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Figure Valuation Mismatch: The market thinks it is a lender, but it has already become a toll collector

Figure Valuation Mismatch: The market thinks it is a lender, but it has already become a toll collector

2026.08.12
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When nearly 80% of traffic is contributed by partners and the share of platform fee revenue approaches 30%, the market is still valuing it using the traditional lender model.

Author: Artemis Analytics

Compiled by: TechFlow

TechFlow Editor's Note: Figure is quietly transforming from a balance sheet-driven lender that needs to acquire customers and fund loans itself into an asset-light marketplace platform connecting loan originators and institutional buyers. When nearly 80% of traffic is contributed by partners and platform fee revenue approaches 30%, the market is still valuing it using the model of a traditional lender—this misalignment deserves re-examination by everyone following fintech and on-chain assets.

Figure spent six years building a home equity loan platform, aimed at shortening funding time and reducing costs. Today, an increasing portion of its business comes from marketplace matching activities, where loans are not acquired or funded by Figure. We believe this model could bring considerable incremental profits. In Q1 2026, partners originated 78% of platform traffic, Connect transaction volume surged from $8 million in Q4 2024 to $1.6 billion, and fee income items with higher incremental margins have grown from 5% of revenue to 28%. We expect Figure to evolve into a channel collecting asset-light 'toll fees' on loan flows, while the market is still valuing it based on balance sheet logic.

Therefore, the key question is: exactly how much loan volume can pass through this platform without acquiring customers or funding loans independently.

This memo is a joint view from Artemis and North Island Ventures. Artemis is a digital finance research institution focusing on blockchain and equity assets. NIV is an investment company headquartered in New York, focusing on the intersection of blockchain, fintech, and AI.

Figure Connect launched in June 2024 and is a marketplace connecting loan originators and institutional buyers. Partners originate loans, institutional capital provides funding, and Figure earns underwriting and distribution fees. Figure reports all related activities as Consumer Loan Marketplace volume: every loan originated on its platform, plus third-party loans traded on Connect.

The model is scaling. Loans originated by partners now account for 78% of the total, Connect reached 56% of CLM volume within seven quarters of launch, loan inventory days dropped from 31 days to 16 days, and ecosystem and technology fees also grew from 5% of revenue to 28%.

More loan supply may come from two sources. The pending acquisition of Kiavi will bring an origination engine with an annual loan volume of $7 billion, and Figure should be able to divert part of it to the same infrastructure. Additionally, available industry data indicates that junior lien loans have begun to recover after more than a decade of contraction, which is expanding Figure's core market.

Meanwhile, Wall Street seems to be pricing in rate compression for Figure's entry into the first lien business, as first liens structurally have lower rates than its core second lien business. However, the net rates disclosed by Figure have risen instead, even as the proportion of first liens nearly doubled. We believe this disconnect is part of a broader misunderstanding of the business and explains why market consensus expectations remain too low.

Figure was founded in 2018 by Mike Cagney and June Ou, who were co-founder and CTO of SoFi respectively. Figure and its approximately 390 partners issued $8.4 billion in loans in 2025, a 63% year-over-year increase; the platform currently has an annualized loan volume of about $17 billion, a 130% increase. This accounts for approximately 5% of loans collateralized by residential real estate nationwide.

We believe Figure's initial competitive advantage lies in speed and cost. The company built two things simultaneously: a fully automated home equity loan origination platform, and a blockchain Provenance built specifically for this purpose—every Figure loan is originated, registered, and eventually securitized on its chain. Together, they compressed home equity loans from about six weeks and a cost of $11,000 to within seven days and $1,000. In our view, this advantage established Figure's position in second lien HELOC loans; it is now the largest non-bank originator.

Second liens rank behind the borrower's existing mortgage: homeowners can keep the low-rate first mortgage unchanged and borrow against the home equity on top of it. First liens have the first claim on the house, whether it is the original mortgage or a new loan provided to mortgage-free homeowners.

Connect may represent a significant shift in the business economic model.

We see two potential catalysts potentially spanning 2026 and beyond: the continued scale expansion of Figure Connect, and the pending acquisition of Kiavi—upon completion, it will double Figure's first lien business, expected to close in the fourth quarter. Part three below will explain why neither is reflected in the stock price.

1. Connect is Transforming Figure from a Lender to a Marketplace Platform

In our view, as of 2024, Figure was an excellent loan originator under a structurally mediocre business model. It acquired borrowers through a sales team, provided loan funds using warehouse financing lines, held loans on the balance sheet for about a month, and then monetized them upon sale.

We believe this economic model is typical of professional lenders: capital intensive, reliant on external financing, facing risks of credit and volume cycles, so the market usually values it in the industry range of 5-7x EBITDA.

Connect changed the funding source for part of Figure's growth. Partners acquire borrowers and originate loans against commitments pre-sold to institutional buyers, while Figure provides underwriting and distribution infrastructure, collecting about 3% market fees. Therefore, the expansion of Connect volume does not require a corresponding increase in customer acquisition spending, warehouse financing, or credit exposure.

Connect transaction volume grew from $8 million in Q4 2024 to $1.6 billion in Q1 2026. Partner-originated volume now accounts for approximately 78% of total traffic, meaning most loans reaching Figure do not require Figure to bear customer acquisition costs.

Figure's reported balance sheet metrics also reflect this shift. Loan inventory days have dropped from about 31 days to 16 days, while transaction volume has instead grown nearly twofold. Warehouse financing borrowings are only $15 million, compared to a committed financing line of $1.9 billion, with a utilization rate of less than 1%. And relative to $6.8 billion in securitized collateral, Figure's disclosed maximum risk exposure is only $378 million.

The revenue structure is shifting towards the highest quality line in the income statement: Ecosystem and Technology Fees. These are platform and market fees, possessing incremental margins close to 100%, and they have grown from 5% of total revenue in fiscal 2023 to 28% in Q1 2026.

From fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2025, revenue grew 142%, while costs grew only 18%. Incremental EBITDA margins reached 82% and 91% in 2024 and 2025 respectively, driving reported adjusted EBITDA margins from negative 4% to 49%. If business volume continues to grow on the current cost base, it should support margins moving further towards management's mid-term target of 60% for 2028.

2. More Loan Supply May Be Coming

The larger the loan flow of Connect, the higher its value, and Figure is facing two streams of significant new supply that may arrive simultaneously.

Let's start with second liens. Industry data shows that after experiencing about 13 years of continuous contraction following the subprime crisis, balances have recently begun to rebound. Bank HELOC balances reached $287 billion in 2026 and resumed growth, while the peak in 2009 was $600 billion. The industry opened 1.2 million new HELOC lines in 2025, the highest since 2022, but still only about half the peak of the mid-2000s.

Currently, homeowners hold 71.6% of their property value as equity, the highest level in about 35 years. Much of this equity is backed by mortgages with rates locked at 3%-4%, making full refinancing at the current rate level of about 7% uneconomical. For homeowners who wish to access this equity but are unwilling to give up low-rate first mortgages, second liens are a rational choice.

When Figure resumed growth, it was already the largest non-bank HELOC originator, and we believe it faces a relatively thin competitive field: capital requirements, compliance costs, and lack of government-sponsored enterprise support have squeezed many lending institutions out of this category.

Meanwhile, Kiavi opens a second battlefield for Figure—first liens, and this acquisition will double Figure's existing first lien business. First liens serve borrowers not covered by second liens: mortgage-free homeowners—accounting for about 40% of US housing units—and those who still have reasonable grounds to refinance existing balances. Single balances are typically between $200,000 and $300,000, with an annual origination flow of about $2 trillion, approximately ten times the market space of second liens.

Kiavi is the largest originator of residential transition loans, which have a term of about 12 months and are used for purchase and renovation for fix-and-flip. 85% of its business volume comes from RTL. Kiavi's share in the RTL market grew from 2.1% in 2020 to 9.7% in 2025, achieving this during three years of frozen housing turnover, while underscaled competitors lost credit lines and collapsed. In 2025, its business volume exceeded $7 billion, revenue exceeded $250 million, growing 30%, with an EBITDA margin of about 40%.

In our view, the structure of this deal is also important. Figure jointly acquired with Sixth Street for $717 million in cash, of which Figure paid $538 million and Sixth Street paid $179 million. Figure will retain the operating platform, and Sixth Street will put Kiavi's loan assets into a joint venture entity supported by over $3 billion in forward purchase commitments, locking in demand for Connect in advance.

3. The Market Likely Misread This Transformation

We believe there are three main reasons for the mispricing.

The market may have underestimated the sustainability of Figure's rates. First liens structurally have lower rates than Figure's traditional second lien business, so as their proportion rises, the portfolio effect should mechanically press down the company's overall rates.

However, this has not happened so far. Figure's disclosed net rates rose from 3.4% in Q4 2024 to 3.8% in Q1 2026, while at this time the proportion of first liens nearly doubled, and second lien pricing remained at about 4.5% to 5.0%. Base pricing appears healthy enough to absorb the impact of portfolio changes.

This distinction is important for valuation. Price erosion reduces the economic benefits of existing business; while the portfolio change of first liens is adding incremental business at a lower rate level. Furthermore, Connect allows more of such business volume to scale under conditions of less capital, almost no customer acquisition costs, and higher profit margins. Market consensus expectations seem to be digesting rate compression, however, there is almost no sign of deterioration in product-level pricing.

Weak research coverage. Currently only four analysts cover FIGR. Since the Q1 2026 earnings report, Figure has published CLM volume weekly on its own website, giving investors a near real-time revenue proxy indicator. However, only one sell-side analyst explicitly modeled CLM volume, and even this analyst's estimates were lower than the volume reported by Figure itself. Figure is handing over real-time business line data on a platter, while the market basically turns a blind eye.

Stock misclassification. Our judgment is: FIGR was initially traded as a crypto proxy, now behaves more like a momentum stock, even though its business is increasingly approaching financial trading platforms, such as Tradeweb or ICE.

We believe valuation has not yet reflected this transformation. FIGR currently trades at about 12x EBITDA, the lowest multiple since listing: higher than the usual 5-7x for professional lenders, but far below the level deserved by a scaled financial platform.

Figure did retain crypto-related business, including stablecoin YLDS and its tokenized securities market, but both combined contribute less than 2% of revenue. Management seems to be working hard to correct market perception. Figure's investor education presentation materials steer investors away from the crypto narrative, instead focusing on two variables that increasingly determine company profitability: CLM volume and rates.

Counterarguments

If Figure's competitive advantage proves to be temporary, housing transaction volume deteriorates significantly, or the economic benefits of its core products weaken, this thesis will fail.

AI commoditizes underwriting. A former Figure product manager believes AI may make five-day closing a basic requirement, weakening Figure's speed advantage and forcing competition towards price. We believe the more durable moat lies in the marketplace platform, but general industry improvement in underwriting speed and cost remains a key risk.

Weakening Housing Transaction Volume

Weakening housing transaction volume. Connect reduces credit risk, but does not reduce volume risk. Home equity lines of credit (HELOC) default rates are climbing from historical lows, and a housing market downturn will suppress HELOC demand and cause a particularly severe impact on fix-and-flip loans.

Core Pricing Deterioration

Core pricing deterioration. This investment logic relies on product-level pricing remaining healthy while the proportion of low-take-rate products continues to rise. A continuous decline in second lien take rates, or net take rates falling below about 3.5%, will indicate that competitive pricing pressure is beginning to overwhelm the benefits brought by incremental transactions.

Governance Risk Realization

Governance risk realization. Cagney and Ou control about 71% of voting rights through a dual-class share structure, leaving shareholders with limited recourse means. The counterbalancing factor is alignment of interests: Cagney's considerable FIGR shares and nearly a decade of experience building Figure bind his financial and professional career deeply to the company's long-term results.

Our assessment is that Wall Street still focuses on two points: the risk of low-take-rate products diluting Figure's economic benefits, and the loans Figure itself is still issuing. We believe this ignores the essence of the transformation. Connect is allowing more transaction volume to flow through the platform with less capital, lower customer acquisition costs, and higher incremental profit margins. In our view, as more loan volume flows along these channels, Figure is looking less and less like a lending institution that the market is still pricing in a traditional way.

Important Disclosures

This article and all information contained herein is provided by Artemis Analytics Inc. and North Island Ventures, LLC ("NIV") (referred to separately as "Author", collectively as "Authors"), for information reference only, used to provide educational content and general market commentary.

Any statement in this article does not involve nor constitute an offer of NIV investment advisory services; any content in this article, including but not limited to mentioned companies, does not constitute an offer to sell or solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, nor does it constitute an invitation to offer for interests or shares in any private investment fund of NIV current or future (each referred to as "Fund"). Such offers can only be made by qualified offerees upon receiving relevant confidential private placement memorandums, subscription documents, and governance documents (collectively "Operating Documents").

Information in this article is not intended to provide nor should be relied upon as accounting, legal, or tax advice or investment recommendation. NIV does not serve in any capacity, nor claims to serve as advisor or trustee to any potential investor of any Fund. Recipients of this article should consult their tax, legal, accounting, or other advisors regarding matters discussed in this article.

Although information contained in this article is believed to be accurate, the Authors or their respective affiliates and representatives do not (i) make any express or implied warranty regarding the completeness or accuracy of the information, (ii) assume responsibility for errors appearing in this article, or (iii) have an obligation to update information in this article. Certain information contained in this article constitutes "forward-looking statements", identifiable through the use of words such as "may", "will", "should", "expect", "anticipate", "project", "estimate", "intend", "continue", "target", or "believe" (or their negative forms) or other similar expressions. Due to various risks and uncertainties, actual events or results or actual performance of investments may differ materially from those reflected or envisioned in forward-looking statements. No representation or warranty is provided regarding such forward-looking statements.

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Accounts advised by NIV currently invest in Figure, and may decide to add investments or exit positions at any time for various reasons, without further notice. No performance (historical performance or otherwise) or track record statements are made in this document. Company metrics, including but not limited to revenue, earnings, EBITDA, net profit, and similar metrics, are not proxy indicators of potential investment performance and shall not be understood as such. There is no guarantee that achieving any financial metrics (including stock price changes) will bring positive investment performance. Unforeseen or unconsidered events may have a significant impact on Figure's performance and/or valuation—in this case, forecasts may change significantly. Investment performance is based on and must consider many factors not reflected in the material, such as trading behavior, investment terms (e.g., share class), use of leverage, transaction costs, and other factors. Readers of this article should not interpret any stock price display as a proxy for the performance or investment return of NIV managed funds. NIV does not guarantee or warrant that any Fund will make similar investments. All investments face the risk of total loss.

Discussion of Figure references public information, certain estimates or forecasts are provided by Figure or mainly sourced from Figure. The Authors make no representations regarding (i) the accuracy or reliability of any estimates or forecasts, (ii) the reasonableness of applicable assumptions and comprehensiveness of available inputs, or (iii) the validity and reliability of calculation methods. The Authors make no warranty regarding the price of any securities buying or selling. Numerous factors affect the performance of any investment.