
The Real Cost of Strategy Being Forced to "Hoard" USD
Written by: Allard Peng
Compiled by: AIdidiaoJP, Foresight News
Strategy (formerly MicroStrategy)'s USD cash reserves have surged to $4.65 billion, up from $3.75 billion just two weeks ago. Meanwhile, since the end of June 2026, it has sold nearly 7,000 Bitcoins.
Once this number came out, the entire crypto community exploded. Why did a company that wrote "hoarding Bitcoin" into its corporate DNA and bet almost all its assets on BTC suddenly start hoarding fiat currency on a large scale? More critically, should other Bitcoin treasury-related companies follow suit?
This is not a simple question of "should or should not." Behind it lies credit ratings, capital structure, opportunity cost, volatility risk, and the true business model positioning of Bitcoin companies. Today, we will peel back the truth layer by layer.
Why is Strategy Dead Set on USD? Because It Took a Path Almost No One Else Can
Strategy now looks less and less like a traditional software company and more like a "digital credit" issuance platform. The preferred securities it issues are essentially economically supported by a massive Bitcoin balance sheet. These securities carry fixed USD dividend obligations—regardless of Bitcoin's price movements, dividends must be paid in USD on time.
Here comes the problem: Bitcoin itself does not generate any cash flow. Although Strategy's software business still exists, the cash it generates is far from enough to cover its increasingly massive capital structure.
Even more critical is the traditional credit analysis system. In October 2025, S&P gave Strategy a B- rating, with reasons stated plainly: too high Bitcoin concentration, insufficient USD liquidity, and extremely weak risk-adjusted capital. In S&P's methodology, Bitcoin is almost directly excluded from "effective capital" due to market volatility risk—no matter how much BTC, in their eyes, it equals zero.
When we previously analyzed this rating report specifically, we explicitly mentioned: if you want to improve credit ratings, cash reserves are one of the directions worth seriously considering.
So Strategy chose to hold a large amount of USD. The purpose is pure—to support its ability to continuously issue digital credit. More USD liquidity can make preferred securities appear "safer" in the eyes of investors and rating agencies, thereby expanding demand and reducing financing costs.
But cash is not a free lunch. Excess capital should generate returns. Ordinary companies can use it for reinvestment, stock buybacks, or dividends. The most direct choice for Bitcoin companies is to buy more Bitcoin. Every USD cash sitting on the books means you give up Bitcoin's potential positive returns in exchange for certain negative real returns (inflation erosion).
Strategy is willing to take this loss because its business model is already bound to "continuous credit issuance." Three extremely special conditions hold simultaneously:
- Bitcoin almost dominates the entire balance sheet;
- Rating agencies impose heavy penalties on Bitcoin exposure;
- Management is clear about continuing to issue digital credit on a large scale.
Each of these three conditions is special enough on its own; only when combined do they create the situation of "must hoard cash." Conversely, if Strategy does not issue credit, it simply does not need these USD.
The Real Cost of Cash Reserves: The "Invisible Tax" Calculated by Math
Let's go straight to the numbers and calculate the drag clearly.
Assume Strategy issues $100 of preferred stock with an annual dividend rate of 10%. To cover three years of dividends, it must reserve $30 in cash, leaving only $70 actually available to invest in Bitcoin.
It still needs to pay $10 in dividends annually. So this $70 Bitcoin investment must generate at least:
10 ÷ 70 = 14.29%
The originally stated 10% cost of capital instantly becomes a hurdle rate of 14.29% on actually deployed capital. Cash reserves directly raise the return requirement by 42.9%.
Cash itself can earn some interest, which will slightly alleviate this number, but the structural drag will not disappear.
The real hurdle is actually higher. Bitcoin is highly volatile, and in some years it will significantly underperform this 14.29%. But dividends cannot be skipped (assuming no default here). So besides "cash drag," there is an added layer of "volatility drag"—you are using a high-volatility asset to leverage fixed obligations. This risk must be compensated by raising the hurdle even further.
The result is cruel: the larger the required cash reserve, the lower the proportion of every new dollar that can actually go into Bitcoin. If Bitcoin's long-term appreciation rate cannot consistently exceed this raised hurdle, ultimately ordinary shareholders foot the bill.
Of course, cash is not completely useless. It provides real option value:
- When Bitcoin plummets, it can cover dividends and interest, avoiding forced selling of coins at low positions;
- When preferred securities trade significantly below book value, opportunistic buybacks can be made.
Strategy recently played a beautiful hand. At the end of July, it bought back STRC with a book value of $28.89 million for $25 million, a discount of up to 13.47%. Afterwards, it used $108.6 million obtained from selling Bitcoin to buy back another 1.15 million shares of STRC. Buying back preferred stock at a price below par value equals eliminating more preferred claims and future dividend obligations with less cash. This is truly accretive to "Net Bitcoin Per Share."
Most Bitcoin Companies: Don't Blindly Follow the Trend, Cash Needs Must Be Bound to Real Business
Now let's pull the lens back to the vast majority of Bitcoin companies.
For them, cash needs should be strictly bound to the operating business itself, rather than arbitrarily setting a "reserve target." Keep in mind, even Strategy itself is not clear exactly how much cash it needs to hoard to get a better rating or attract more credit investors to buy STRC.
A company with real cash flow is usually clear about its expenditure structure: salaries, taxes, debt repayment, supplier payments, recent capital expenditures, plus a reasonable buffer for operating cash flow volatility.
The buffer size depends on business stability.
- Profitable companies with recurring revenue, low fixed costs, and predictable expenditures can keep only a small buffer;
- Businesses with strong cyclicality and large capital expenditures must keep more.
The only legitimate reason for increasing reserves is that the business itself needs liquidity, not that management simply wants to see a large sum of cash on the books.
Once operating needs and prudent buffers are covered, excess cash must have a clear economic purpose. Otherwise, it will only generate huge opportunity costs, directly diluting shareholder returns. Any company's excess capital should be used to compete directly with the company's own hurdle rate:
- Buy back significantly undervalued stock;
- Repay high-cost liabilities;
- Or invest in projects that can generate higher returns.
For Bitcoin companies, the default high-return project is often to continue hoarding Bitcoin.
Conclusion: Strategy Is an Extreme Exception, Most Companies Have No Reason to Hoard USD on a Large Scale
Connecting all the logic, the answer is actually very clear.
Strategy is an extremely rare case. The reason its cash reserves exist is entirely because it forcibly built a large-scale digital credit issuance machine on top of its Bitcoin balance sheet, while credit rating agencies, with obvious institutional inertia, treat legal, high-liquidity Bitcoin assets directly as zero.
Companies without this special liability structure—that is, almost all other Bitcoin-related companies on the market—have almost no reason to hoard USD on a large scale beyond maintaining daily operations and reasonable liquidity buffers.
Hoarding one more USD in cash equals buying one less USD of Bitcoin. Under the assumption of Bitcoin's long-term upward trend, this is exchanging certain negative real returns for uncertain "security." For most companies, this is not cost-effective.
Ultimately, what truly decides cash or Bitcoin is not sentiment, nor others' practices, but your own business model, capital structure, and real cash flow needs.















