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After the lending market disappears, what remains for these public chains?

After the lending market disappears, what remains for these public chains?

2026.08.06
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Aave withdraws from six chains, credit infrastructure collapse triggers chain reaction.

Written by: Vaidik Mandloi

Translated by: Chopper, Foresight News

Last week, Aave announced it would close lending markets on six blockchains. Each of these six chains generated less than $5,000 in revenue per quarter. Based on Aave's normal revenue share of 13 cents per $1 of interest, the revenue it earned on Mentis and Aptos was probably only enough for a dinner. In contrast, Aave's deployment on Ethereum generated $142 million in revenue last year; meanwhile, it is expanding to new chains like Linea, with V4 version deposits exceeding $300 million.

This article will delve into what these public chains will encounter after Aave's withdrawal, and whether any project will take over for Aave. If no one takes over, these public chains may permanently lose credit functionality.

The Chain Reaction of Collapse

What exactly happens when a leading lending protocol withdraws from a public chain? Let's review past cases first.

The first case is Harmony Protocol. In June 2022, its core cross-chain bridge Horizon was attacked, losing about $100 million. As the largest lending protocol on the chain, Aave froze all reserve assets on the chain. Later that year, the community proposed a bailout proposal, but it was vetoed by 99% of Aave token holders. Today, this public chain has perished, the root cause being the complete loss of lending liquidity.

You might wonder: why not just fork Aave and redeploy it on Harmony? After all, the code is open source, and deploying a lending protocol takes less than a day. That's true, but what is easily overlooked is: the lending market also requires continuous operations and maintenance, oracles supported by funders to quote prices for collateral assets; it also requires sufficient DEX liquidity to ensure that when borrowers are liquidated, collateral can be sold automatically without causing price slippage of over 40%.

At the same time, stablecoin issuers need to recognize this public chain and support on-chain native redemption. That is, issuers like Circle and Tether can natively issue tokens on the chain, allowing users to directly exchange USDC for fiat currency without cross-chain bridging. After Harmony's cross-chain bridge paralyzed, all stablecoins on the chain depegged, oracle price feeds failed, and the liquidation mechanism became completely inoperable. The entire set of components supporting the lending market failed collectively. After this, no party had the commercial incentive to rebuild this system. On a public chain that no longer has lending demand, who is willing to spend money to maintain oracle price feeds?

Another typical case is Fantom, which also suffered a cross-chain bridge hacker attack in 2023. Before this, 78% of the chain's market cap relied on this cross-chain bridge. After the attack, the price of bridged USDC on Fantom plummeted to about $0.22, a large amount of collateral value shrunk, falling into insolvency.

The most thought-provoking point is: Fantom was once the third largest DeFi public chain in the crypto industry, with real users and lending demand. Even with these foundations, it still failed to rebuild the credit market. For a public chain that is losing users, the cost of rebuilding the entire underlying infrastructure of oracles and stablecoins will always be higher than the revenue that can be obtained; the core user base has long departed.

Later, Fantom attempted to restart under a new name, renamed Sonic, attempting to turn the situation around solely relying on capital. The project launched a $190 million token airdrop; on the first day of launch, Aave, Silo, and Euler were all deployed, with Wintermute providing market-making support. But the result was contrary to wishes; the project suffered a Sybil attack. Depositors and borrowers were mostly the same batch of users: depositing assets to farm airdrop points, then using the same assets to collateralize and borrow, maximizing point rewards. TVL was inflated; the same funds were counted repeatedly through leveraged loops.

Lending demand came entirely from airdrop incentives, rather than the objective demand for working capital and leverage from real on-chain economic activity. For example, Ethereum users borrow to perhaps loop stake stETH, or to obtain funds for trading strategies; regardless of whether the protocol distributes rewards, the demand truly exists. But on Sonic, once incentives are removed, there is no real lending demand. This directly led to, after Wintermute's cooperation expired, on-chain TVL plummeting 98%, token price falling to less than 1 cent, and both founders resigning from the board. Subsidies and market-making cooperation can create the appearance of a false credit market, but cannot sustain its long-term operation.

Data Source: DeFiLlama

Looking at the public chains such as Soneium, Aptos, Zksync, and Scroll that Aave is about to withdraw from this time, the situation is even worse than Harmony and Fantom. On-chain deposits have already plummeted 95%, and lending business quarterly revenue is less than $5,000.

Harmony and Fantom at least had native lending demand generated by real users before being hacked. But these six public chains never formed native business demand from start to finish. These public chains averaged $250 million in financing per chain, and also deployed the most cost-efficient lending protocols in DeFi, but still failed to spawn real demand.

Data Source: Aave Governance Page

Aave's withdrawal will also trigger a chain reaction. Many people do not realize that Aave is the core pillar of these public chains' financial infrastructure. Almost all Chainlink oracle price feeds on these chains are borne by Aave for maintenance costs, after all, Aave is the largest caller. After Aave withdraws, all oracle service providers will re-evaluate whether to maintain price feeds for a public chain without an active lending market. Market makers will also, for the same reason, stop investing funds in DEXs on these public chains. Even stablecoin issuers will not provide native issuance support for public chains with monthly revenue less than a thousand dollars. One service provider exiting will accelerate the next service provider's departure; the commercial viability of all service providers is built on the premise that other supporting services are functioning normally.

Resources will accelerate towards public chains that are running well, have sufficient liquidity, and where lending markets can work normally. The exit of infrastructure from every niche public chain will further strengthen the aggregation effect of head public chains, subsequently making the business logic for remaining niche public chains to maintain their own lending infrastructure even weaker.

This centralization will self-reinforce; lending is the underlying layer of a public chain's entire financial system. Without lending, most yield strategies cannot operate; most strategies require collateralizing one type of asset to borrow another; efficient liquidity market making is out of the question, as concentrated liquidity positions often rely on borrowed funds. Once lending disappears, all financial applications built on top of it will lose their foundation. Subsequently, developers will leave one after another, on-chain activity will further decline, and there will be even less willingness for infrastructure service providers to stay.

Because of this, Aave has set a threshold for future new chain deployments: annual revenue must reach at least $2 million. This funding is basically the cost for a single public chain to maintain oracle price feeds, risk monitoring, liquidation, and the entire set of lending infrastructure. This matter also fully illustrates that the past model of public chains raising hundreds of millions and relying on subsidized liquidity to launch quickly no longer works and is no longer sustainable.

A Dilemma Not Unique to the Crypto Industry

Public chains losing credit infrastructure is not a phenomenon unique to the crypto field. Any industry with high fixed costs but a small market volume will encounter similar problems.

After 2008, major global banks began cutting off correspondent banking business with some small countries. The logic is highly similar to Aave: anti-money laundering monitoring, regulatory reporting, each established cooperative relationship requires incurring fixed costs, and revenue from some small-scale cross-border business cannot cover costs. Between 2011-2022, global effective correspondent banking relationships decreased by 30%. US dollar clearing channels for Pacific island countries shrunk by over 60%, with some countries left with only one correspondent bank. The situation became so severe that the World Bank had to put up $69 million in subsidies to keep the remaining clearing service providers for 8 Pacific countries operating.

However, there is a key difference between the crypto industry and traditional cases. In the traditional correspondent banking system, there is still the World Bank stepping in to provide a safety net, with central banks and development institutions providing subsidies to maintain business. But the crypto industry almost lacks this safety net mechanism, which is exactly the reality these public chains are experiencing. A medium-sized bank's compliance costs alone cost $15-40 million annually; the World Bank invested $68 million, just to save the last US dollar clearing channel for 8 countries. Yet Aave's total risk monitoring contract costs for all public chains are only $5-8 million, and these six public chains cannot even afford their share of this cost.

Of course, this does not mean DeFi lending as a whole is shrinking; quite the opposite: the industry is growing rapidly while highly concentrated. Morpho's TVL grew from $105 million to over $8 billion within a year; Euler expanded from $6 million to $300 million in just a few months. Aave's V4 launched and deposits exceeded $300 million in just a few months, and Societe Generale also became the first traditional bank to access a DeFi lending protocol. The credit market is vibrant, but resources are concentrated on Ethereum, and two or three Layer 2 networks like Base and Arbitrum, rather than dispersed across dozens of public chains.

In the past, a large number of public chains were born behind the assumption: deploying infrastructure costs are extremely low, and every public chain can build its own financial system. This assumption was only half right; launching a public chain indeed costs very little, but running a set of credit infrastructure on top of it is extremely costly. Looking at current Layer 2 networks, Ethereum and the top three ranked public chains occupy 90% of TVL. The remaining public chains can only compete for meager shares; this revenue cannot even cover the cost of one set of Chainlink price feeds. These public chains may perhaps see a forked version of Aave with defective oracles in the future, or possibly nothing will be left at all.