
Tiger Research: Deep Dive into Asian Prediction Market Regulatory Gaps
Author: Tiger Research Reports
Compiled by: TechFlow
TechFlow Editor's Note: The West has already opened the door for prediction markets through derivatives laws or gambling licenses, but Asian regulators have neither a general licensing framework nor an open definition of financial products, leading to tens of millions of dollars flowing to offshore platforms, where governments collect no tax and investors lack protection. The regulatory gap is not a cultural issue, but a lack of institutional design.
Key Points
Asian markets lack a regulatory framework to classify prediction markets, leaving regulators to keep them in a gray area
Western jurisdictions utilize existing frameworks—US derivatives regulation or UK gambling law—to create clear access paths for operators and establish regulatory mechanisms
The lack of a framework in Asia has not suppressed market activity, as evidenced by significant liquidity flowing into offshore platforms, but this prevents tax collection and consumer protection
Establishing a regulatory foundation requires public discussion: should prediction markets be viewed as derivatives, gambling, or a entirely new third category
The Importance of Definition and Classification
As previously reported, prediction markets have value as information platforms, but the law has never drawn a clear line between them and gambling.
This raises a question: how does the law define gambling, specifically betting behavior.

Section 9 of the UK Gambling Act 2005 provides a broad definition of betting objects; once monetary value is attached, they fall within the scope of gambling regulation:
The result of a race, competition, or other event or process
The likelihood of something happening or not happening
Whether something is true
According to this legal definition, prediction markets attach economic value to the outcome of specific events or the determination of facts, meaning they are structurally highly similar to betting (a core element of gambling).
The core of the regulatory debate ultimately boils down to a definition issue: whether to include prediction markets within the traditional gambling regulatory framework, reclassify them under financial architectures such as derivatives, or establish them as a independent category through separate legislation.
The West: How Institutional Paths Produce Different Outcomes
Compared to Asia, Western jurisdictions are more tolerant of prediction markets, but this does not stem from cultural tolerance of gambling, rather it reflects that existing institutional architectures allow them to bypass direct confrontation with gambling laws. The main paths are as follows:
United States: Prediction markets are classified as derivatives (swaps) under the Commodity Exchange Act, included in existing registration frameworks
United Kingdom: Markets are accommodated within the general "Betting Intermediary" licensing system
European Union: If contracts are classified as financial instruments, the Binary Options Ban applies; if they avoid this classification, they face the second barrier of strict national gambling laws
The consistent pattern is: institutional acceptance is only possible in jurisdictions that have alternative regulatory frameworks independent of gambling regulations, such as derivatives laws or flexible licensing systems.
United States: Expanding the Derivatives Definition
The United States does not accommodate prediction markets by recognizing a gambling framework, but through the purposeful application of the existing contract structure of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA): Laid the foundation through an open definition of "excluded commodities," allowing non-financial variables such as election results and weather events to be classified alongside traditional commodities like crude oil
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010: Granted the CFTC two key powers: exclusive federal jurisdiction over event contracts; the power to prohibit specific contracts related to terrorism, assassination, war, and gambling under Rule 40.11
Neither law was designed for prediction markets, but together they created a legal basis to treat such contracts as financial agreements rather than gambling, and established a centralized regulatory counterpart at the CFTC, replacing the fragmented process that originally required state-by-state lobbying.
A long-accumulated legal architecture spawned markets operating around licensed entities.
In November 2020, Kalshi obtained Designated Contract Market (DCM) status, allowing the sale of a wide range of event contracts to retail investors. After enforcement action in 2022, Polymarket moved towards compliance by acquiring the licensed exchange QCEX in 2025.
United Kingdom: Inclusion Through a General Licensing Framework
The UK did not view prediction markets as an extension of derivatives, but as a form of betting, utilizing the existing Gambling Act 2005 to bring them within regulatory scope. Three clauses are particularly important:
Section 9: The definition of betting is broad enough to provide a flexible legal basis for prediction markets
Section 13 "Betting Intermediary": Precisely captures the structural characteristics of prediction markets, as they match contracts between users rather than holding positions directly
Section 65(4): Allows adjustment of license categories through ministerial order, enabling the framework to absorb new market models without separate legislation
In February 2026, the Gambling Commission clarified that prediction market platforms belong to the "Betting Intermediary" category and must obtain the corresponding license. This is not an outright ban, but constitutes a clearly defined access path: on one hand, severe penalties for unlicensed operation, on the other, an open registration window.
Despite the established framework, major global platforms remain cautious about entering the UK market, for reasons rooted in their US litigation strategies.
Both Kalshi and Polymarket heavily emphasize in legal arguments that prediction contracts are financial derivatives rather than gambling. Obtaining a UK "Betting Intermediary" license would formally classify them as gambling operators, which would weaken their legal standing in US litigation.

This creates a market environment in the UK different from global standards, effectively creating ideal conditions for UK-based operators to establish business. Existing gambling exchange Matchbook utilized its Betting Intermediary license to launch "Matchbook Predictions" in January 2026, and new entrant Versus obtained a UKGC general gambling license and launched its own prediction market.
Europe: Dual Closure of Financial and Gambling Regulation
The regulatory landscape in continental Europe combines financial regulation under MiFID II with national gambling laws, forming a dual-layer barrier:
Any contract classified as a financial instrument immediately encounters the Binary Options Ban
Any contract escaping this classification subsequently faces strict national gambling definitions
In July 2026, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) clarified the financial regulatory dimension in an official statement, pointing out that the binary payment structure of event contracts falls entirely within the scope of the Binary Options Ban. This effectively closed the path to entering the European market as a financial product.
Prediction markets face equally difficult conditions under gambling laws. France is the clearest example: the National Gambling Authority (ANJ) implemented phased enforcement escalation, ultimately classifying prediction market operations as illegal gambling.

The only exception is Gibraltar. In July 2026, Gibraltar designed a specialized legislative framework—the Prediction Market Regulations—defining prediction markets as a unique "third category." This is a strategy of creating a new path rather than operating within existing frameworks, but since Gibraltar is not an EU member state, the limitation of this method is that it is not bound by European internal mutual recognition.
However, Europe's closed structure may not be permanent. The European Commission has currently formally included the legal treatment of prediction markets in the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) review process. Depending on the conclusions of the report due in June 2027, the door remains open for a shift towards a new institutional framework accommodating prediction markets.
Asia: The Status Quo of Institutional Absence
Asian jurisdictions face two structural obstacles that do not exist in the same form in Western markets:
State-controlled gambling licenses: There is no general licensing framework capable of accommodating private sector innovation in the manner of the UK "Betting Intermediary" category. Licensing rights are distributed through state-controlled monopoly structures
Financial product classification constraints: Financial laws in Korea and Japan use a closed positive list to define underlying assets, making the broad reclassification achieved in the US through the concept of "non-financial contingent events" legally infeasible
As shown in Western cases, whether prediction markets can gain a foothold depends on which path defines them: existing financial product architecture or gambling regulation. However, the fundamental constraint facing Asian markets is that neither classification system provides an institutional foundation capable of accommodating this new business model.
Legal gambling markets already exist across Asia—Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—so any view denying the market based on emotional resistance or cultural specificity is far from the actual situation.
So the core question is not whether the market is socially accepted, but how to design a regulatory foundation to accommodate this new market model.
Korea: Missing Architecture and Criminal Enforcement as the Default Option
Domestic discussion on prediction markets has not yet reached the stage of debating their legal status or social value. The existing regulatory framework defaults to viewing them as speculative products, cutting them off before substantive discussion begins.
Relevant legal clauses already conflict with the operational methods of prediction markets. The "Special Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Speculative Acts" covers "prize business," defined as business that distributes money or property through correctly predicting the outcome of specific events. This is structurally similar to the operation of prediction markets.
However, the legal issue is not fully resolved. The Prize Business Act presupposes a casino-style structure, where the operator directly controls the pool of funds. Modern platforms like Polymarket use a matching architecture, where the operator facilitates contracts between users rather than holding funds directly. There is currently no judicial interpretation explaining how this structural difference would be handled under current regulations.
The financial regulatory pathway is also closed. The "Capital Markets Act" uses a positive list method to define underlying assets. While financial indicators are covered, there is no clear basis to classify non-financial variables such as election results as derivatives.
Since the right to operate gambling business is reserved for state monopoly entities regardless, private platforms cannot enter the market through this channel either.
Japan: Complex Workarounds and Limitations of Informal Practices

Prediction markets in Japan follow a model of regulatory workaround rather than institutional integration.
Methods adopted by local platforms are similar to the three-shop system, a mechanism originating from the Pachinko industry, by physically cutting off direct cash flow during operations.
Platform Operators: Platforms prevent direct cash deposits, instead operating a free reward model based on activities such as watching advertisements. It also eliminates any cash redemption functions within the platform, thereby removing the definition element of gambling "gain or loss of property."
Reward Issuers: Third parties independent of the platform issue rewards for successful predictions, such as gift vouchers. Separating the platform operator from the issuing entity eliminates the legal risk of the operator becoming a direct participant in redeeming rewards for cash.
External Redemption Market: Peer-to-peer transfer markets and affiliated merchants outside the platform form an ecosystem where rewards are actually consumed or converted to cash. Since the operating platform does not participate in this distribution process, the structure remains independent and avoids satisfying the legal elements of the crime of gambling.
This is ultimately an informal business practice appearing in a regulatory gray area, rather than a structure built on a solid legal foundation. Global platforms are either blocked from entering the Japanese market or operate through cryptocurrency exchanges under strict restrictions. The substantive level of policy discussion in Japan is no different from Korea.
What Asian Markets Are Giving Up
The lack of institutional architecture in Asia does not mean the market does not exist. Liquidity exceeding $52 million (approximately 72.8 billion KRW) flowing into prediction markets related to Korea's June 2026 local elections indicates that user participation in offshore platforms has crossed a meaningful threshold even without a domestic regulatory framework. These transactions are outside the tax system, lack consumer protection mechanisms, and market integrity supervision is impossible.
Regulators face three available countermeasures:
Expand existing criminal regulations to implement sanctions (current approach in Korea).
Use technical means to completely block platform access (Singapore model).
Bring prediction markets within regulatory scope, gaining tax revenue and regulatory authority in the process.
Only the third option can precisely achieve actual regulatory goals such as tax collection, consumer protection, and market transparency.
Global annual trading volume for prediction markets in 2026 is expected to exceed $200 billion. Conservatively assuming domestic users in Korea account for 1% of this volume, attributable volume for any given Asian market would reach $2 billion. Depending on the tax model adopted, this would generate estimated new tax revenue of $4 million to $43.2 million annually.
The more important point is not the scale of these numbers themselves. Without regulatory adaptation, these transactions will not disappear; they will continue in an unregulated environment. Regulators will give up tax and regulatory authority while continuing to bear administrative and criminal enforcement costs.
Reconstructing Regulatory Approaches for Prediction Markets
As mentioned above, institutional adaptation for prediction markets depends on which existing regulatory architecture (gambling or financial products) is used to define them.
Gambling Regulatory Framework: This path adapts existing Asian models used for state-approved speculative activities, such as sports betting pools or integrated resort casinos. It is consistent with state monopoly structures and can be justified through public funding reasons, but has inherent limitations in adapting to the business models of private platforms.
Derivatives Regulatory Framework: This represents the path with the least friction and most operational feasibility. It involves fine-tuning the definition of financial products, drawing on precedents such as Japan's "Financial Instruments and Exchange Act" accepting non-financial variables or the "economic risk" language in Korea's "Capital Markets Act." This method avoids direct conflict with existing state gambling monopolies, while preventing concerns about speculation and market manipulation by limiting eligible underlying assets to publicly verifiable statistical variables.
Creating an Independent Third Category: This involves designing a specialized legislative framework, as Gibraltar did. It allows for the most precise regulatory calibration, but given the lack of precedents, bears the highest legislative and political costs.
It is worth noting that this is a long-term institutional endeavor, not a near-term result. In many Asian jurisdictions, basic public discussion regarding the legal identity of prediction markets has not yet formed. Ensuring the legislative momentum required for any of these paths first requires establishing public deliberation procedures and building broad social consensus on the value of prediction markets.
It is worth noting that prediction markets remain a foreign concept across Asia, with no entity leading the shaping of discourse around prediction markets. Therefore, even the most basic agenda items have not yet been discussed.

Accurately analyzing how prediction markets operate as a whole requires a formal public forum, such as a public-private roundtable established around the core issues mentioned above; establishing such a forum is now an urgent priority.
Even if this level of discussion is set, an entity capable of bringing it to the actual policy table is needed. Professional research institutions like Limitless Research demonstrate data-driven prediction models in practice, and in the process play a core role in establishing market value systems and shaping public discourse.
Starting with Limitless Research, the process of organizations with professional analytical capabilities demonstrating their data reliability and public value will become the decisive catalyst for elevating the fragmented discourse of prediction markets into core agenda items within the institutional system.
Prediction markets have obvious benefits and risks, but reaching institutional conclusions before debate occurs would be a rash approach that ignores core issues. What is needed now is constructive discourse that has not yet happened.















