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Altcoin Market Making Black Box: How Project Teams Use "Loans + Call Options" to Create Hidden Selling Pressure?

Altcoin Market Making Black Box: How Project Teams Use "Loans + Call Options" to Create Hidden Selling Pressure?

2026.07.29
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Perpetual contracts, on-chain shorting, and on-chain lending information—these three waves of democratization are gradually prying open this black box.

Author: WuBlockchain

Compiled by: TechFlow

TechFlow Summary: What does "5% allocation to market makers" actually mean in tokenomics? Is it borrowing or selling? What is the strike price? Must tokens be repaid upon maturity? The answers to these three questions determine an altcoin's price trajectory for a full year, yet retail investors almost never see them. The accidental exposure of Movement Labs' token protocol has given us our first clear look at how this black box operates.

If you've ever wondered, like I have, what "5% allocated to market makers" truly means in tokenomics, this article is worth reading. Does this 5% represent a loan or a sale? What is the strike price? Are tokens required to be returned upon maturity, or can options be exercised? The answers to these three questions can dictate an altcoin's price movement for an entire year, yet retail investors rarely get to see them.

Introduction

In spring 2025, months after Movement Labs launched its MOVE token, something both familiar and unusual occurred in the crypto space.

It feels familiar because the story follows the standard altcoin script: TGE marks the price peak, market makers are accused of constant dumping, the project publicly denies the allegations, and the price delivers the clearest verdict.

What makes it unusual is that the market-making protocol itself was exposed. Chat logs, term sheets, MM positions, strike prices, and borrowed token volumes gradually came to light through Twitter threads, investigative reports, and community discussions. For the first time, the industry could see a standard MM lending structure—a "token lending + call option" agreement—in action through a concrete project, revealing how what should be liquidity provision turns into a zero-cost dumping channel for market makers post-listing.

Looking back, MOVE is not an exception but the norm. The only difference is that someone leaked the protocol. Even outside of scheduled unlocks, the persistent sell pressure common to altcoins is largely rooted in arrangements of the same type. But most often, these agreements are buried in PDF files, encrypted Signal groups, and informal understandings known only to the project team and its market makers.

If the evolution of the crypto market over the past decade can be distilled into one core theme, it is the gradual transfer of capabilities once controlled by small groups—including leverage, shorting, and information—from insiders to retail investors through on-chain protocols. Perpetual contracts broke the asymmetry in leverage access. Protocols like Shortit are breaking the asymmetry in short-selling rights. Putting MM lending details on-chain dismantles the final barrier: information asymmetry in primary markets.

Once these three forces converge, the altcoin market will finally possess a price discovery structure comparable to traditional capital markets.

This article explores these three waves of democratization: how they emerged, why they are converging, and what the altcoin market will look like once they arrive.

The Triple Asymmetries in Altcoin Price Discovery

Altcoins are not stocks. This may seem obvious, but nearly every structural issue in the altcoin market stems from a widely assumed yet rarely stated fact: it wears the outward appearance of financial markets but lacks their underlying framework.

A U.S. stock IPO must pass SEC review, underwriter pricing, roadshows, lock-up periods, post-listing market-making rules, and insider selling disclosure requirements. Each stage is bound by public and enforceable rules. Retail investors may not sit at the same table as Goldman Sachs, but they at least know the shape of the table: float size, insider selling windows, identity of market makers, and restrictions on naked shorting.

Altcoins are different. From launch to secondary market trading, almost all critical variables require no mandatory disclosure. Actual effective circulating supply, MM identity and positions, option strike prices, and unlock schedules—all variables directly shaping price expectations—are typically hidden from retail.

This structural opacity has long bred three layers of asymmetry in the altcoin market.

The first is leverage asymmetry. In early crypto markets, especially before 2017, spot trading was virtually the only option. Even if retail traders were right, they could only express their view through unleveraged spot positions. By contrast, projects, VCs, and market makers could amplify identical directional bets many times over via OTC lending, derivatives desks, and proprietary capital deployment. Thus, even when two participants in the open market receive the same information, their ability to act is profoundly unequal.

The second is directional asymmetry. Before perpetual contracts, crypto markets were essentially long-only. Short positions on BTC and ETH could barely be constructed via spot lending, but shorting altcoins was nearly impossible. This created a peculiar equilibrium: marginal incentives for almost every market participant pointed in the same direction—push the price up first. Because only price appreciation generates returns, narratives, KOLs, media coverage, and marketing budgets are all incentivized to pull in the same direction. A large part of why altcoin markets have long relied on narratives stems from their structurally one-way nature.

The third is information asymmetry. Even if retail gains leverage and shorting tools, they still don't know at what price or when to act. They remain unaware of actual effective circulating supply, token volumes lent to MMs, option strike prices, or the economically rational choices MMs would make at different price levels. Projects know. VCs know. MMs know. Only retail is kept in the dark.

These triple asymmetries collectively forged the most enduring power structure in the altcoin market over the past decade: projects, early VCs, and market makers simultaneously control information and tools. They can reposition ahead of each token handoff to retail, ultimately shifting price risk onto participants lacking equal access. This is a flaw in altcoin market design, not a moral failing unique to any single project.

Next comes one of the most important structural shifts in crypto over the past decade: how these triple asymmetries began to unravel.

Perpetual Contracts: Democratizing Leverage

In 2016, BitMEX launched what seemed like a strange product in Seychelles: perpetual contracts, derivatives without expiration dates that use funding rates to track spot prices.

There is no exact equivalent in traditional finance. Traditional futures always have expiration dates, which dictate their hedging and arbitrage structures. BitMEX removed expirations, introducing funding rates as a cost of carry. From an engineering standpoint, this standardized infinite-duration leveraged positions and made them liquidatable and custodiable.

Before that, crypto retail seeking leverage could only use "margin spot trading" on CEXs. In practice, this meant borrowing from exchanges to buy tokens—a cumbersome process with opaque costs and primitive liquidation mechanisms. Institutions operated completely differently, using proprietary trading books, OTC lending, and cross-exchange arbitrage. Leverage had long been a standard part of their toolkit.

Leverage itself isn't new. What perpetual contracts truly changed was accessibility. BitMEX offered up to 100x leverage, allowing anyone with USDT to open positions. When Binance entered in 2019, it brought this mechanism to global retail. Trading interfaces simplified to two buttons—Long and Short—with automatically calculated margin ratios and visible liquidation queues for everyone.

The 2021 bull run provided final validation: perpetual contract daily volume surpassed spot volume. The primary venue for price discovery in crypto shifted from spot markets to perpetuals.

This shift is often described as "retail getting wiped out by perp leverage." That assessment is only half right. Perpetuals indeed caused massive liquidations among retail traders using high leverage, but they also gave retail a tool for the first time to take leveraged positions on equal footing with institutions. Before perps, even if retail correctly predicted market direction, maximum position size was capped by available spot capital. After perps, a trader's capacity is limited only by personal risk tolerance and margin management.

More frequent liquidations are the cost of leverage democratization. It is an inherent feature of the tool, not necessarily a flaw. A market that allows retail and institutions to bet at the same table must let everyone bear the same risk structure.

Yet perpetuals only solved leverage asymmetry. Even with 100x leverage, retail expecting an altcoin drop might still find no suitable tool. Most altcoins lack perpetual listings. Even where available, liquidity is often so thin that funding fees consume returns. Perpetuals resolved leverage and directional asymmetry for major cryptos but left two unresolved layers: directional asymmetry for altcoins and information asymmetry across all tokens.

These are problems the next decade must solve.

Short Rights: Democratizing Directional Exposure

If you believed in 2023 that a specific altcoin would decline—an L1 that peaked at listing, a GameFi token whose valuation detached from fundamentals, or an AI agent token whose narrative exhausted—you would hit an awkward reality: there was virtually no way to short it.

Perp contracts on CEXs only cover a handful of major cryptos. For most altcoins ranked outside the top 50, derivatives either don't exist or come with only one extremely thin contract. Order books may be so shallow that trades worth tens of thousands of dollars move the price by 5%. Funding rates might stay persistently positive for shorts, meaning traders pay a "short tax" every eight hours, while liquidation thresholds are brutally unfavorable to holders. Thus, even with correct market views, liquidity constraints erode actionable edge, making shorting mathematically unattractive.

Spot-lending-driven shorting barely exists for altcoins. No CEX is willing to maintain lending markets for long-tail tokens due to insufficient liquidity and excessive risk for lenders.

This creates a long-standing structural problem in altcoin markets: they are long-only ecosystems.

Long-only markets produce a specific set of equilibrium effects. Marginal incentives for all participants point in the same direction. Projects want price up. VCs want price up. MMs want price up, at least until exercising options. KOLs want price up. Media wants price up. Secondary retail wants price up. When everyone in the market profits only from price appreciation, narratives, traffic, marketing, and community operations focus on one question: how to push the price a little higher? This is an incentive structure problem, not necessarily one requiring moral framing.

A deeper consequence is that when no one can bet against an asset, negative information never gets priced in. Efficient markets require pessimists and optimists betting against each other at the same price for that price to approximate fair value. For most of the past decade, only optimists could bet in altcoin markets. Pessimists' only option was to not buy, and not buying leaves no signal in prices.

This is what on-chain shorting protocols like @youcanshortit aim to solve: allowing any retail investor to short any token at transparent pricing and cost, at any time. The core mechanism simplifies as follows. The protocol maintains a lending pool, allowing any token holder to lend tokens to short sellers. Shorts pay transparent interest rates determined by pool supply/demand, not CEX black boxes. Stablecoins from selling borrowed tokens are held as collateral within the protocol. If the token price rises, the position liquidates. If it falls, the short seller profits.

In traditional finance, this is called securities lending, a specialized market restricted to institutions. In crypto, it must operate on-chain and be open to retail, as no CEX will provide this service for long-tail tokens; it simply doesn't make economic sense for them.

The value of democratizing short rights is easily misunderstood. Many think it merely lets retail bet on price declines and profit from crashes. That's just the tip of the iceberg. Shorting has always been mathematically difficult and risk-asymmetric, so even with tools, most retail may still fail to profit. What it truly changes is much deeper. Once tokens can be shorted, overly optimistic narratives face scrutiny from bears, and overly pessimistic ones face verification from short squeezes. Altcoin markets begin to take the form of two-way debate.

But even with two-way positioning tools, retail still faces a fundamental problem: they don't know at what price or when to short. The most critical variable determining mid-to-long-term supply in altcoins—MM positions and option strike prices—remains invisible to them.

This is the third asymmetry, and the true last mile.

On-Chain MM Lending Data: Democratizing Information

A. Standard Structure of Market Maker Lending

To understand why MM lending sits at the core of altcoin information asymmetry, we must first grasp its standard structure. Even retail veterans who've spent years in crypto may have heard the term "market maker" but never seen a real MM agreement in detail.

Agreements between altcoin projects and MMs almost always follow the same template: lending + call option.

Shortly before TGE, the project provides a certain number of tokens to MMs in the form of "lending," typically equivalent to 1% to 5% of circulating supply. Accounting-wise, the word "lending" matters. The project hasn't "sold" tokens, so no sales revenue needs disclosing. In tokenomics docs, these are still categorized as "MM allocation" or "liquidity reserve." Agreements typically last 12 to 24 months. At maturity, MMs have two choices: return the identical token amount, or purchase at a predetermined strike price. In financial terms, this buy-or-not choice constitutes a European call option. Strike prices are usually set 25% to 100% above the TGE price.

Agreements may also include profit-sharing arrangements, floor clauses, and MM obligations, but lending + call option forms the underlying framework.

This structure is highly attractive to both parties. The project gains immediate secondary market liquidity without directly selling tokens. Accounting-wise, no sale occurs, keeping the tokenomics narrative clean. The MM's position is even more favorable. It acquires substantial inventory at zero upfront cost, secures upside optionality, and bears minimal downside risk. If price drops below TGE, the MM simply returns the tokens without recognizing impairment losses. Incentives are asymmetric. The project bears opportunity cost—if price rallies and the MM exercises, the project loses the chance to sell those tokens at higher valuations. The MM captures all upside with negligible downside risk. This explains why market making became one of the most profitable businesses in crypto over recent years, despite retail barely understanding its actual mechanics.

B. How This Structure Systematically Drives Dumping

Once the agreement structure is understood, it becomes clear why many altcoins face persistent sell pressure even outside scheduled unlocks. The key lies in analyzing the MM's rational choices across different price zones.

When price trades far below strike, the probability of exercise approaches zero. When the market price hits $0.50, it won't buy tokens at a $2 strike. In this scenario, borrowed tokens hold no long-term ownership value for the MM since they must eventually be returned. Rational action is to sell before maturity, repurchase at lower prices, and lock in the spread. Each cycle of "sell high, buy low" allows MMs to profit using tokens borrowed from the project. Any portion unconstrained by profit-sharing becomes pure MM profit.

As price approaches strike, incentives grow more complex. If price breaches strike, MMs must buy back borrowed tokens at strike upon maturity. Price appreciation benefits the MM, but exercise still carries cost. Rational behavior involves selling early as a hedge, partially offsetting potential exercise obligations. From a market perspective, this creates an invisible supply wall near strike prices, further suppressing breakout attempts.

Together, these mechanisms produce one of the most common yet hardest-to-explain phenomena in altcoin markets: persistent, seemingly irregular sell pressure outside of unlock events. Retail sees prices fall but finds no identifiable unlock event to explain it. This is because the sell pressure doesn't originate from the project or its VCs, but from MMs holding project-borrowed tokens. In tokenomics documentation, these are labeled "liquidity reserves." Transactionally, however, they are already in circulation, generating continuous sell pressure.

This forms the structural foundation of so-called "controlled pricing." When a token's price appears precisely bounded within a range, repeatedly hitting ceilings on ralls and finding buyers on dips, an option-driven MM behavioral model is likely operating behind the scenes. Retail simply cannot see its parameters.

Figure: Dumping Mechanism Illustration — MMs "sell high, buy low" when far below strike, and pre-set sells near strike, creating continuous invisible sell pressure outside unlocks. Source: WuBlockchain

C. What On-Chain Data Should Be Disclosed?

If MM lending is recognized as the most critical black-box variable in altcoin markets, the next question is what information should be disclosed.

Not every detail needs publishing. MM quoting algorithms and risk management parameters constitute their alpha; putting them on-chain would destroy their business model. What should be disclosed is the minimum dataset directly impacting retail price expectations, without exposing proprietary MM algorithms: borrowed token amounts and related wallet addresses, contract duration, strike price, unlock and repayment schedule, profit-sharing mechanism, and any floor or default clauses.

These six fields together give retail enough information to infer MM rational responses across price zones using standard financial analysis, transforming current black boxes into modelable supply curves. Specific MM trading behaviors constitute their alpha and need not be disclosed. What should be revealed are the incentive parameters driving that behavior.

Figure: Six Fields Requiring On-Chain Disclosure — Borrowing Volume & Addresses, Contract Duration, Strike Price, Unlock & Repayment Plan, Profit Sharing, Floor & Default Clauses. Source: WuBlockchain

Technical implementation is straightforward. A standardized schema, a contract mandating every token lending transaction record an on-chain registry, and an index service analysts can query can all be built with a few hundred lines of EVM code. The real challenge has never been technology, but incentives: how to persuade projects and MMs to put this data on-chain. That's what the next section addresses.

D. Post-Disclosure Altcoin Ecosystem Evolution

If such disclosure materializes, several immediate changes will occur in altcoin markets.

Sell pressure structure becomes readable. "Circulating supply" reported in tokenomics docs will finally separate from tokens lent to MMs. Retail can directly calculate:

Reported circulating supply + tokens lent to MMs = actual sellable supply

Once strike prices go public, volatility around strikes gets priced in advance by the market. Strikes become new key levels in altcoin technical analysis, analogous to "institutional cost basis" in equities, but more precise because they're hard-coded in contracts. Paired with shorting tools like Shortit, retail can finally construct symmetric positions around strikes.

Accountability becomes enforceable. Today, during sharp drawdowns, projects claim "market conditions," while MMs argue "passive hedging." Post-disclosure, every outflow from MM wallets ties to a public contract, attributing dumps to specific project-MM pairs. Reputation costs enter MM decision functions for the first time. Projects can no longer simultaneously claim "the team faces no sell pressure" and "we partner with top-tier MMs." Post-disclosure, they must pick one.

The most significant second-order effect will be a "transparency premium." Once some projects proactively disclose, non-disclosers will be presumed worst-case, somewhat akin to proof-of-reserves. Retail will assume these projects lent heavily, set low strikes, offered generous floors, and discount valuations accordingly. Disclosure thus shifts from cost to signal, from self-restraint to a tool for capturing valuation premiums. This creates endogenous incentives sustaining any disclosure mechanism. It's driven not by regulatory pressure, but by market pricing dynamics.

Of course, the above describes ideal scenarios. In practice, implementation will be extremely difficult.

The Altcoin Market After Three Forces Converge

Leverage, direction, and information. The three asymmetries discussed earlier have been addressed over the past decade by three distinct types of protocols. When these three democratization waves are considered together, a new market structure begins to emerge.

Figure: New altcoin market structure after convergence of leverage, shorting, and information democratization. Price discovery shifts from "narrative + liquidity" to "information + expectation." Source: WuBlockchain

Leverage democratization lets retail amplify bets when market direction calls are correct. Shorting democratization allows positioning when declines are expected. Information democratization gives retail visibility into exactly what prices and times to bet. Only when all three align does retail finally possess a complete toolkit to compete with institutions at the same table.

Once all three tools are in place, the price discovery mechanism itself begins to transform.

Altcoin price discovery has long been dominated by two factors: narrative, i.e., whose story captures the most attention; and liquidity, i.e., who deploys the most capital to push prices to specific levels. Before these democratization waves, both were always coordinated among projects, VCs, and MMs. Retail remained perpetually the receiver of narratives and provider of liquidity. The former dictates what they buy; the latter dictates when others dump on them.

With these asymmetries broken, the core driver of price discovery shifts from "narrative + liquidity" to "information + expectation." Retail no longer just sees KOL pump posts and candlesticks; they can also read MM contract disclosures, transparent lending pools, and modelable option strike matrices. Narratives will persist, but no longer drive prices alone. Information immediately prices in bubbles manufactured by hype.

Crucially, this won't eliminate coordination space between projects and MMs. Sophisticated players will continue developing new strategies, such as splitting option structures into off-chain sub-agreements, dispersing strikes via multi-leg derivatives, or replacing direct token lending with DAO governance tokens. Every evolution in disclosure rules spawns new evasion tactics. This is normal in any financial market.

Yet the marginal cost of such coordination will rise significantly. Today, projects and MMs designing retail-hostile contracts face near-zero marginal cost because nobody sees them. Post-disclosure, the market identifies and prices any overly aggressive terms. Contract design itself becomes a public game. Collusion won't vanish, but returns will plummet.

A more important second-order effect is the reshuffling of market participants.

MOVE, discussed in the introduction, is a concrete example. But similar projects accounted for most new altcoin supply over the past three years. Their core business model hinges on "low float + high FDV + aggressive market making + narrative-driven pumps." Under disclosure regimes, they would instantly repricing along actual supply curves, eliminating their economic foundation. Such token exits would significantly depress the overall valuation baseline of the altcoin market.

Projects with genuine demand, willing to proactively disclose, and adopting on-chain market making will capture valuation premiums, build more stable retail holder bases, and enjoy extended market lifecycles. Such projects are rare today, but disclosure mechanisms will create positive feedback loops in secondary markets, causing their numbers to grow exponentially.

Another new participant type will emerge: on-chain market making protocols themselves. Once all critical parameters of MM arrangements are recorded on-chain, the market maker role partially programmatises. Fully smart-contract-driven "algorithmic market makers" will appear. Projects configure parameters based on public schemas, while contracts auto-execute trading and token repayments, stripping away intermediary layers represented by firms like GSR and Wintermute. Market making transitions from "relationship-driven + information-asymmetric" to "protocol-driven + standardized," ultimately restructuring the altcoin MM industry's industrial landscape.