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Bank Runs Don’t Easily Kill Banks: New Research Refutes the “Ponzi Scheme” Narrative on Bitcoin

Bank Runs Don’t Easily Kill Banks: New Research Refutes the “Ponzi Scheme” Narrative on Bitcoin

2026.09.02
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A new study reviewing nearly 4,000 U.S. bank runs between 1863 and 1934 finds.

Author: Byron Gilliam

Compiled by: TechFlow

TechFlow Brief: Bitcoin supporters often dismiss fractional reserve banks as Ponzi schemes, claiming that when a bank run hits, even good banks will fall. But a new study analyzing numerous bank run events found that most runs fizzle out on their own before they can even threaten the banks. For investors treating bank fragility as a central crypto narrative, this is a rebuttal they must face head-on.

"You're entirely mistaken, as if I locked your money in a vault." (George Bailey on fractional reserve banking)

The fundamental promise of banking is that everyone can withdraw their money whenever they want, as long as they don't all do it at the same time.

This is what George Bailey taught us.

"You're entirely mistaken, as if I locked your money in a safe." He told the customers who came to run on Bailey Brothers Building & Loan. "Your money isn't here. Your money is in Joe's house, right next door to yours. It's in the Kennedys' house, Mrs. Macklin's house, and hundreds of other homes."

"You gave them that money to build houses, and they'll do everything in their power to pay you back," he explained.

The anxious customers did not immediately calm down. George had to pull out his own $2,000 to withstand the run. Even so, the bank was not truly saved until the end of the film: friends and customers donated enough money to cover the $8,000 hole in the bank's balance sheet.

Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard would say to just let Bailey Bros. fail. "The fractional reserve system is a sham, a Ponzi scheme, fraud," he once wrote.

He argued that banks get away with this deception because bankers like George Bailey obscure how they are able to issue so many loans.

"Because people have become accustomed to thinking of banks merely as intermediaries borrowing our money to lend out," Rothbard explained in a speech, "it is difficult to shift one's mindset and realize that banks are actually engaged in legalized counterfeiting."

In other words, if people truly understood how fractional reserve banks work—how banks create money "out of thin air"—everyone would rush to withdraw their funds simultaneously. Even the best banks would collapse.

This pessimistic view of banks seems to have academic backing. Economists Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig wrote a seminal paper on the fragility of fractional reserve banks: "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity."

This formalizes Rothbard's intuition: banks that fund long-term loans with demand deposits face the risk of being brought down by a run, even if their assets are healthy.

Thus, fears of bank failure can become self-fulfilling: "During a bank run, depositors compete to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail," the authors explain. "In fact, sudden withdrawals force banks to sell off many assets at a loss, ultimately leading to their failure."

"This has nothing necessarily to do with the bank's fundamentals," they add. Instead, "anything that leads [depositors] to expect a run will cause a run."

"Even 'healthy' banks may fail."

Diamond and Dybvig reach this worrying conclusion primarily by relying on theoretical models based on mathematics and game theory.

A new study shows that this model does not reflect reality.

Every bank run event, scraped from newspaper reports by a large language model, is logged on a website that details why each run started and how it was resolved.

The surprising finding is that most runs fizzle out on their own before they can even threaten the bank. The authors note: "Runs that do not lead to bank failures outnumber those that do."

This contradicts the expectations of the Diamond-Dybvig self-fulfilling model.

Even among banks with "very weak" fundamentals, only 59% failed following a run.

I imagine Rothbard would have expected that number to be 100%.

Meanwhile, banks with the strongest fundamentals "seldom fail," even when subjected to runs.

The authors' conclusion? "This pattern casts doubt on a strong claim: that liquidity problems alone can trigger severe financial distress."

I suppose that's their polite way of saying that Diamond, Dybvig, Rothbard, gold bugs, and bitcoin believers are all wrong about fractional reserve banking.

A Mountain of Cases

Diamond and Dybvig got at least one thing right: "Bank runs in our model are triggered by shifts in expectations," they note, "and expectations can depend on almost anything."

I randomly browsed the bank run database and found some perfect examples.

In 1910, the Merchants National Bank in Los Angeles experienced a run after boxer Jim Jeffries visited the branch, drawing a crowd of boxing fans. A newspaper reported: "Dozens of depositors thought something was wrong and began cashing in their deposits. The terrified customers only calmed down after the fighter left."

Jeffries had simply come to open an account and deposit a portion of his championship purse.

In 1924, the Metals Bank & Trust Company in Butte, Montana, faced a run over a joking bet: someone claimed the bank wouldn't open the next day. Newspaper reports noted that the bank stayed open for an extra four hours past its normal closing time to meet withdrawal requests, "continuing to pay depositors until it became too dark to be safe."

The joke referred to the fact that the bank would indeed be closed the next day because it was Lincoln's Birthday.

In 1929, the Bay Ridge Savings Bank in Brooklyn, New York, faced a run fueled by rumors that the president had died. Fortunately, newspapers reported that the bank "learned of this false report in advance," giving it time to prepare $14 million in cash to handle withdrawals.

The truth was that the president had traveled to Connecticut to have a carbuncle removed from his neck. (He survived the surgery.)

Again, this is just a random sampling from the database.

But the peaceful resolution of these runs seems to refute the strongest interpretation of the Diamond-Dybvig theory: it turns out bank runs rarely become self-fulfilling.

Still, sometimes they do happen.

In 1930, the Independence State Bank in Chicago faced a run sparked by a fight outside two doors down. Newspapers reported: "A police patrol car stopped in front of the bank building after responding to a call from a restaurant, sparking rumors that the bank was being run on." Somehow, over $1.6 million was withdrawn from the bank's $5.6 million in deposits, likely exhausting its liquid assets, as state officials felt compelled to close the institution.

The Bank Runs website does not specify whether Independence Bank had fundamentally sound assets. But the authors' research suggests that if it did, the bank would almost certainly have survived.

In many cases, surviving a run required little more than publicly displaying cash.

For example, a run in 1907 was quelled by "displaying large amounts of bills and cash on the counters for depositors to see."

In 1857, an Alabama bank halted a "profitless run" after depositors saw the teller's desk piled high with "a Malakof of gold and a Redan of silver." (Malakoff and Redan are famous Russian fortresses.)

In 1924, a bank manager in Brooklyn stopped a run by stacking banknotes worth up to $1,000 in the front window, "thrown into a heap for all to see."

Did bank clients understand that no matter how high the pile of cash was, it would never be enough to pay everyone if they all tried to withdraw at the same time?

I suspect they did.

(Byron Gilliam)