TechFlow Logo
Login/ Sign up
ETH Gas
Gwei
Fear
gas
a16z: From Companies to DAOs, DUNA May Become the Next-Generation Organizational Form

a16z: From Companies to DAOs, DUNA May Become the Next-Generation Organizational Form

2026.07.31
Share
What DAOs lack has never been technology, but rather a legal shell that can be understood by courts, regulators, and counterparties.

Author: a16z crypto

Compiled by: TechFlow

TechFlow Editor's Note: From Marco Polo's family trade to the Dutch East India Company, the essence of every commercial revolution is "how to enable strangers to cooperate". This article by a16z sorts out the 500-year evolution history of organizational forms and points out the legal dilemma faced by DAOs—it is not a technical problem, but an institutional vacuum. For practitioners thinking about how Web3 projects can operate within a compliance framework, this is a background article worth reading carefully.

For centuries, the core challenge of business has remained the same: how to enable people with different roles, asymmetric information, and divergent interests to collaborate for a common goal? The answer is almost always some form of organizational innovation—a new structure that distributes risk, reward, and responsibility in ways previous generations could not achieve. The history of business is also the history of collaboration.

The corporate system is the most recent great organizational leap, born for the industrial age, specifically designed to solve (and leverage) the collaboration problems of that era. But software and internet-native protocols are cutting down on the once-inevitable overhead of traditional enterprises—multi-layered centralized management, bureaucratic bloat, and intermediation.

Existing legal structures were not designed for this new world. The only one currently emerging as a strong contender for the next organizational leap is DUNA—a relatively new entity, and the only legal entity explicitly recognized in the once-in-a-generation market structure legislation currently advancing in the U.S. Congress. It can be said to be the only structure truly built for internet-native organizations.

To understand why new organizational forms are emerging today, it is necessary to first recall what problems the corporate system actually solved—and where we are heading.

How Merchants Managed Risk

Before the emergence of corporations, business was a private affair: imagine Marco Polo engaging in long-distance trade with his father and uncle. In such family businesses, they truly gambled their lives. Once something went wrong with the contract, personal property could be completely wiped out—even their lives endangered.

Merchants' adventures relied mainly on two forms of protection, but neither was guaranteed. The first was geopolitical: the relative peace brought by the "Pax Mongolica" of the Mongol Empire. If you offended someone the Mongols liked, you were in trouble. The second was social: if you deceived someone, breached a contract, or violated the "Lex Mercatoria" (a self-enforcing code of honor among merchants, circa 1100—1600 AD), your reputation would be ruined, and you would be blacklisted from the trade circles from Quanzhou to Timbuktu.

In the absence of strong institutions, a merchant's word was truly worth more than gold. The Polo family was relatively lucky because they relied on blood ties. Many other business partnerships were not so smooth.

In the absence of strong institutions, a merchant's word was truly worth more than gold.

A major problem business has long faced is the tension between principals and agents; here, it is the relationship between investors and merchants. The medieval "commenda" was an innovation that provided limited liability protection: investors only bore losses within the amount of their capital contribution, and theoretically, so did the merchants. Partners distributed profits according to the initial capital contribution ratio. The commenda formed spontaneously, predating any formal regulations. However, every business could still be capsized by just a little storm. This model also could not scale: a commenda dissolved upon the end of a voyage, bankruptcy, or death.

A further innovation was the Florentine "compagnia"—think of the Medici Bank. This form was a more durable and operationally complex legal entity than the commenda. Companies could maintain long-term business relationships with multiple parties, but still relied on the personal liability of all partners. This was the most advanced pre-corporate tool in medieval history—the peak of medieval partnership—yet it still left partners exposed to risk. Churches and universities had long enjoyed legal personality derived from the Roman concept of "universitas" (treating a collective as a single legal person), but commercial enterprises always lacked a fully independent legal identity.

These defects were not resolved until the 17th century, when early modern Europe invented something new. This innovation and its legal protection made it easier for enterprises to raise capital, distribute ownership through stock issuance, and protect owners from liability—this was the corporation. These corporate powers were most famously granted to the Dutch East India Company (VOC: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie). Like a revelation, once people realized what a good idea the corporation was, it quickly spread to other parts of Europe. (Although the British East India Company was established a few years earlier than the VOC, its system was far less mature than the VOC's, raising funds only for specific voyages and lacking a public offering mechanism.)

By reducing business risk and coordination costs, the corporate system made large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises possible—creating much of the modern world.

The Cost of Scale

While solving a series of real problems, the corporation also brought new ones. Its first achievement was making participants care about each other's outcomes: by binding shareholders, directors, and captains to the same legal entity and the same profit line, the corporation forced parties to internalize costs that could otherwise be recklessly shifted to others. But common interest does not equal perfectly aligned incentives.

Take the VOC as an example, its legal form was familiar yet complex: shareholders included many Dutch citizens eager for investment returns, but they were too busy with their own lives to attend to the VOC's daily operations or macro strategy. The board of directors, the "Heeren XVII," was responsible for planning how to make money for everyone. Captains and merchants on the front lines in Southeast Asia needed to make the best decisions for the company at the moment with limited information and resources.

Theoretically, this was the case. In reality, the interests of these three parties were not fully aligned; one party could sacrifice the interests of others to gain more for themselves.

Common interest does not equal perfectly aligned incentives.

How to ensure that captains, far from the supervision and control of the Heeren XVII, would not plunder other ships or abscond with funds? Prevent merchants from taking bribes, or making bigger deals privately for themselves? Ensure the board made correct decisions? What if you were a group of shareholders who simultaneously believed in Protestant values and were dissatisfied with the VOC's sometimes predatory behavior? These questions spawned various innovations in incentive design—options, dividends, audits, supervision, and even so-called efficiency wages—as well as new legal protection mechanisms enforced by the state to ensure fair competition. Of course, this also spawned countless abuses of power.

However! The corporate system, evolved over time, remains the best tool we have for coordinating incentives, reducing collaboration costs, creating profits, and protecting all participants.

Shortly after the founding of the United States, the corporate form was recognized through special legislative authorization, but initially it was extremely rare. The First Bank of the United States, chartered by Congress in 1791, was the earliest and most famous case. New York introduced the first general corporation law in 1811. By the mid-19th century, more states allowed incorporation without special acts, and the concept of "limited liability" gradually became standardized across states. Subsequently, in the industrialization wave of the late 19th century, the number of corporations exploded, culminating in the landmark Delaware General Corporation Law of 1899.

Cooperatives were another option that emerged in the 19th century. They explored another coordination scheme: member ownership and democratic governance. Farmers, consumers, workers, and credit unions utilized cooperatives to bind participant interests more directly to the organization itself. Cooperatives achieved success in some fields, such as agriculture (e.g., Land O'Lakes), but overall remained relatively specialized. Meanwhile, the corporate form became increasingly popular.

Another option is the Limited Liability Company, or LLC. Although the LLC had earlier predecessors such as the German GmbH or the UK Limited Company (Ltd.), the LLC itself appeared quite late: Wyoming did not write it into law until 1977. Before this, corporations provided limited liability but had rigid structures and faced double taxation, while partnerships were flexible but left participants bearing personal risk. The LLC took the best of both worlds—limited liability plus pass-through tax treatment—making it more suitable for various small businesses. Today, it has become the default form for numerous startups, small businesses, and investment vehicles.

Since then, a series of minor variants have emerged: Limited Liability Partnership (LLP, 1991), Low-profit Limited Liability Company (L3C, 2008), Benefit Corporation (2010), and so on. These are undoubtedly useful, refinements of the corporate form for specific purposes. But every once in a while, technology changes the boundaries of possibility, thereby spawning new forms that are revolutionary in comparison.

DAOs and Their Dilemmas

Decentralization is such a revolutionary concept: large groups can coordinate without centralized management or trusted intermediaries.

Before the emergence of the crypto field—especially before Satoshi Nakamoto invented blockchain—this possibility remained more at the philosophical level than the practical level. One of the earliest great innovations in the crypto field was the DAO, or Decentralized Autonomous Organization. A DAO is an organization governed by software-encoded rules and managed collectively by participants rather than dominated by a central authority. There is no centralized management team or board of directors, no Heeren XVII.

But decentralized governance is hard. Getting token holders to vote on important issues has proven more difficult than getting individual shareholders to vote for board members—and the latter's turnout is already abysmally low, on par with U.S. municipal elections. Ensuring power does not concentrate in the hands of a few token holders is equally challenging.

The legal environment in recent years has further exacerbated these challenges. Regrettably, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the previous administration refused to provide clear rules for crypto projects, while weaponizing this ambiguity through aggressive enforcement actions against the industry. Entrepreneurship is difficult to grow in uncertainty; even with clear rules, running a business is hard enough.

Entrepreneurship is difficult to grow in uncertainty; even with clear rules, running a business is hard enough.

The core of the legitimacy issue is one of the three criteria of the so-called "Howey Test"—used by the SEC to determine whether an instrument constitutes a security: (1) investment of money; (2) common enterprise; (3) profits solely from the efforts of others. For public companies, "efforts of others" includes the management team operating the company. For crypto projects and their DAOs, the SEC believes that the continued development of the protocol—even if done by a group of unrelated persons who may or may not hold tokens—also subjects the relevant tokens to securities laws, thereby making broad participation and on-chain trading impossible.

Equally important, since DAOs are not formally recognized by the state, project owners cannot obtain any of the aforementioned protections, such as limited liability. In other words, DAO members may face unlimited personal liability, which from a legal perspective, brings crypto governance almost back to medieval levels.

Thus, crypto projects act according to lawyers' advice. They establish foundations overseas as independent entities to supervise the continued development of the protocol, thereby severing the connection between that work and U.S. operations. Or they directly establish operating entities outside the United States. Both of these "solutions" harm U.S. innovation capability, as well as U.S. employment and tax revenue.

Overseas crypto foundations, to put it nicely, are workarounds. These lawyer-crafted workaround solutions transfer power and continued development work to an "independent" entity, hoping to evade securities regulation thereby. This strategy is understandable in an era of hostile regulation, but it also exposes deep flaws: foundations have weak incentive coordination mechanisms, limited ability to drive growth, and inevitably tend to consolidate centralized control.

But when projects are caught between "being sued by the SEC" and "building a strange organizational structure that creates incentive misalignment problems," what choice do they have?

This is why DUNA—Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association—is so important. It draws on the long history of business structures and governance design, pursuing the common goal of all enterprises: efficiently coordinating people around a common purpose. But its implementation does not rely on centralized management control, thereby reducing the principal-agent problems and information asymmetry common in traditional corporations. Precisely because of this, DUNA deviates from a core assumption of the Howey Test: that participants rely on the managerial efforts of others to create value.³

Groups Get Their Own Legal Form

Before the emergence of DUNA, there were only three options for organizing and governing around crypto projects: DAOs lacked legal recognition, leaving members facing potentially devastating liability risks; traditional corporate entities forced projects into unsuitable hierarchical structures while facing SEC regulatory actions; offshore foundations were extremely cumbersome both legally and practically, pushing a large portion of the industry overseas.

Until recently, there was no clear way for a group of users to enjoy some corporate protections while governing a decentralized network—an organizational form that blockchain technology has only just made possible. Now there is.

Simply put, DUNA turns a group of people into a legal entity. Currently, three states—Alabama, West Virginia, and Wyoming—have authorized this new business structure through law. It combines the legal advantages of existing organizational forms with the ability for decentralized control, distinctly different from traditional corporations, and something no previous entity has truly achieved.

Simply put, DUNA turns a group of people into a legal entity.

What protections does DUNA specifically provide? Its powers include legal personality, limited liability, perpetual existence, and recognition by the state government—these are also core elements that enable modern corporations to function. Recognizing the "legal personality" of a group allows the entity to sign contracts on behalf of participants; limited liability ensures members do not bear personal responsibility for organizational obligations. Together, these characteristics allow large-scale loosely connected groups to collaborate—raise capital, hold assets, hire managers, pay taxes, consummate transactions—without exposing members to excessive risk or devastating liability.

Organizational forms do not take root overnight; they spread slowly as competition between states intensifies, lawyers become familiar, and entrepreneurs begin to trust. Before Delaware became the preferred destination for corporate registration, New Jersey was the dominant player;⁴ today, Texas and Nevada are catching up. The LLC was initially approved in Wyoming, and after tax treatment was clarified, it spread to all fifty states by 1997. As for DUNA, Wyoming again acted as the pioneer, legislating it in March 2024. Crypto protocols and communities including Uniswap Governance and Nouns DAO have already adopted it first.

Just as the corporate system gave large-scale enterprises their first native form, DUNA is giving open, internet-scale decentralized networks their own legal form.

A New Era of Organizational Design

Think of DUNA as a legal shell that allows the governance mechanisms of decentralized networks to conduct business without introducing traditional centralized management. It is built on the basis of the Unincorporated Nonprofit Association (UNA)—a legal framework adopted by 17 states and Washington D.C., helping groups like homeowners associations, civic associations, recreational sports leagues, religious congregations, and hobby clubs organize legally. UNA provides lightweight governance, without the heavy architecture of corporations or LLCs, allowing these groups to hold property, sign contracts, and file lawsuits (or be sued) in the entity's name.⁵

Just as the corporate system did not replace all partnerships, DUNA will not replace everything that came before.

DUNA is similar in this regard: it allows a group of token holders or contributors to govern through on-chain rules or token-based voting, without relying on a board of directors or management team. Members enjoy limited liability protection, separating entity obligations from personal assets; the organization can also be understood and interacted with by courts, regulators, and counterparties.

But DUNA cannot solve all problems. It cannot eliminate governance challenges, guarantee decentralization (although to qualify for DUNA status, a DAO must have at least 100 active members), nor magically bypass securities laws. What it truly achieves is filling a specific gap: making decentralized organizations legally recognized organizations.

From informal merchant networks, to partnerships, to corporations, to LLCs, and now to DAOs, every new organizational technology emerges when people need new coordination models. DUNA may mark the beginning of a new era in the evolution of organizational design. But just as the corporate system did not replace all partnerships, DUNA will not replace everything that came before. It simply expands the menu of options. And for the first time, it allows decentralized networks to be represented by a fully identifiable legal entity.

For most of human history, scaled organizations—even small-scale ones—meant assuming huge personal risks. Bold entrepreneurs like the Polo family relied on family, reputation, and fragile conventions to sustain everything, and could be ruined by a shipwreck at any time.⁶ The corporate system changed this equation, separating the fate of the venture from the fate of the people behind it. DUNA extends this separation to a new field: community governance of blockchain-based decentralized networks.

Now, even a group of strangers loosely organized on the internet can act as a single entity—sign agreements, hold assets, assume risks—without any participant betting their livelihood. In this sense, this is a new answer to one of the oldest questions in business history.

Acknowledgments: Thanks to Aiden Slavin, Alejandro Flores, Miles Jennings, Scott Duke Kominers, Sonal Chokshi, and Steph Zinn for valuable opinions and revision suggestions. Any errors in the text are solely the responsibility of the author.

Cooperatives seem spiritually quite compatible with internet-native organizations like DAOs, but cooperatives presuppose a relatively stable, identifiable member group and hierarchical leadership structure, which many decentralized networks precisely lack.

Interestingly, another major U.S. contribution—corporate bankruptcy law—was not widely promoted globally for a considerable period. This law codifies the concept that "a person can take risks, fail, restructure, and try again," and is an engine of U.S. vitality.

Wyoming attempted to solve this problem in 2021, allowing DAOs to organize as LLCs. But the LLC still assumes a clear member list, K-1 tax forms, and a profit purpose. Although it suits some small investment clubs, it is very awkward for a network driven by a nonprofit mission, permissionless, and with anonymous members, and offers little help in solving the Howey problem—whether member interests themselves constitute securities.

That is to say, it was not until then-New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson cracked down on the state's business-friendly registration laws that he inadvertently did Delaware a huge favor.

Trusts seem on the surface to be a natural vehicle for decentralized groups, but in reality, they are not suitable. Trusts are designed around the relationship between identifiable trustees and beneficiaries, which is an awkward choice for organizations deliberately pursuing dispersed governance.

Incidentally, Marco Polo once commanded a Venetian warship in a war between opposing trade powers, was later captured and imprisoned in Genoa, and it was in prison that he dictated that famous travelogue.