
ZachXBT Spent Nearly $350,000 Out of Pocket as a Customer: How an Undercover Investigation into a Money Laundering Network Unfolded
By Xiaobing
On October 5, onchain investigator ZachXBT published a 12-post thread on X with a single-sentence title: “How I infiltrated a Chinese organized crime syndicate that has laundered $1B+ across multiple exploits for Lazarus Group.” (“How I infiltrated a Chinese organized crime syndicate that has laundered over $1 billion for the Lazarus Group.”)
He kept this lead under wraps for 18 months before going public, marking the start of his undercover journey.
The Beginning: 15 Telegram Accounts Openly Soliciting 'Business'
In February 2025, Bybit suffered a $1.5 billion security breach. ZachXBT linked the attack to North Korea’s Lazarus Group using onchain data on the day of the incident, a attribution confirmed by the FBI days later.
But tracking the attackers' wallet addresses was only half the story. The stolen funds were split, mixed, and bridged across chains, flowing through dozens of networks at an astonishing pace. Freezing these assets required more than just spotting wallet addresses; it meant identifying the individuals behind them, understanding their operational tempo, and predicting which chain the funds would move to next.
This information doesn’t live on the blockchain. It lives in chat logs.
ZachXBT identified over 15 accounts in public Telegram and Discord groups that openly solicited “clients” and assisted with transactions linked to the stolen Bybit funds. The money launderers submitted “customer complaint tickets” on public channels, complaining about issues with certain orders tied to Bybit.
One Telegram user operating under the alias “Jimmy Green” caught his attention.
The $350,000 Entry Fee
On March 6, 2025, ZachXBT deposited 349,700 USDC from his own funds into a new Ethereum address. He then began transacting with Jimmy Green posing as a regular OTC client.
For every transaction, ZachXBT absorbed a 5% fee, the money laundering commission charged by Jimmy. This meant that with each operation, ZachXBT was personally losing money to buy the other party’s trust and intelligence.
The first transaction validated his suspicions. The deposit address provided by Jimmy had gas fees directly traceable to the stolen Bybit funds, and this gas sponsor wallet was already flagged in the public Bybit blacklist database.
But ZachXBT held back. He kept trading, kept taking losses, and kept waiting for Jimmy to let his guard down.
The Launderer Starts Talking
Once trust was established, Jimmy started talking more.
He began revealing fund movements in advance. At one point, he told ZachXBT that Bybit funds would be moved to the Solana network the following day. The next day, a corresponding transfer indeed appeared on-chain. This type of “advance notice” intelligence is incredibly valuable for onchain investigators, as it allows them to lock onto target addresses before funds arrive rather than perpetually chasing them.
Jimmy also claimed that his team handled the bulk of the stolen Bybit funds. ZachXBT noted that this aligned with his independently observed onchain laundering patterns.
Jimmy shared three Solana addresses. Using these as starting points, ZachXBT traced out a wallet cluster linked to over $12 million in stolen Bybit funds. The capital flowed across four networks: BTC, ETH, Solana, and Tron.
In another conversation, Jimmy mentioned laundering $3 million in fraud proceeds for another client. ZachXBT tracked these funds and found they flowed into a hot wallet associated with Huione Guarantee, a Cambodia-based money laundering marketplace run on Telegram. FinCEN later determined that Huione Guarantee was involved in at least $4 billion in illicit financial activity, and its former chairman was arrested.
Jimmy also mentioned that around $300,000 belonging to a partner team was frozen in 2024. ZachXBT located this freeze on-chain, confirming the exact amount was 332,000 USDC originating from the November 2023 Poloniex exchange hack.
Between these intelligence exchanges, Jimmy would casually discuss playing mahjong, hunting wild rabbits, eating fat-loss meals, family life, and planning trips to Disney.
A man processing hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit funds for North Korea while simultaneously planning his itinerary for Disney.
From Intelligence to Freezes: The Middle Steps Are More Complex Than They Seem
ZachXBT’s undercover operation ultimately led to a concrete execution result: Tether froze 442,000 USDT linked to the wallet cluster.
That’s 442,000 dollars. Compared to the total $1.5 billion stolen, the number seems small. But to grasp its true value, one must understand how many steps lie between “identifying an address” and “freezing assets.”
Onchain tracing only tells you where the money went. Stopping it requires a completely different set of capabilities: stablecoin issuers like Tether must execute freezes, exchanges must cooperate with tagging and blocking, and law enforcement must step in to investigate and issue legal requests. Each stage operates on its own timelines, workflows, and compliance thresholds.
ZachXBT stated that he passed his findings to private investigators and the law enforcement agencies handling the case. He delayed going public for 18 months because the “investigation was still in a sensitive phase.”
Prior to this, he served as an incident response consultant for Paradigm, a venture capital firm. However, this undercover operation was funded entirely with his own money. Since 2022, he has helped facilitate the freezing of over $75 million in crypto assets linked to North Korea.
Three Questions With No Standard Answers
The value of ZachXBT’s operation extends beyond exposing a laundering network; it highlights several deep-seated structural vulnerabilities within crypto’s security infrastructure.
Why isn't onchain data enough? Blockchains are transparent, and every transaction is visible to anyone. But transparency only means you can see funds moving from Address A to Address B. You cannot see who is behind Address A, why they are making the transfer, or which chain they plan to route the funds to next. A launderer’s operational tempo, internal division of labor, and cross-chain plans exist in private chats, not on public ledgers. The information ZachXBT paid $350,000 to uncover was precisely this invisible off-chain data.
Who is paying for crypto security? ZachXBT conducted an undercover investigation using personal funds, effectively acting as a law enforcement agency. In traditional finance, such work is handled by the FBI, SEC, or Interpol, funded by taxpayer budgets. In crypto, an anonymous independent investigator pays out of pocket, bearing dual risks of financial loss and personal safety. Bybit later launched a bounty program for white-hat hackers and security researchers, but ZachXBT’s operation predates that initiative. When he placed his bets, no one promised reimbursement.
Where is the pipeline from intelligence to execution? What ZachXBT can do is identify addresses, establish links, and gather chat evidence. Freezing funds requires coordination with Tether, apprehending suspects demands international law enforcement cooperation, and prosecution relies on aligning jurisdictions. Currently, this pipeline is cobbled together ad hoc: an independent investigator contacts law enforcement through private channels, who then reaches out to stablecoin issuers. This workflow functions for a massive $1.5 billion case, but it cannot scale to the countless minor thefts and frauds occurring across the industry daily.
$1.5 billion stolen, 18 months of investigation, $350,000 invested, ultimately resulting in a $442,000 freeze. The gap between these numbers reveals the reality of crypto’s security infrastructure. Courage is plentiful, tools are abundant, what’s missing is an institutionalized pipeline connecting them.















