
Coinbase, Custodian of 5% of Global Bitcoin, Calls for Immediate Quantum-Resistant Upgrade; Lost Coins Debate to Be Discussed Separately
Author: Omkar Godbole
Compiled by: TechFlow
TechFlow Guide: Quantum risk is transitioning from a "long-term tail risk" to a concrete agenda for institutional custodians. As a publicly traded company that holds approximately 5% of all existing bitcoin on behalf of banks, asset managers, and hedge funds, Coinbase has issued its first systematic stance on the matter: implement flexible post-quantum signatures, pursue phased migration, enable compatible MPC custody, and decouple the most contentious issue of "what to do with dormant/lost coins" to avoid derailing the overall upgrade. This checklist essentially serves as the roadmap for bitcoin's quantum migration in the eyes of institutional capital.

What happens if someone builds a sufficiently powerful quantum computer capable of breaking the security of your bitcoin wallet and draining your coins?
This is a concern everyone is watching closely, as some forecasts suggest that while such quantum machines do not yet exist today, they could emerge within a few years.
Coinbase (COIN), the Nasdaq-listed cryptocurrency exchange, currently holds approximately 5% of all existing bitcoin in custody for clients including banks, asset management firms, and hedge funds. In a new blog post, it shares its perspective on the issue, outlining what it believes bitcoin needs to do to remain secure against the "potential future" threat of quantum computing.
Its first point is clear: preparation must begin now, rather than waiting for the risk to materialize, and the issue of lost coins must be handled separately.
To understand the exchange's recommendations, it helps to first grasp how bitcoin's "locks" operate and how quantum computers could potentially break them.
Locks and Keys
A bitcoin wallet can be thought of as a mailbox: there is a narrow horizontal slot at the top, and the key to open it is held only by the owner. This visible slot—which anyone can use to drop mail into—is the wallet's public key. In contrast, the private key is the physical key that opens the mailbox. The private key is strictly held by the owner, remains invisible to the outside world, and secures the bitcoin inside the wallet.
When a user sends bitcoin, the wallet generates a digital signature using the private key, akin to a tamper-proof seal. The network verifies this signature using the user's public key; if it matches, the transaction is approved.
The bitcoin blockchain uses two methods to generate and verify these digital signatures, known as ECDSA and Schnorr. They are currently highly secure because current computational power is insufficient to crack the mathematics behind these technologies or derive a private key from a user's digital signature or public key.
The Arrival of Quantum Risk
A sufficiently powerful quantum computer—researchers at Google estimate such a machine could emerge by 2029—can do exactly that: reverse-engineer the private key from the public key and drain the holder's bitcoin wallet.
Researchers refer to machines with this capability as Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers, or CRQCs.
The proposed solution is post-quantum (PQ) cryptography. In plain terms, these are new signature methods designed to resist quantum attacks.
In Coinbase's view, simply choosing one new security method is not enough. They believe a complete upgrade to protect bitcoin from quantum threats must simultaneously safeguard both legacy and new funds, fit within bitcoin's limited block space, and allow ordinary computers to continue running the network. It must also work seamlessly for both large crypto platforms and everyday users, while providing a clear path forward for older coins that may never move.
Coinbase Wants Action Now
This work needs to start immediately, largely because bitcoin's decentralized design—which is often touted as an advantage over centralized institutions—also makes implementing changes difficult.
As the exchange stated, "Bitcoin consensus changes and ecosystem migrations could take years." This is why the work must begin "well before any CRQC announcement."
Bitcoin developers are already considering proposals to build quantum defenses.
Measures Proposed by Coinbase
Decouple the "Container" from Signatures
Simply put, bitcoin's design should allow its transaction format to support new post-quantum signature types without rebuilding the entire system. This will make it easier to add, replace, or combine quantum-resistant signatures over time. Coinbase notes that two proposals, P2MR (BIP-360) and P2TRv2, appear to provide this flexibility.
Phased Protection
Coinbase supports a framework that allows active wallets to begin using quantum-resistant or hybrid signatures before bitcoin ultimately finalizes the rules for phasing out legacy signature types. One possible transition mechanism is a "1-of-2" setup: the same bitcoin could be spent using either traditional ECDSA/Schnorr keys or post-quantum keys. This would allow users to secure their funds earlier without forcing everyone to switch simultaneously or risking sudden loss of access.
Use of "State"
Some post-quantum signature schemes require wallets to record certain information after each signing operation, referred to as "state." These schemes utilize numerous one-time signing keys, meaning the wallet must keep track of which ones have been used to ensure they are never reused. If a wallet is restored from an old backup or fails to maintain this record, it could inadvertently reuse a key.
This could allow attackers to forge valid signatures. Stateful signatures can be smaller and faster but are more prone to misuse. Coinbase argues that if bitcoin adopts stateful signatures, it should simultaneously support stateless alternatives that do not require this record-keeping. This would offer safer options for users and wallet developers, reducing the risk of lost funds or forged transactions.
Robust Implementation
Coinbase wants the evaluation process to place high value on software that runs reliably across platforms, verifies signatures consistently everywhere, avoids timing side-channel leaks, uses clear parameter configurations, and remains secure even if the random number generator used during signing fails. This will make quantum-resistant bitcoin wallets more reliable and lower the risks of vulnerabilities, hacking, or fund loss.
MPC Compatibility
For Coinbase and many of its clients, post-quantum solutions must integrate well with Multi-Party Computation (MPC). When properly implemented, MPC helps prevent private key theft and adds a critical layer of security protection for large institutions facing persistent cyber threats. This will make it easier for exchanges, custodians, and large enterprises to secure bitcoin without relying on a single individual or device to hold a key.
A Pathway for Late Migrants
If bitcoin eventually restricts or terminates spending via ECDSA and Schnorr, some individuals may still have funds trapped in old wallet formats. Coinbase suggests it is worth considering whether and how these users could later transfer their funds to quantum-safe outputs. The correct approach and its trade-offs remain an open question. Addressing this will help prevent some users from being locked out of their bitcoin due to delayed upgrades. This discussion can proceed alongside and separate from the technical work of adding post-quantum signature support, avoiding delays in that core effort.
Forgotten Coins
Finally, not everyone will upgrade to post-quantum solutions in time, particularly owners of long-dormant wallets. Some belong to individuals who have already lost their keys. Others hold bitcoin in older address types where public keys have already been exposed.
Coinbase worries that someone might quietly build a quantum machine and begin draining coins from these wallets "before the public knows."
The exchange has not taken a stance on how to handle these coins, but states that this debate should occur separately to avoid delaying protections for others. It emphasizes that any rescue mechanism must itself be quantum-safe; otherwise, thieves could exploit the rescue method itself.















