neither money nor projects.
It lacks two things. Language, and rulers.
Traditional finance has a mature language: Revenue, EBITDA, DCF, P/E, WACC, Beta. Speak these words, and global investors, analysts, auditors, regulators instantly comprehend, compare, and trade. This language enables efficient capital flow. Traditional finance also has rulers: accounting standards, disclosure requirements, audit processes, regulatory penalties. How listed companies draft annual reports, what must be disclosed, what constitutes fraud, how severe penalties are—all codified in rules. Language and rulers combined, capital markets turn.
Public goods-oriented Web3 projects lack both today. Project teams say "we build highly valuable things", investors ask "what's your Revenue?", and the dialogue dies—no common language. Even with a common language, teams don't disclose, disclose irregularly, disclose un-audited, audit incomparably—no standard ruler. Teams rely purely on narratives, visions, Memes, influencer endorsements for fundraising. Narratives are uncomparable, unauditable, un-replayable. Bull markets believe any narrative; bear markets kill narrative-driven projects first.
Gitcoin, Optimism RetroPGF, Hypercerts, OSO, dMRV, SourceCred, ESGN, IRIS+, SROI—these tools have proven feasibility across different stages. OSO allocates tens of millions OP via influence metrics; Hypercerts traden influences into assets; Gitcoin QF grants 100 donors giving $1 each more weight than one donor giving $100. These aren't fantasies; they're operational systems. Filecoin Kernel, L2 Sequencer fee split discussions, EIP-1559 burn mechanisms all march correctly.
What's missing is just the layer stitching them into standard pipelines: a complete framework from economic value anchoring, to public value identification, to impact attribution & anti-cheat, to protocol capture α, to Token bearing β, to market calibration. This framework won't eliminate financial metrics; it fills the void when financial metrics hit zero or distort. It won't replace audits; it embeds disclosure norms from Day 1—which data must disclose, in what format, data source location, auditor assignment, penalty for fraud. Giving "unprofitable yet indispensable" elements a language verifiable, comparable, capital-priced, and a ruler measuring, comparing, enforcing accountability.
Coase articulated in 1960 that when transaction costs rise high enough to prevent private markets from internalizing externalities, new mechanisms are needed. Blockchain itself is a transaction-cost-lowering device. Quadratic funding is mathematically proven optimal public goods preference aggregation by Buterin, Hitzig, Weyl. Radical libertarianism isn't utopian; it's already running years on Gitcoin. The Crypto-Coase Theorem states blockchains outperform centralized regulation when transaction costs are low—but the prerequisite is that you must quantify,权属, trade, disclose, audit externalities.
Hoffmann et al. calculated open-source software's demand-side value at ~$8.8 trillion. Every $1 of MLOSS investment corresponds to at least $100 in global economic value. These values are now "ownerless", freely enjoyed by society, yet unmaintained, unfunded, unpriced, even unquantified. 2026 EF contraction, security researchers surviving on grants, DeSci decade-long cycles clashing with six-month liquidity windows & opaque ledgers, decentralized social platforms fearing token issuance—behind all lies the same problem: value is created but doesn't return to creators; value exists but lacks universally understandable, trustworthy exposition and quantification.
The Filecoin Kernel framework asks a good question: If this project vanishes, will the network truly suffer? The entire crypto industry must ask the same: If these public goods projects die, will Web3 truly suffer?
The answer is yes. RWA needs underlying protocol security; Memes need live chains; ETFs need non-downtime nodes; AI Agents need decentralized storage and compute. All glittering commercial applications rest atop open-source code, public infrastructure, security research, open data—"unprofitable" foundations. Unstable grounds make taller buildings riskier.
If Web3 truly aims to become next-gen public infrastructure, it must learn to forge languages and rulers for values incapable of direct profitability. Not substituting valuation with sentiment, not masking with narratives, not swapping old Meme rhetoric for new ESG buzzwords, but translating social value into capital's dialect via verifiable data, auditable metrics, comparable frameworks, executable disclosure standards. Internalize free-rider costs into protocols, lock volume-flooding/fraud risks into mechanism design. This isn't charity; it's infrastructure's survival imperative.
Prices record exchange value. But civilization's true dependencies—open-source code, security research, open science, decentralized comms, privacy protection—their value was never merely exchange value. Supplement these values' measurement, establish disclosure rules, solve free-rider problems, public goods won't wait till grants dry up to realize they're starving, builders won't choose between idealism and survival, and this industry won't remain merely a colossal casino.
Ultimately, an industry's maturity marker isn't how many multiples it surges, but whether it honestly sustains what keeps it functioning—and possesses a mechanism ensuring no one can pretend these elements don't exist.














